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'Aishaibat

000 STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITY IN A BEDOUIN TRIBE: THE 'AISHAIBAT OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

by

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Submitted to the
faculty of the Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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Department of Anthropology, Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana

[Title Page]

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[Introductory, p. i]

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PREFACE

101
121
This study is based on data collected during the period of June of 1964 to May of 1965. The focus of the research was a permanent Bedouin community, the 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr near the town of Marsa Matruh in the Western Desert of Egypt. Al-Qasr was selected for study because of its sedentary and relatively nucleated settlement pattern which rendered it accessible and manageable in the time allotted for research; also, because this community had been designated by the government as one undergoing rapid social change. The Marsa Matruh area, as a focus for anthropological research, was first suggested to me by Professor Ahmad Abou-Zeid, an Egyptian anthropologist who has written on the problems of social change in the Western Desert.

My original research plan was designed as an ethnographic survey of Bedouin society in the al-Qasr area, and a concentration on the specific problems related to the government's policy of integrating the Bedouins, socially and politically, into the national society. I was interested in the various ways in which the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area conceptualized the aims of the government, and in the structural reorganization, if any, of Bedouin politics and political thought under the impetus of social change programs.

121 However, the political climate of Egypt at the time of my research made such a study impracticable. In reorienting my research, I decided to confine my study to al-Qasr and an analysis of "micropolitics" at the local community level.

The aim of the present study is, then, an understanding of the political structure of al-Qasr. Also, since no group exists in isolation and relations with others are mainly a matter of politics, I have tried to present here the structural and ideological bases of politics in al-Qasr. This study is concerned with politics in the traditional sense and in the modern sense. An analysis of the traditional meaning of politics necessitates a discussion and understanding of the structural principles of Bedouin society and the manner in which they function in defining the rights and obligations contained in social relationships. Such an analysis also seeks to establish a base level from which we can perceive and understand the political process in al-Qasr and the modern context of Bedouin politics. The main focus of the political analysis in this study is upon authority and leadership roles, as they were in the past and as they are in the present.

121 I should hasten to make one thing clear at this time,
114 for it directly affected the way I went about my research and
*613 the type of data which I collected. In al-Qasr, there exists communication boundaries, and even barriers, corresponding to the structural and territorial lines of the lineage system.
[178] The 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr, once a nomadic tribe, is now

121 sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments
114 is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-
*613 [178] emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr
[186] and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By
[571] "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive,
face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity
and common goals to which these give rise. The relationship
121 *613 between lineage structure and territoriality was such that
571 kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days,
and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree
of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe
was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern
made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal
society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded
the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural
relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social
interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this
emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure
differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close
participation of members in the social relations of the larger
society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that,
in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the
sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison
[123] with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Conse-
quently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

121 123 recorded that which people said in formal and informal interviews, and hoped that events would materialize to corroborate, in one way or another, that which I heard or suspected.

123 Since al-Qasr lacked the "space-time component of communal living together" (Firth 1961:27), I was not able to select a central vantage point from which I could view the everyday life of the Bedouins. More importantly, since the Bedouins interpret social structure in terms of a close relationship between residence and group membership, by the very fact that I chose to live in al-Qasr, and so had to live in the territory of some one lineage, I threatened my own objectivity and that of the Bedouins toward me.

123 *613 In consideration of the time element, I made the decision to live with the most prestigious lineage in al-Qasr. I felt that this association would give me more freedom of movement in the field, and would provide me with access to more data in a shorter time. What I did not know at the time of my entry into the field was that the Bedouins prize neutrality and objectivity just as much as the anthropologist. [829] As the Bedouins often said: "A man should only speak about the things he knows."

121 This is a study of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. They are not nomads nor are they even primarily pastoralists. Various degrees of nomadism and pastoralism exist in the Western Desert of Egypt among the different units of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. Therefore, while the Bedouins of al-Qasr may represent a case

121 for comparative study, they do not represent the ethnological entity known as the Awlad 'Ali. However, one might heuristically think of al-Qasr as a post-tribal or pre-peasant stage of social change, and on this basis generate some hypotheses about the sedentarization process or other specific cultural processes.

126
104 The translation of the Arabic documents presented here were made in the field. In most of the cases, translating took place on the spot and this may account for some of the awkward phraseology. Arabic terms and names have been transliterated according to the system used by Cowan in An Introduction to Modern Literary Arabic (1958) with certain exceptions: long vowels are shown by a double vowel; the guttural stop is indicated by an apostrophe; and the glottal stop is indicated by the use of a short "e," such as in 'aiela ("family").

000 I owe a great deal of gratitude to my former teachers who have given freely of their time and knowledge and have shown an interest in my training in anthropology and Middle
122 Eastern studies. I would like to thank in particular Dr. William Sanders, of Pennsylvania State University, who introduced me to anthropology; Dr. David Bidney, of Indiana University, and Dr. P. J. Vatikiotis, now of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, who were my advisers in anthropology and Middle Eastern studies during my graduate training; Dr. Irfan Shahid, now of Georgetown University, who instructed me in the Arabic language; Dr. Vincent Cantarino, of Indiana University, who instructed me in Arabic literature

122 and took the time to serve on my dissertation committee; Dr. Alan Merriam, of Indiana University, who taught me anthropology, served on my dissertation committee, and showed a sincere interest in my future; Dr. Harold Driver and Dr. John Messenger, both of Indiana University, who taught me anthropology.

128 I would also like to thank Dr. Richard Antoun, of Indiana University, who took the time and interest to serve on my dissertation committee and who offered valuable suggestions which have vastly improved the study offered here.

000 I owe a great and special debt of gratitude to Dr. John Kennedy, of the Neuro-Psychiatric Institute of U.C.L.A., who served as my adviser during a two-year stay in Egypt. He, more than any other, has influenced by own approach to anthropology. I am glad to have this opportunity to thank him for being a good friend and a brilliant teacher.

I must thank Dr. David Bidney a second time for serving as chairman of my dissertation committee and for being a good friend and guide throughout my graduate training period.

Finally, to my wife Judith Criste Obermeyer, I owe the greatest debt which words cannot express. Without her constant support and encouragement this study would never have been 128 written. I am grateful for her aid in preparing this manuscript, but this is only an insignificant part of her contribution to the total effort.

122 During the course of my graduate training, my fieldwork

122 and the writing-up stage, I have received financial support and assistance from a number of sources which I would like to recognize and thank at this time. The United States Office of Education supported me over a two-year period at Indiana University through a National Defense Title VI Fellowship for the study of Arabic. The Carnegie Seminar in Political and Administrative Development of Indiana University, under the direction of Professor Fred Riggs and Professor William Siffin, provided me with a summer's employment and a small research grant prior to my leaving for the field. The American University in Cairo supported me over a two-year period, the first year with a research fellowship at the Center for Arabic Studies, and the second year with a research grant to carry out the field study which is presented here. I would like to thank, in particular, Dr. Laila Shukry el-Hamamsy, the Director of the Social Research Center of the university, who helped me a great deal and took an interest in my work.

Finally, the University of Chicago awarded me a Carnegie Fellowship for the Comparative Study of New Nations which permitted me the time to prepare the greatest part of
000 this dissertation. I am especially grateful to the members of the Committee for the Comparative Study of New Nations who make it their practice to give the graduate student a unique experience in intellectual fellowship. During my stay at Chicago, I gained intellectual insight and stimulation in particular from the ideas and work of Professor Leonard Binder, Professor

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION: HISTORY AND CHANGE

[P. 1]

CHAPTER I

THE BEDOUINS OF AL-QASR: PAST AND PRESENT

General Historical Background

121 No full historical account of events leading up to the present study is intended here. Only a fragment of history, a backdrop to the discussion of al-Qasr Bedouin society is offered. The account is an effort to trace, historically, the arrival of the Bedouin into the Egyptian Western Desert.

175 During the Arab conquest of Egypt in 639 A.D., tribesmen
167 made only a few forays into Upper Egypt. But these sojourns represent the first intrusion of the Bedouin strain into this part of the world and were the vanguard of a force which would conquer all of North Africa. The Bedouin tribesmen of the Arab army found the pastures of Upper Egypt similar to their traditional habitat in Arabia, and certain trible segments settled in the area.

175 In 647 A.D., Muslim troops under the command of Ibn abu-Sarh pushed across the Western Desert as far as Tripoli in present-day Libya. This was an expeditionary force, and not until about 670 did permanent Arab occupation come to Libya. Historical sources are vague about the nature of the relationship between the Arabs and the Berbers of the newly

175 conquered lands. Generally, the Berbers fought assimilation and change when and where they could, just as they had in their confrontations with the Greeks and Romans. But as the Arabs took more and more of the "sown" lands of North Africa, Berber resistance decreased. Only in mountainous areas, such as the Kabyle region (from the Arabic qabaa'il, i.e., "tribes"), were the Berbers successful against the Arabization process.

Around the time of 908 A.D., the Ismaili Shi'a sect, based in the Yemen, established a western mission in Tunisia. This outpost grew into the Fatimid Dynasty, and in 969 the Fatimids were able to capture Egypt from the central Islamic empire. By the 11th century they had reached their zenith as a religious and political power. At this time, their rule was threatened internally by two Bedouin tribes, the Bedouin element in Egypt, the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim.

175 In his Histoire des Berberes (trans. 1925), Ibn Khaldun
167 states that the original homeland of these two tribes was the
Najd area of Arabia. They were dangerous predators who spent
their summers raiding along the frontiers of Syria and Iraq:
the Banu Sulaim even attacked pilgrims traveling to and from
Mecca (1925:28-166). Some segments of these tribes found their
way into the delta region of Egypt where they became trouble-
some to the Fatimid Caliph, and were promptly exiled into Upper
175 Egypt. Apparently, they were responsible for discord among
the other tribes there, for in an attempt to solve two problems

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

175
648 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went, especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu
175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in
571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority
182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority,
*[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

175
114
619 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture

175 114 619 between the Bedouin and the Berbers (1954:46-47). G. W. Murray informs us that the Bedouins of the Egyptian Western Desert themselves believe this to be the case (1935:33, 247). I agree that the Cyrenaican Bedouin are the descendants of the Banu Sulaim; nevertheless, and despite what Murray says, my informants (when they knew) claimed to be descendants of the Banu Hilal. They refer to their ancestress, Sa'ada, as al-Hilaliyya, "she of the Banu Hilal."

175 167 Data concerning the Awlad 'Ali migratory history are insufficient for a satisfactory reconstruction of the process. As we have noted, there were two invasions of North Africa by the Arabs. The first, about 643 A.D., was a shock wave from the Arab conquest of Egypt in which the Arabs defeated the Luwata Berbers who were living in eastern Libya. The second invasion, in the 11th century, took place at the hands of the Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim and penetrated into the North African countryside. As a result, the Banu Salaim tribe settled in Cyrenaica where they intermingled with the Luwata Berbers. That part of Cyrenaica which they claimed as their
[103] territory they called the Jabal Akhdar (i.e. "Green Mountain"), a plateau region set back from the coast. The Bedouins of al-Qasr refer to the Jabal Akhdar as their original homeland (see Figure 1).

We hear nothing more of the Banu Salaim until the 17th century. At this time, segments of the tribe began drifting

175 167 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to determine the exact conditions associated with this migration, but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

175 619 726 167 [648] Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe, the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya. This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.

619 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
726 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe
167 dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal
tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the
Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una
before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable
from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since
the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

175 According to Murray, on July fourth "thirty Sheikhs of the
648 Hanadi, the Awlad 'Ali, and the Beni'Una made their peace
with the new power" (1935:30).

175 The version of history provided by my informants is
186 no radical departure from these facts. But there are a few
124 differing aspects which represent ethnocentric highlights on
history. For instance, the Bedouins of al-Qasr have a few
(648) stories which exaggerate the fact that the Harabi needed the
cooperation of the Turkish rulers to defeat the Awlad 'Ali
and to force them out of Cyrenaica. Also, the Bedouins point
out, the Jumi'at tribe begged the Awlad 'Ali to come and
rescue them from the oppression of the Hanadi.

175 Shortly after 1800, Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman
619 viceroy, drove the French from Egypt and supported the Hanadi
648 against the Awlad 'Ali. The Egytian ruler felt that political
control over the Awlad 'Ali would insure the security of the
whole desert, and especially Egypt's western frontier with
Libya. Despite the alliance between the Hanadi and Muhammed
'Ali's forces, the outcome was a temporary victory for the
Awlad 'Ali. This event actually set the stage for a transformation of Bedouin tribal society.

175 After the defeat of the Hanadi and the Pasha's troops,
648 the Awlad 'Ali were given preferential treatment by Muhammed
'Ali. He wisely secured the Hanadi tribe in Sharqiyya Province.
Then he granted the Awlad 'Ali, by right of usufruct, the

175 648 [651] territory of the whole Western Desert. They were also exempted from land taxes, military duty, and forced labor on the irrigation projects of the Nile River. In return for these privileges, the Bedouins were expected to guard the frontiers of Egypt and to furnish warriors for the expeditionary forces of Muhammed 'Ali. The Pasha, who was in the process of carving out his own empire independent of the Ottomans, needed warriors, a role which traditionally excluded the fallahin of the Nile Valley. Bedouin horsemen from the Western Desert fought with Muhammad 'Ali in his Wahhabi campaign of 1815 in Arabia. They also aided the Pasha's son, Ismail, in the conquest of the Sudan.

Muhammad 'Ali instituted the practice of granting to the Bedouin leaders land in the rich Nile Valley. He made it explicit that the leaders were to dwell upon this land: their role, as it was officially stated, was to provide a liaison between the Pasha and the tribes. In fact, the leaders were hostages. By controlling them, Muhammad 'Ali was able to exert proper pressure on the Bedouins when and where it was needed (Baer 1957:84-98).

175 648 651 423 Bedouins did not pay land taxes, but neither did they "own" the land; they simply had the right of usufruct. The law stated that only those who paid land taxes had the right to purchase and own their land. But along with ownership of land came the onerous responsibilities of corvée labor on the

175 648 651 423 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin" came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt, one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to forced labor or military service. On this basis, the Director [162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095 - settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880 - living among the fallahin
70,472 - real Bedouin or nomads

601,447

175 177 648 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relationship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few crops they could. These new political and economic conditions are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social condition of the Bedouin.

175 648 The British, in the style of the politics of colonialism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

175 posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the
648 capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders. This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security
[124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale tribal warfare.

175 The political relationship which the Bedouins of the
795 Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya
[619] was historically not so important compared to that of the other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a Sufi tariiqa ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955:
[793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi founded his order, al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented, in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among

175 the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused
795 the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox 'ulama ("clergy")
[798] of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian
[793] peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first zawiya ("lodge"),
[346] al-zawiya al-baida, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as
acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the
[793] tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of al-Sanusi
al-kabir ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit
into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even
spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order
[793] showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the
[346] Sanusi shaikh ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the zawiya
[485] became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where
[794] Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through
175 the zawiya, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic
795 integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the
346 legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The zawiya became a
182 [793] very important part of the traditional desert economic system.
Today one zawiya remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used.
The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by
camel, we could get what we wanted at the zawiya. Now that we
have trucks and trains no one goes to the zawiya."

175 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those
795 of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale
648 conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

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795
648

the brunt of the war. With Bedouin warriors, the Sanusiyya religious order became a political force for the Italians to reckon with.

From 1911 until the start of the world war in 1914, the Sanusi Bedouin army fought the Italians in the desert and harrassed them in the coastal area. In November, 1914, the Turks entered the war on the side of the Germans, and in May, 1915, Italy joined the Allies. As a result of the declaration of alliances and the expansion of the war, the Sanusi army was sent into Egypt against the British. This move brought the Awlad 'Ali into contact with the Sanusi army. Before this, they had had little involvement in the war. This relative inactivity of the Awlad 'Ali can hardly be explained by the notion that they were "an unwarlike peoples," as Evans-Pritchard (1954:127) has characterized them. The Awlad 'Ali were not in the mainstream of Sanusi war activities in Libya. Also, the British exerted a great deal of control over them in contrast to that which the Italians were able to gain over the Cyrenaican Bedouin.

In 1915, the Sanusi army captured the British Libyan outpost at Sallum, and in January of 1916 they were threatening the town of Marsa Matruh. But within a month's time, by the end of February 1916, the British had routed the Sanusi army, and the following month had retaken Sallum.

During the Marsa Matruh campaign, some of the 'Aishai-

175 795 648 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time basis. [124] One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 177 554 631 648 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

175 Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation
177 and political specialization began with the appointment of
554 Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This
631 was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of _'umda_,
648 the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the
Nile. The first Bedouin _'umda_ died in 1909. At this time,
under the British, another political role was instituted.
This new role, that of _shaikh_, was a kind of vice-_'umda_ position. The son of the first _shaikh_ is now about 80 years old
[115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant
for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were few government officials in the desert, and, according to my informant, "there was need for only a few _'umdas_ and _shaikhs_. But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of incumbents in the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ increased as the political needs of the British grew.

175 According to the Bedouins, the British administration
648 did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that
time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

175 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British
648 reached Matruh, they jailed all of the *'umdas* and *shaikhs*
554
631 (two *'umdas* and five *shaikhs*, at that time). Then they chose new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British, they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail, they returned to their positions of political office. While they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the
[178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western
648 Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of 1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940, that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did
175 they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the
648 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya
722 near Alexandria for the duration of the war.
166
[556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
722
556 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
166 'Umran Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the
shaikh of the 'Ali Ahmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time, refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local government and promised him all the help and supplies that he needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained
[162] behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before
the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000 remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the
war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath, the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines left by the advance and retreat of three different armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
648 getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has
727

648 important effects on contemporary al-Qasr. There remain about
727 11 million land mines in the ground between Marsa Matruh and
648 Sallum. Accidents connected with these mines take one thousand
727 Bedouin lives every year, and cause about 10,000 injuries
165 annually. (Reported in al-Ahram, January, 1965). This danger
164 limits the areas in which the Bedouins can use the tractor, and, as a result, a great deal of the coastal land must be plowed by hand. In al-Qasr, physical disfigurements resulting from mine mishaps were quite common, and most families have had members killed in this way. In one al-Qasr lineage, 'Ailit Ma'fas, there have been sixteen men killed by mines since 1943.

Change and Present Attitudes

648 Political and economic changes, begun at the turn of
177 the century, have continued into the present. The Bedouins of al-Qasr have been increasingly drawn into the political and economic life of the Egyptian national community. They have come to depend upon the national market for their products and upon governmental agricultural subsidies for their security. The net result of this process has been a sedentary Bedouin society which is not quite tribal and not quite peasant. Al-Qasr has this in-between quality--what Fallers (1961) has called the tertium quid quality.

[829] It is difficult to gauge the feelings of the Bedouins of al-Qasr about the social changes taking place. They complain

648 about the lack of concern shown toward the Bedouins throughout
177 the history of their relations with the Nile Valley: they
829 complain that the Egyptians have no right to take over the
desert and order their lives for them. They say that "the
Egyptians know nothing about the desert"; that "they do not
know how to live in the desert and should take our advice on
these things." "They (the Egyptians) have given us nothing,
we had all of this before they came. Jamal Abd al-Nasser did
not invent socialism (ishtarikiyya): the Bedouins have
always had it. We have always shared and taken care of one
another." The Egyptians are still "outsiders" to the Bedouins.
They are referred to as "fallahin" or "peasants."

Interestingly enough, the Bedouins include President
Nasser in their own in-group. They insist, in a half-serious
way, that he is of the Awlad 'Ali because he is originally
from Upper Egypt. One can compare the roles of Nasser and
the Grand Sanusi in some ways. Both leaders made special
[778] efforts to bring the Bedouins into a new community, to share
their "good fortune" with them; also, both leaders are considered to be possessors of charisma, or baraka ("blessing")
by the Bedouins. One may hear unkind remarks about "holy
men" or "government officials," but never about Nasser or the
al-Sanusi family. One Bedouin said: "Jamal Abd al-Nasser works
hard and tries to do good for the people, but his officials are
000 very lazy and do not care about us." While the Bedouins

While the Bedouins

795 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their
771
829 religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and
demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said
that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead
[576] you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the
[778] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand.
Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory,
transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

648 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by
641 Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This
has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with
political consciousness and promote participation in the
nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should
be: they want the right to own land and to accept the
responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do
[651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because
the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile."
Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they
insist that they do.

648 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or
177 impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such
423 laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants
can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of
under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural
land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

648 177 423 size in the barley and pasture area of al-Qasr would not permit a subsistence level economy. Just as important is the political implication of any attempt at large-scale land reform in al-Qasr. The pattern of land distribution in al-Qasr reflects an intimate relationship between the structural principles of Bedouin society, especially the lineage system and territoriality. (In a later chapter we will discuss this relationship.) The ramifications of land reform would amount to a structural rearrangement of al-Qasr society and would make redistribution of land difficult to administer, or even to imagine. A reorganization of property relations is, in effect, a basic change in the authority structure. Therefore, the Bedouins want no part of land reform. There is a law which forbids the ownership of "more than 100 feddans (one feddan=one acre) of agricultural land. This shall also apply to barren and desert land."[1] One of my informants, a [115] large landowner, claims that this "law only applies to the Nile Valley where there is plenty of water. If the government wants the Bedouins to abide by that law then they must take care of us. I would gladly trade this land (which was considerably more than 100 feddans) for 100 feddans in the Nile Valley." The traditional tribal structure of Bedouin society

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[1] "Decree for the Amendment of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Southern Region," Department of Information, Cairo, July 25, 1961.

648 177 [423] makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful, but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid." [181] Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn: "They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The [186] Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive [186] would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians," they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

[241] The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

648 tions and innovations in agriculture which the Egyptians bring
177 to the desert. On the other hand, the Bedouins do not get
241 the modern materials which they need to increase the production
of their land. This is most serious when it comes to heavy
farm machinery, such as tractors, and the spare parts to keep
it functioning. Furthermore, seldom did a man in al-Qasr
receive the number of olive seedlings that he requested. This
invariably led to bitterness between Bedouins and Egyptians.
648 Most of the Bedouins believe that the desert is a difficult
177 (wihsha) life, and they favor change. They want to know, for
instance, why an American would leave home to live such a life.
[114] At a Governor's Council meeting which I attended, the Bedouin
representative from al-Qasr did not protest government interference. He complained that the Governor was not furnishing
the materials and facilities which the Bedouin needed if he
was to become "modern" and "educated." The Bedouins' major
complaint about the Egyptians is not that they are trying to
change the desert, but that they are not changing it fast
enough!

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
JABAL
AL-AKHDAR
SALLUM
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
ALEXANDRIA
CYRENAICA
Libyan
Plateau
CAIRO
SIWA
WESTERN
DESERT
LIBYA
U. A. R.
SCALE APPROX. :
1 INCH = 176 MILES

EGYPT AND CYRENAICA

FIGURE I

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619


SA'ADA
JIBARNA
AQAQRA
BANI SALLAM
BARAGHUTH
'AWAQIR
'ARAIBAT
MAGHARBA
JAWAZI
FAWAYID
HARABI
AWLAD 'ALI
SHARAI'
HANADI
BAHAJA
BANI 'UNA

THE GENEALOGY OF THE CYRENAICAN BEDOUIN

FIGURE 2

CHAPTER II

THE ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY OF THE AL-QASR AREA

Changing Patterns of Land Use

131 Al-Qasr is located in the Northwestern Coastal Zone,
a relatively fertile littoral region forming the northern
edge of the Egyptian Western Desert. Extending from Alexandria
to Sallum on the Libyan border, the Zone is some 500 kilometers
in length and reaches south into the desert some 20 to 50
134 kilometers. A deep soil deposit and a relatively high average
132 rainfall of about 15 centimeters (20 centimeters of rain would
241 be considered "high") permit limited agriculture in this
region.

133 Due to the drainage pattern of the coastal area there
is a fair supply of underground water. The rain percolates
[172] down through coastal sand dunes and is trapped in man-made
underground galleries dating from Roman times. Farther into
312 the desert, cisterns, which also date from Roman times, catch
the rains draining off the Libyan plateau to the south. This
plateau and the catchment area form the southern boundary of
the greater al-Qasr settlement area (see Figure 4). The
General Desert Development Authority, an agency of the government, estimates that there are about 3,000 of these

312 cisterns spread throughout the Western Desert. Many of them
are still used by the Bedouins for watering their livestock.
The southernmost part of the catchment area provides grazing
for sheep. Northward near the coast, where the soil deposit
permits, barley is cultivated.

311 The Bedouins divide al-Qasr into "the good life"
823 (ma'isha simha) on the coast, and "the bad life" (ma'isha
[103] wihsha) in the desert. Ma'isha simha consists of two zones:
the shatt or sahil (i.e. "the coast," "as far as one can still
see the sea"), and the area of sha'ir wi mar'a ("the barley
and pasture area"). Ma'isha wihsha is the zone beyond the
plateau where nothing grows, the daf'a or sibta ("uncultivable
361 land which is sandy and stoney"). All of the Bedouins of
al-Qasr are settled permanently either on the coast or just
south in the barley and pasture area. Nomadic and semi-
nomadic activity disappeared generations ago in this part of
the desert.

823 When the Bedouins speak of al-Qasr, they are referring
103 to an area which is traditionally defined. When the Egyptians
131 speak of al-Qasr, they are referring to a "village" only
recently incorporated. The difference is a substantial one
and not merely a difference in dialect. The Bedouins use the
term mintaqit al-Qasr ("the area, or territory, of al-Qasr"):
the Egyptians say qaryit al-Qasr ("the village of al-Qasr").
000 As the Bedouins view it, the Western Desert is the watan

131 view it, the Western Desert is the watan
619 ("homeland") of the Awlad 'Ali tribe, and is subdivided into
631 tribal zones each referred to as a mintaqa. Mintagit al-Qasr
is part of mintaqit qabilit 'Aishaibat (i.e. "the area of
al-Qasr" is part of "the territory of the 'Aishaibat tribe").
131 Each tribal mintaqa is further broken down into contiguous
619 parcels of land belonging to lineages, and these are also
*613 referred to as mintaqa; for instance, there is mintaqa
631
[423] 'ailit Ma'fas, i.e. "the territory of the Ma'fas family."
In the al-Qasr segmentary lineage society, genealogical
ties and local ties are coincidental. The boundaries of
al-Qasr are defined by the agnatic lines of the 'Aishaibat
tribe and include the sahil and sha'ir wi mar'a zones.

361 To the Egyptians, a qarya ("village") is a nucleated
631 cluster of permanent dwellings with some degree of social
integration: al-Qasr is a qarya for administrative matters.
The Bedouins, who think in terms of kin-based residence groups,
tribal boundaries, and political and economic symbiotic relations, see the Egyptian qarya as only a sector of al-Qasr.
They refer to this sector as the 'izba, i.e., "farm" or "rural
settlement." The 'izba is land fertile enough to support a
secure and sedentary life. "The 'izba," the Bedouins say,
"is the seed of the madiina" (city).

[[121]] For my own purposes, the Bedouin sense of al-Qasr is
the more useful concept. Al-Qasr is all of the territory of
[[131]] the 'Aishaibat tribe. Situated at 31°N and 27°E, al-Qasr is

361 directly on the Mediterranean coast. The *'izba* sector is
631 just 14 kilometers due west of Marsa Matruh, and about 300
131 kilometers due west of the coastal city of Alexandria.

161 In 1960, the population of the whole Western Desert
162 was 98,000, the majority being of Bedouin stock. Considering that Egypt is a country with a 2 - 1/2 per cent rise in birth rate per year, the desert population would have been about 127,000 in 1965 when I was in the field. The town of Marsa Matruh, which is the capital of the Province of Matruh (formerly the Western Desert Province) has a population of about 7,000. With increasing economic and political concern for the desert provinces and the oases, this number should continue to rise.

131 *Mintaqit al-Qasr* (see Figure 4)[1] is an area which measures about six kilometers from east to west along the sea, and about ten to fifteen kilometers on a north-south line extending into the desert as far as the Libyan plateau. The
162 population of al-Qasr is less easy to determine. In 1960, al-Qasr, by official count, consisted of 225 families, 595
[631] males and 749 females, or a total of 1344 souls. Al-Qasr, as the Bedouins define it, includes the *qarya* and six other demographic sections separately defined by the Egyptian government. The population of this al-Qasr is 2,996, 1,287 males and 1,709
[114] females. There is reason to doubt any census figures of the al-Qasr area because the Bedouins are reluctant to reveal their

[1] [See p. 67--Analyst]

162 true numbers. As recipients of aid programs, their rations
114 are based upon the number of members per family. For these
[657] purposes, they are anxious to present as high a population
figure as possible. They exaggerate their livestock count in
order to receive more fodder, and, at other times, underestimate
their numbers to escape taxes.

162 For purposes of this study, the Bedouin population of
161 al-Qasr is about 1,500 to 3,000. Most of this population lives
361 on the coastal area and in the cultivable _wadi_ areas. The
remainder is scattered south of the plateau region, near the
621 desert proper. The _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr may be described
*613 as a nucleated cluster or settlement, but due to the nature
of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system, with its relatively
autonomous kin-based residence groups, this sector lacks the
usual degree of social interaction and integration associated
621 with the village or hamlet. The _'izba_ might be described as a
*613 multi-nucleated settlement or cluster. Each lineage has its
423 own _mintaqa_. Each _mintaqa_ usually has a small dry-goods store
631 owned and operated by a lineage member and catering chiefly
443 to his own lineage-mates. Water and land in the _'izba_ sector
423 are individually owned. In the barley-pasture area, rights
*613 and privileges of ownership are vested in the corporate group,
621 even though the Bedouins and the government claim that tribally
423 owned land is illegal. All land boundaries, whether a _mintaqa_
or an individual's plot, are well-marked and well-known. The

423 boundary marker is usually a pile of stones, a tree, a *wadi*,
or, a line recorded on paper by two parties and given to a
third to hold in case of future differences of opinion.

342 In the extreme southern pastoral zone, there were few
361 permanent houses but with new government land registration
[656] laws the number is increasing. The settlement pattern in this
area might be characterized as a scattered homestead type,
"homesteads" being defined as tents or houses whose location
is permanent. Tents are seldom, if ever, moved these days even
[657] during a heavy rainy season. This is because barley production
has increased, and, mainly because government aid programs
supply fodder for the sheep. Bedouin shepherds in the pasture
area change dwelling places, but only to move their tents from
their winter protective hiding places out into the open for the
springtime, or to move from their tent into the stone house
for the cold, rainy winter. In either case, no real change in
location is involved.

342 The tent is called *bait al-'Arab* ("house of the Arabs").
There are two types: the *bait al-saif* ("summer house"), and
the *bait al-rabi'a* ("spring house"). The summer tent, made of
"gunny" and flour sacks sewn together, is for protection from
the sun. The spring tent is the real Bedouin tent. It is
[286] woven from the wool of the sheep and camel hair, and is used
[237] during the winter. Most Bedouin now say that they cannot afford
[435] the 125 Egyptian pounds (1 pound = $2.80) which the *bait al-rabi'a*
costs to make or buy.

342 costs to make or buy. In the 'izba sector, most of the Bedouin have a summer tent which they place next to their stone house for the hot months. According to the governmental community [657] development program, in order to own land and register it properly one must build at least one room upon it. The one- [735] room house (daar) is not common in al-Qasr: it is a symbol of poverty. The multi-roomed house (duwaar) is common. It is [333] built of large pieces of cut sandstone which are quarried in [316] al-Qasr. Those who can afford it build the duwaar and surround 342 it with a wall in compound fashion. Only one man in al-Qasr 556 is rich enough to afford two of these compound-type houses. The size and style of a house reflect status. Traditionally, [184] a man furnished a tent for each wife and for each married son. Although this is still the custom in parts of the desert, in al-Qasr the private room (daar) in a duwaar has replaced the private tent.

596 The basic residential unit is called naja' (literally, "hamlet"). It is composed of the father, his wife (wives), his unmarried children, and married sons and their families. The naja' takes the name of the father who is called the shaib ("elder," literally, "white-haired one") of the group. In the naja', the word of the shaib is law, and the members' chief duty is unquestionable obedience. The average naja' in al-Qasr consists of about three or four houses or tents.

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

173 [166] [175] 173 *613 [712] The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica. No historical documentation for this period exists. The various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 361 [198] Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life," they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled [619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

173 [361] [425] [423] land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land) wad'a-l-id ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 425 656 [178] The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today. Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 423 182 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However, *613 423 182 241 [312] [361] there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a below), at the western end of al-Qasr's 'izba sector, settled there "because of the abundance of underground water in this area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"

*613 in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and
423 vegetables." To the southeast of the 'izba, the lineages of
182
241 Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and
[312] grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so
vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these
lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in
Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It
*613 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the
182 richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better
184
241 able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of
the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr
depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture.
[231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and
Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own
sheep.

656 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert.
423 The government attempted it a number of times, but with little
success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization
(GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the
361 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins
342 began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the
178
time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants
agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the
361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town.
648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

361 648 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin." 361 556 178 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two residences.

175 423 657 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley. Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage in this.

423 648 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

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the structure of both the nomadic and the sedentary tribe: "Settlement should take place on the basis of granting each individual capable of working in agriculture a piece of land, the area to be fixed by the state, calculated to ensure the raising of his living standard and to enable him to support himself and his legal dependents on condition that he start cultivation of the land. When distributing the land, care should be taken that a family be settled on a single piece of land composed of the total of the plots granted to its members, the family being composed of relatives to the first grandfather" (Abu-Zeid n.d.).

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From this point, each Arab country dealt with the problem of the nomad in its own way, some effectively and others not so effectively. Not until 1958 did Egypt make a formal effort to integrate the Bedouins of the Western Desert into the national society. And it was not until 1960 that the so-called "Desert Law" of 1958 (U.A.R. Law Number 124) was activated and enforced. The most important provision of this law followed the plan formulated at the Baghdad conference: "There is no recognition of tribal possession of land which is considered as belonging to the State, and whenever a family develops and plants on a holding, this gives it the right, if approved, to the issue of a title to it by the government." Law Number 124 also provided that land occupied by buildings or orchards before 1957 can be owned by the occupants at a low

423 cost payable over a period of thirty years. As pointed out
657 by Professor Abu-Zeid (n.d.), this law is welcomed in part
656 because the garden area to which it really applies (the garden area in al-Qasr would be the 'izba sector) is not considered "tribal territory" or lineage-owned as are the barley and pasture regions.

653 Governmental activity growing out of the "Desert Law"
177 has been an important catalyst for social, economic and
*613 political change. All of these aspects of change had repercussions on the lineage system and the authority structure of the Bedouins. In 1959, the government entered al-Qasr with the goal of revitalizing and reorganizing the hydraulic system of the area. The revival of the Roman water system, especially the network of cisterns covering the southern region of al-Qasr, and, on the coast, the restoration of the well system and underground galleries, the drilling of new wells and the intensification of olive farming have all led to a levelling of economic differentiation between lineages and between individuals.

657 In 1956, the Egyptian government passed the Cooperative
177 Law (U.A.R. Law Number 217) establishing agricultural cooperative
474 societies throughout the country. But not until 1959 did this law have any impact on the tribes of the Western Desert.
[433] Generally, the cooperative society has served as a primary and successful agent of social change in the desert. It has

657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
177 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
474 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the
433 cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops.
In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy.
Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile
Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of
individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and
affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends
to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
177 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society,
as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the
lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle
between the old and new.

657 The major problem encountered by the government officials
177 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
474 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
661 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
435 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative
program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

657 sale of goods on the black-market. Tribal leaders, or members
177 of a "status group," in whose hands the operation of the
474 cooperative society had been placed, confiscated more than
661 [435] their share of food and fodder and resold it either in the
Nile Valley or to their own tribesmen for whom it had originally
been intended. The government could not really prosecute the
guilty parties for fear of jeopardizing the entire program.
Nor could they convince the cheated tribesmen that they had
[673] been treated unfairly by their leaders. For one thing, the
Bedouins did not consider that their leaders were committing
a wrong; furthermore, any Bedouin who would go to the government
to inform on another Bedouin would be subjected to a
[577] trial by Bedouin justice. It is still the traditional codes
of Bedouin law and honor, and not the modern judiciary system,
which prevail in al-Qasr.

474 The cooperative society in al-Qasr is one of thirteen
in the general area of Marsa Matruh. It began with a membership
of twenty-five, twenty-two of these were from the 'Aishaibat
tribe. Today, the enrollment is 139 official, and another 195
"unofficial" members. The unofficial members represent unregistered
branches of the al-Qasr cooperative. The Bedouins
[735] explain that they cannot allow any members of the tribe to go
hungry, and, therefore, they will distribute food to all those
[661] who need it (Zein, n.d.). This, of course, shows that those
cooperative officers who do profiteer are not entirely oblivious

474 of the needs of their tribesmen; that, in fact, the patronage
661 system is relative to the traditional situation. Unavoidably,
474 the al-Qasr cooperative society is dominated by one tribe:
619 107 of its members are from the 'Aishaibat, while only 32 are
from other tribes. This relationship between traditional and modern structures is common throughout the Western Desert. When a new cooperative is organized within the boundaries of a certain tribal mintaqa, members of the local tribe will resign from other cooperatives to join "their own." Thus, when a new cooperative was founded in Marsa Matruh, twenty members of the Jum'iat tribe left the al-Qasr branch to join the new chapter which catered largely to the needs of the Jum'iat in the town.

474 The World Food Program of the Food and Agriculture
747 Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations operates through
433 the cooperative society. It has had an impact on the economy
177 of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. In 1963, this organization, with
the cooperation of the U.A.R. government, proposed to stabilize economic conditions in the Western Desert by providing 4,000 Bedouin families (20,000 persons) with enough food and fodder to help them through the three dry summer months. The program was designed to encourage mixed and settled farming through the reclamation of 20,000 acres of arid desert land, while its range improvement project was to furnish pasturage for 500,000 sheep throughout the Northwestern Coastal Zone. In al-Qasr,

747 177 433 this number included pasturage for 11,000 sheep (Abu-Zeid n.d.: 19-27).

[474] F.A.O. has encountered a number of serious problems and the program has received setbacks. The program, as an agent of social change, failed to take proper measure of the structural and ideological aspects of the Bedouin traditional system. Range improvement projects were carried out with disregard for existing tribal boundaries (the mintaga) in the desert. In one case, the Bedouins removed fences on their property, and allowed sheep to destroy an entire experimental range area. Food distribution has fallen short because polygyny as a structural feature of marriage and the Bedouin family was not taken into account. The government estimated five persons per family, and planned to distribute food to 4,000 families. They were only able to subsidize 3,281 families. Aid officials failed to consider the strength of Bedouin values. To qualify
747 177 474 426 for government aid, a Bedouin must belong to his local cooperative society. Some Bedouins wish to remain independent of government business, and others cannot afford the 50 piasters membership dues. A man may borrow money from another, of course, but in al-Qasr a "debt" is actually a particular kind of social relation which, like all others, carries with it a set of specific rights and obligations. A debt among Bedouins is a
[571] complex relationship: it may draw two parties together, or it may be, as it is with the Kachins of Burma (Leach 1954:153),

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 426 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
571 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
747 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
177 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
262 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what
they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered
milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
177 as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
[178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e.,
pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally
objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations
and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system
of meanings in terms of which social action takes place
(Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and
economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one.
But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently
of a specific cultural structure.

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233 The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastor-
183 alist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening
241 and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving
[461] long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and
complex market operations. They understand the logic and
[556] operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a
source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year
of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more
sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most
472 Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern
433 cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins
241 who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are
434
177 those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive
the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who
can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to
that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men
in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most
of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

433 The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant
177 economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased
178 while pastoralist activities became less important. In the
past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;"
even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
177 relatives. In terms of economic specialty, the economy of
178 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
177 vegetables being grown in the _'izba_ sector of the coast and
178 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in
the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased.
The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much
of this comes from the government. With the shift to olive
arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and
grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial.
But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this
transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned
with securing a good livlihood. They express this idea in
the term _ma'isha simha_, and, as I have noted, they identify
it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The security
of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
433 have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
241 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
311 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
434 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted
with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted
in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

These gardens

433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443 [656] priced market in Alexandria.

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an
atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change, and have further enhanced the future of the program. The figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of orchards in the *'izba* of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

TABLE 1

ARBORICULTURE IN AL-QASR, 1964

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Plant	Acres	Plants Distributed	Successful Plants
Olive	947	40,399	32,488 (80%)
Almond	57	2,570	1,752 (67%)
Fig	66	10,537	(experimental stage)
Grape	.5	512	512 (100%)
Peach	2.5	804	200 (20%)

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in al-Qasr, and these were distributed among only 27 men. Most of these men also owned large numbers of sheep.

In 1960, the government began planting olive trees on the registered land of individuals living in the _'izba_ sector. This plan also involved instructing the Bedouins in the care of the tree: an individual who had traditionally depended on the rains now had to learn irrigation farming. This aspect of the program, learning modern "water discipline," was a source of conflict for the Bedouin with his pastoralist outlook on life. The olive tree must be watered twice weekly. The Bedouins say that this made them feel like "peasants." The Bedouins were also apprehensive over the fact that the olive tree did not bear its first fruit, i.e., the first cash

654 245 crop, until five to seven years after planting. To alleviate
177 the difficulties of this period of apprehension, which the
433 Governor of the desert province refers to as "the dangerous
[747] period," the United Nations F.A.O. aid program was designed
and put into operation in al-Qasr.

654 A Bedouin may purchase an olive seedling from the
245 government for the price of two piasters (about six cents).
177 This same seedling costs the government 26 piasters. Once
433 through "the dangerous period," a Bedouin can expect a yield
435 of 120 to 150 kilos of olives from one tree. Olives sell for about 15 piasters per kilo. Or, at a cost of 5 piasters per kilo, the olives can be converted into oil. One ton of olives will render about 23 per cent oil. Olive oil is now considered a luxury item in Egypt, and the market price is very high. But only the Bedouin with a large harvest of olives finds it profitable to sell his product on the oil market. These conditions have made many Bedouins willing to convert from horticulture and sedentary pastoralism to arboriculture.

654 Between 1960 and 1964, the government reclamation
245 program has planted a total of 9,514 olive trees on land
177 registered to 124 individuals. The average distribution of trees, about seventy-six per man, is indicative of one of the problems related to change in al-Qasr and about which we have spoken earlier. Most of the trees have gone to men who, before

654 1960, were olive tree owners. One individual, who owned 400
245 trees before the reclamation program, now owns 1,400 trees.
177 His increase has not all been at government expense, but a
large share of it has been. Of the 9,514 trees planted by
the government, 4,666 of them have been planted in the
barley and wadi area to the south; 4,848 in the garden area
on the coast. In the southern sector, a Bedouin who owns at
[312] least ten acres of land may have the government drill a well
and erect a windmill pump on his property. For this, he pays
[452] 350 Egyptian pounds (approximately $1,000.00) over a thirty-
year period. The Bedouin is willing to undertake this contract, and also to take land out of barley production,
because he sees the future security of the olive market.
Because of this, also, he is willing to agree on land boundaries
and to register his land with the government.

657 Economic transition would not be possible, nor could
the Bedouins afford to hazard it, were it not for government
welfare payments in the form of staple products. These rations
stabilize the mixed economy of the al-Qasr while promoting a
shift to a fuller dependence on agriculture. Of the thirteen
657 474 cooperative societies in the Matruh area, al-Qasr is the
largest and has been designated as a pilot project for the
whole Western Desert. Al-Qasr garners the largest share of
government aid, and, consequently, is heavily dependent upon
it. The table below shows the amount of aid given monthly to

TABLE 2

AID PER MONTH TO THIRTEEN COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES OF MATRUH AREA, 1963

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	No. of Families	Beef	Fish	Oil	Cheese	Tea	Powdered Milk
al-Qasr Aid:	308 (1344)*	1008	604	604	1209	201	1209
Total Aid:	627 (3134)*	2350	1410	1410	2826	470	2820

*Number of Persons

al-Qasr during the year 1963. This amount is compared with the total amount of aid given to all thirteen cooperatives in the area.

654 233 During this period, 1960 to 1964, the government has succeeded in stabilizing the pastoral sector of the economy. The Bedouins are given barley and cottonseed-oil cakes as fodder for their animals. Consequently, they must depend upon their own barley crop only to a minimal degree. There are 144,804 sheep in the Marsa Matruh area, as of 1963. In al-Qasr, 332 men own 9,958 sheep, about 30 sheep per man. One sheep requires a kilogram of barley and six kilograms of cottonseed [474] cake per month. The table below shows the amount of fodder distributed to al-Qasr and the whole Matruh sector, in 1963, through the cooperative societies.

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TABLE 3

FODDER DISTRIBUTED IN MATRUH SECTOR, 1963

	No. of Sheep	Kg. of Barley	Kg. of Cottonseed Cakes
al-Qasr	9,958	85,392	56,928
Total Distribution	144,804	1,303,236	868,824

the cooperative societies.

243 Barley is the important staple in al-Qasr: it is used for bread and fodder. About one-half of the Bedouins plant barley on a small scale. The wealthy individuals who own large flocks of sheep plant up to 100 acres of barley. Barley is planted in October and harvested at the end of April. Two methods of cultivation are used: plowing and seeding takes place either before the rains, i.e., the 'afiir system, or, after the rains, i.e., the haraati system. After harvesting, [251] the grain is threshed and stored in two-meter deep pits (matmuura). Grain stored in this fashion can be preserved for three years.

244 The main vegetables raised in al-Qasr are onions, radishes, peppers, and mint. Mint is the only dependable [263] cash crop of those mentioned. It is used by the Bedouins [272] in tea, and tea drinking is a ceremony which takes place at all times of the day in the desert.

244 all times of the day in the desert. The Bedouins had most
of these crops before the government came to al-Qasr. Since
[177] 1960, however, the Bedouins have been planting new crops such
as okra, squash, cucumber, tomato, spinach and melon. All of
these are plants adopted from the Nile Valley. Vegetables
244 312 are grown by means of irrigation or dry-farming. Where there
is no well water, an individual will cultivate without irrigation.
In this case, crops are planted in the spring after the
rains. This method is called ba'ali. Irrigation makes it
possible for a man to obtain four crops during the year, but
usually, the Bedouin is more concerned with security than
with profit. Therefore, most Bedouins try for one good crop
244 and allow a portion of the land to remain fallow. Land which
has been planted all year around needs at least one year's
rest before it can be replanted. The vegetable harvest
usually takes place in July or August.

241 The government has attempted to introduce other crops
177 into al-Qasr which have failed. Failure is related to two
312 main problems in al-Qasr: salination arising from the short
supply of fresh water, and the Bedouin's misunderstanding of
the techniques of successful irrigation farming. Figs have
245 177 not been successful in al-Qasr due to the nature of the soil
itself. The almond tree has succumbed to the climate of al-
[132] Qasr. This tree blooms in April during the khamsin season,
fifty days of hot, dry winds blowing in from the Sahara. The

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

233 178 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head. But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 407 492 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually, the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 241 492 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally, barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 407 434 433 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone, during the year 1963, also became important for raising watermelons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

241 407 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr
434 is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary
433 for a successful crop.

407 Tractors are rented through the cooperative society.
474 Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all
[427] members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers
and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The gov-
[654] ernment has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors.
They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic
reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors
407 are to be used. Consequently, the tractor, like the rations
619 of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In
474 one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of
the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Ahmar tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed. Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that cooperative membership coincide with local group membership. It is better, they say, if the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr have their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems among themselves. The government, during this transitional period, seems to agree.

407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

407 the lack of spare parts. Three of the tractors were Russian-
built, and two were Egyptian made. The Bedouins say that the
Russian tractors are the better.

407 In 1964, the Western Desert received its heaviest
241 rainfall since 1947. To take advantage of this, local govern-
654 ment officials of the reclamation project requested an additional
[132] fifty tractors for plowing on the coastal zone. They received
only six additional tractors. In that year, the thirty-nine
tractors used in the entire Western Desert were able to plow
15,240 acres of land. During this period of economic change,
731 a bad barley crop causes a fodder shortage for the animals,
233 [654] and seldom is the aid program able to compensate for this.
[166] Consequently, there is a need to ship sheep to the Nile Valley,
or to seek permission to take them to the pastures of Cyrenaica.
Both situations create tremendous difficulties for both the
[432] Bedouins and the government. A third alternative for the
Bedouin is to buy barley on the black-market. In doing this,
[435] he must pay six times the normal cost of grain, and risk
reprisals.

177 Prior to 1960, change in al-Qasr might be characterized
657 as a steady and endogenous process of sedentarization. It had
been taking place for about a century and a half. Exogenous
change, social and economic, may be identified with the desire
of the government to reclaim land in al-Qasr for agricultural
use, and to integrate the Bedouin into the national economy.

177 657 This program cannot be divorced from the fundamental political aim of the government which is to make the Bedouins politically-conscious participants in the Egyptian political community. The reform program, which has been only outlined here, has had ramifying effects on the Bedouin traditional systems, especially the political, and that is a major concern of this study. Changes in one structure of society are apt to have repercussions in other structures. This seems particularly the case where the economic and political structures are concerned. Economic change has been a background to political structural change in al-Qasr. Political change is historical in al-Qasr, but it has been accelerated in the period starting with 1960. For these reasons, we are interested in both the traditional and the modern systems.

177 433 434 Change will continue to occur in al-Qasr. This is because the advantages of cash crops and a market economy are obvious to the Bedouin. He can even have more of what has been traditionally valued if he is successful in the modern market system. He can buy a sheep for 10 L.E.; a goat for [435] 8 L.E.; a horse for 90 L.E.; a camel for 150 L.E.; and a fine spring tent for 125 L.E.. A Bedouin knows that he must, as an individual, register his land, build a stone house on it (which costs about 100 L.E.), and learn the technique of irrigation farming. All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are to some degree willing to do this for the ma'isha simha which it

177 brings. The future of the olive tree on the coast, and the
433 growing importance of the melon crop in the southern sector
434 will be the bases of a modern al-Qasr. The table below gives
177 some indication of what the Bedouins of al-Qasr can hope for,
434 in terms of material profits, by a shift to a cash economy.
435 Prices are approximate, and as of 1964.

TABLE 4

PRICES OF KEY PRODUCTS IN AL-QASR, 1964

Crop	Price Per Unit	Possible Profit
Barley	3 L.E. per ardab (120 kg.)	20 L.E. per acre
Melon	6-12 piasters each	70-100 L.E. per acre
Mint	Few piaster per bunch	150 L.E. per acre
Olive	15 piasters per kg. of olives	1 tree=150 kg. of olives =22.5 L.E.
	40 piasters per kg. of oil	1 tree=30 kg. of olive oil =12.5 L.E.

423 Land Tenure and Rights of Ownership

*613 Traditionally, an individual's rights in the land were of usufruct and tenancy. Sovereignty over the land was vested in the corporate secondary lineage group (see Figure 7). The territory of al-Qasr is a division of lineage zones, and more will be said about this in the next chapter since it relates directly to the structural organization of Bedouin

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
*[613] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
[178] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is
[596] deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
[184] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
*[613] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
[241] The type of rights over the land varies with the method by
which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional
mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins
are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal
tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this
time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land
and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
*[613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage
representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of
usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

178 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change
423 in social and authority relations.

423 In the *'izba* sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were
432 two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an
Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course,
could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by
423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves
registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works
*[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property
423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional
178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships.
571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense,
rather than with respect to his being a member of a group
which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has
been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits
[184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of
al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where
a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A comparison
423 of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern
184 region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land
use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it
becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare
Figures 5 and 6).

428 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son
596 inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

428 the father's property. The egalitarian spirit of the Bedouin
596 inheritance rule functions to maintain the unity of the family,
and, at another level of social complexity, the structural
continuity of the corporate group. Ideally, the surviving
sons will keep intact their father's estate, his land and
animals, and will work it as a unit. And this is generally
596 the case in al-Qasr. On the other hand, there is also the
594 implicit assumption in the structural principle of the
*613 Bedouin segmentary lineage system that each individual will
183 eventually establish a unit of his own, separate from but
interrelated with, the main household. As a result, there
596 usually develops some division of property and labor among
593 surviving brothers. Whether or not this division is formally
agreed upon, and, whether or not it is assigned by the father
or the eldest son is largely arbitrary. In some cases, the
father makes such a decision before his death and prepares
his sons for it. The father's concern is that good relations
be maintained between his sons after his death. Just as the
father mediates conflict between his sons during his life,
so he hopes to maintain peace between them after his death.
The Bedouins say that a father should be fair when dealing
with his sons, and that he should never favor one over the
other.

428 Inheritance is determined through the patrilineal
*[613] lineage principle. The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they

The Bedouins of al-Qasr claim that they
428 follow the Islamic laws of inheritance, in which case, a
562 surviving daughter is entitled to one-half the share of a
surviving son (Quran IV: 177). But, in only two cases did
[423] women own land in al-Qasr: one woman was the only close
survivor of her father, and, the other woman was a widow without sons. In fact, my informant even admitted that these cases were exceptional, that the women were permitted to keep the land only because the brothers of the deceased men, who are the "rightful heirs" after the sons, did not want the land. The Bedouins insist, on the other hand, that a girl can claim her share of the inheritance: "It is her right." But she will never do such a thing "because she respects her brothers too much to accept the land which is offered to her."

428 When the father's estate is large, certain measures are taken to divide it between his sons. In some cases, the division may be somewhat complex and determined over a period of time. One example of this in al-Qasr involved a wealthy man whose own property was divisible into parts roughly corresponding to ecological subdivisions. The subdivisions of the estate became the shares of the sons, and could then be separated but remain symbiotically dependent. Ecological relationships affirm social relations. The following is an
[159] account of inheritance rules in al-Qasr:

428 159

> I am 45 years old and my eldest brother is 53 years old. I have two younger brothers. When my father died, we four sons inherited the property of our father jointly. I told my older brother to divide the land the way in which he wanted . . . My father had divided his land into four parts before he died. Each part was a separate "farm" so that a son could raise barley or olives, as he liked . . . But my brother told me to make the decision. As it turned out, my youngest brother was the first to make his choice of the four parts. He took his land but we still kept all of our sheep together. One year later, my older brother took his share of the land, but Jabril (the next to the youngest brother) and I remained together, and still remain together. Some men want to be on their own and others do not. Our eldest brother was the first to separate his animals from the collective herd . . . When the decisions were made to divide the land between us, we got the local "holy man" to go around the area with us and to witness the boundaries. This is done so that later if a brother changes his mind, or wants to take different land, the true borders will be known. We recorded them on paper and the "holy man" knows them . . . In matters of inheritance, all sons get equal shares, but in a case where there are ten camels and three sons, then, each gets three camels and the tenth goes to the eldest brother.

428 562 [431] [583] Any property which a female may own, if it is land or livestock, will go to her sons upon her death. In al-Qasr, such property will usually be sheep which a woman may accumulate through gift-giving. In one case, which is unique in al-Qasr, a woman received thirteen camels from her husband at the time of her wedding. (This was not the brideprice, for that goes to the bride's father.) At the time of her death her camels numbered seventy, and they were divided equally among her five sons. Concerning lesser items, such as clothing and jewelry, and also chickens, these are

428 562 inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent,
[422] which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on
for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the
177 level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the
178 composition of the basic family structure. One informant,
[124] who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a
household composed of his grandfather, father, father's
brothers and their families. Since that time, his father
has built another house away from the family home; one uncle
has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his
youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home;
and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original
182 house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a seg-
177 mentary society, although as a traditional process, it
*613 represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures.
433 In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the
434 Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism
also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is
a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market
economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market
orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual
profits.

*613


SA'ADA
'AQAR
'ALI 'AQAR
'ALI ABYAD
'ALI AHMAR
SINAINA
QINAISHAT
'AISHAIBAT
KAMAILAT
'AILIT MA'FAS
'AILIT LAZUMI
'AILIT SHRAIF
'AILIT ZALLAT
'AILIT ZAGHARAT
'AILIT DAWLAT
'AILIT ABU QARASA

FIGURE 3
LINEAGES OF AL-QASR

*613
423
311
241
491
133
102


SEA
N
OLIVES AND VEGETABLES
ROAD TO MARSA MATRUH
('AILIT SULWATIYYA)
('AILIT DAWLAT)
('AILIT ABU QARNASA)
('AILIT SHRAIF)
('AILIT ZALLAT)
('AILIT ZAGHARAT)
('AILIT MA'FAS)
('AILIT LAZUMI)
PLATEAU
BARLEY
ROAD TO AL-SALLUM
WADI
PASTURE
(KAMAILAT TRIBE)
DESERT

FIGURE 3a. LINEAGE TERRITORIES OF AL-QASR.

102
133
131


FIGURE 4

LAND FORM MAP OF AL-QASR SHOWING DRAINAGE PATTERN

SCALE = 1:250,000

MEDITERRANEAN
LIBYAN PLATEAU
DESERT
AL-QASR
MARSA MATRUH
'IZBA SECTOR
SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR

102
312
361
423
311
133



FIGURE 5

SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN IZBA SECTOR

WHITE SAND DUNES
N
UNCULTIVABLE STONEY HILL
SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
○ = WELLS
☐ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS

102
423
312
361


SCALE = 1:4,000 (APPROX.)
O = WELLS
☐ = PERMANENT DWELLINGS
N

FIGURE 6

SAMPLE OF LAND TENURE IN SHA'IR WI MAR'A SECTOR

[P70]

000

PART TWO

STRUCTURE AND AUTHORITY

CHAPTER III

KINSHIP AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Principles of Social Structure

*613 The division of Bedouin society into groups is explained in terms of certain principles of organization, the most pervasive of these being unilineality or the lineage
*613 principle. According to this structural rule, an individual
619 born into a tertiary lineage segment (see Figure 7)[1] automatically becomes a member of each successive and more inclusive group represented by the higher levels of segmentation. The status, rights, and obligations of the individual with respect to other members of the tribe are in this way determined on the basis of kinship. An individual gains political status in the tribe, as a societal unit, only through membership in a tertiary group. Theoretically, group membership is based on birth, but there are certain "legal fictions" which represent exceptions to this rule. In al-Qasr exceptions are rare, but a few do exist. For instance, there is one case of
[597] individual adoption, and in another case, a whole tertiary
173 segment was grafted on to a lineage stem. The latter case
*613 happened four generations ago when Taram Mighaiwiz of 'Ailit
619 Lazumi adopted Hajj 'Ali "as his brother." The Bedouins say
597

[1] [See p.77--Analyst]

173 *613 619 597 that in those days it was important "to have men to go to war; Hajj 'Ali came from the Sinai with many men and wrote his name into the books of Lazumi." Today, in the Lazumi genealogy Hajj 'Ali's name appears as the brother of Taram, both are claimed as sons of Mighawsiz. [114] This kind of data is difficult to uncover and I may have missed gathering other cases of ideological kinship ties.

*613 [171] The specific unilinear principle which operates in al-Qasr is partrilineality, common to the Middle Eastern culture area. A corollary principle is the corporate group. *613 571 Together, these two rules structure the social world of the individual and effectively define a range of social choices for him. The individual's social relations and social roles are relative to the rights and obligations of the people related to him through his father. In a sense, the social world for the individual in al-Qasr is his father's group and its network of relationships with other similar groups; he would not think of leaving this group of his own free will though, in reality, he could. The Bedouins believe [181] [829] that a man cannot be happy if he lives with strangers, i.e., outside his corporate group. This value holds up today to the extent that a man will expect his son to return to the desert even after his education as a merchant, a government clerk, or an army officer.

Structural differentiation in al-Qasr is not solely

*613 571 the result of the patrilineal principle even though it is by far the most ideologically significant. Other principles lend structure to associative relationships which may or may not complement those established by the unilinear rule. It is the operation of these other principles which give complexity to the social and political organization of al-Qasr. They may be identified in terms of residence, cognation and social compacts, or the establishment of contractual relations above and beyond those defined by patrilineality. The force of these four structural principles constitute the range or the structural constraints within which individuals and groups in al-Qasr conduct their social relations. Specifically, we *613 571 121 are not interested in all social relations. The main interest here is in those relationships in which individuals or groups struggle for control, or attempt to exercise power. Our interest is, then, the political aspect of social relations or, what Max Weber discussed in terms of, power and established authority (Bendix 1962:290-297).

*613 [121] It is necessary to discuss the lineage system in al-Qasr because in a segmentary society, kinship and politics are analytical aspects of the same process. In the political structure of al-Qasr, we note first of all that the tertiary and secondary segments (see Figure 7 below) are the functionally significant units. Bait 'Umar, the tertiary segment diagramed in Figure 8 below, is typical: it is an autonomous political unit with a discernible authority structure and

*613 formal leadership. Ideologically, group solidarity at this
level is explained solely in terms of patrilineality; in
fact, local contiguity and explicit contractual ties are
*613 just as important. When we add to this the principle of
582 cognation in the form of the Bedouin preferred form of
marriage, parallel-cousin marriage, the resulting structure
is what Emrys Peters (1965) has called "the corporate group
[183] *par excellence*." But, as we shall see later, father's
brother's daughter-marriage is more of a cultural ideal than
it is a social reality in al-Qasr.

*613 The interplay of kinship, residence and contract ties
554 defines a corporate structure of authority and also informs
571 an external system of authority relations including all who
claim descent from 'Ali 'Aqar, son of the mythological Sa'ada.
The feeling of "corporateness," and the concomitant structural
demands upon the individual changes as the scope of political
action widens. This degree of corporate feeling is related
to the structural differentiation between what has been interpreted as "domestic relations based on kinship and descent"
and "the field of political relations" (Fortes 1953:26). In
121 this study, I maintain that both the internal and the external
*613 systems of relations are "political" since power and legitimate
554
571 authority are exercized in both. Therefore, rather than use
the terms "domestic" and "political," I shall refer to the
internal system of political relations and the external system

121 of political relations. The structural differentiation be-
*613 554 tween them relates to certain specifics of role differentia-
571 tion and articulation, and corporate goals. Different roles
function differently in different spheres of politics. This is clear when we consider that the two structural aspects of corporate group politics serve the double purpose of insuring local autonomy while promoting integration into the larger lineage segments. This I will cover more thoroughly in the next chapter. Most of the discussion here deals with social structure and, in particular, the internal elements of the corporate group.

*613 In the total societal context, the tertiary segment
619 is pivotal for the conceptualization of two models: the Bedouin's model of his tribal system, and the observer's model of a segmentary lineage system. Both of these constructs are shown in Figure 7.[1] Both genealogical models can be completed by the addition of Figures 2, 3, and 8, extending the systems both horizontally and vertically.

Theoretically, all of the levels of the Awlad 'Ali tribal system constitute a political community, i.e., the various segments shown in Figure 3 regulate and maintain relations with each other through complementary opposition (Fallers 1963). But in fact, political action of any functional significance rarely occurs beyond the secondary lineage level. In terms of the structural principles, agnation, real or

[1] [See p. 77--Analyst]

*613 fictive, has practical political consequences only at the
619 tertiary and secondary levels of segmentation. Most poli-
tical activity in al-Qasr is the result of either cooperation
or conflict between corporate groups the size of Bait 'Umar
or 'Ailit Ma'fas. 'Ailit Ma'fas is made up of five structurally
replicated political groups such as Bait 'Umar. Toward out-
[609] siders, these five groups act as one; they represent a corporate
*613 entity before the rest of the tribe. As a member of 'Ailit
619 Ma'fas, an individual has jural status in the whole tribe.
554 He also has the means and the moral obligation to articulate
his interests and to settle his arguments with other members
of the tribe. When an individual is involved in an activity
which relates to matters of power and authority, he is playing
a political role in the political process. The units which
make up the internal and external political systems of the
121 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr are roles. Roles then are the
*613 analytical focus of this study. Of course, I realize that
619 the concrete entities present in al-Qasr are human beings.
554 I only use roles as methodological constructs in order to
abstract from, and to understand, Bedouin behavior. By
conceptualizing sets of roles as structures, we will be able
to understand the internal and external political structures
as well as the traditional and modern political structures
of Bedouin society. In al-Qasr, these political roles and
structures emerge from the more generalized kinship structure

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 79]

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
SA'ADA
(1) 'AQAR
TRIBE (2) AWLAD 'ALI
TRIBE (3) 'ALI AHMAR
PRIMARY (4) 'AISHAIBAT
SECONDARY (5) 'AILIT MA'FAS
TERTIARY (6) BAIT 'UMAR
(7) BAIT ('AIT) ABD AL-MALIK

FIGURE 7

GENERATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY OF TRIBAL STRUCTURE

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

173
*613
601

[P.78-A]


BRAIK
(BAIT) KAILANI
(BAIT) YUNIS
(BAIT) MUHAMMAD
ABD AL-RAHMAN
ABD AL-HALIM
ABD AL-SALAM
FARAJ
ABD AL-RAHMAN
'ALI
ABD AL-HAMID
ABD AL-'AZIZ
'UMAR
ABD AL-'AL
QASSIM
ABD AL-MALIK
JAD AL-MULA
ABD AL-MUNSIF
NAJI
SALIH AL-DIN
ABD AL-NASSIR
KAMAL AL-DIN
YUNIS
JIBRIL
ABD AL-LATIF
YA'QUB
ABD AL-MALIK

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

173
*613
601


MA'FAS
HASSAN
QASSIM
(BAIT)
'UMAR
BAIT 'UMAR
HANAISH
ABD AL-QADAR
IBRAHIM
MUHAMMAD
'ALI
ABD AL-KHALIQ
SALIH
YUNIS
ABD AL-RAHIM
MUHAMMAD
'ALI
IBRAHIM
SA'AD
'ATIYA
'UMAR
TAHIR
FARAJ
QASSIM
RIZQ
SAFI
ABD ALLAH
NUWAIJI
HAMAD
MAUHI AL-DIN
SA'ID
IBRAHIM
ABD ALLAH
JIBRIL
RIYID
'ISLAIB
ABD AL-KARIM
BAGHI
JAB ALLAH
HIMAIDA
MAS'UD
HASSAN
MUHAMMAD
ABD AL-NASSIF
RAMADAN
FATH ALLAH

[P.78-B]

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#613
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
MUSA
HAMAD
(BAIT) FIRJANI
(BAIT) SALAH
HUSSAIN
MAHMUD
ABD AL-RAWAF
MUSA'ID
NASIF
SALIH
ABD AL-KARIM
MANSUR
ABD AL-RAWAF
ABD ALLAH
'ISA
GHAITH

FIGURE 8

GENEALOGY OF BAIT 'UMAR

▲ = 'AQILA

[P. 78-C]

121
*613
619
554 and are related to the organizational principles mentioned above.

619 The Awlad 'Ali represent a cultural entity whose membership is defined in patrilineal terms. Cutlurally, and genealogically, they are related to the Cyrenaican Bedouin but distinct from the Egyptians of the Nile Valley. The
619
177 political system of the Awlad 'Ali can be extended to include Cyrenaicans "as Bedouins" but it can only interact with the Egyptians "as foreigners." This means that the Awlad 'Ali possess common roles, structures, and cultural institutions which can articulate with those of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. In the case of the Egyptians, however, social interaction calls forth new cultural categories and new structural elements in Bedouin society. This is the basis of political change in al-Qasr. Role differentiation and ideological replacement are taking place vis a vis the nation-state: the traditional political structure of the Bedouins is adapting to the Egyptian political environment. In the language of the "politics of modernization," this process is referred to as "politicization" or "political socialization." We shall deal with this process in later chapters.

The principles which relate the Bedouins of al-Qasr to other Bedouins of the Western Desert and Libya are the organizational principles of kinship, residence, and contract; but the principle which relates them to the Egyptian state is

619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
177 traditional situation.
[121]

The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence
619 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
*613 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaqa).
571 Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent concrete authority structures, or political groups. This follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or what we call political structures, most often deal with the exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power relations do occur and when present complicate the situation. In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority (Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an idological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
*613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all
*613 authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
829 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
173
571

*613 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the
829 lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin
173
571 knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only
does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it
also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In
*613 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map
173 corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground.
571 Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may
be properly interpreted as property relations between groups.
Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an
essential premise upon which the social and political order
rests, although it is not the only premise.

619 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion
*613 of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are
separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a[1] shows the
correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and territorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmentation.

121 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary
*613 societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity
is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79)
in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the
interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity"
and the central principle of the "connexion in blood," how
they combine to become "the condition of community in political

[1] [See p. 66--Analyst]

121 functions." The political system as a structure with reference *613 to the territorial principle and descent system is the unit which the political analyst seeks to understand. To do so, he must concentrate his attention upon the local descent group, the corporate group (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:11; Leach 1954:128). Structural analysis in terms of functional group differentiation is preliminary to political content and political role analysis (Smith 1966:113-129). The objective 121 of this chapter is to define the basic political unit in Bedouin society and the set of authority relations which characterize it. We are looking for, what Maine referred to as, the "Corporation" and its "Public Officer" or "Corporation sole."

[128] The rest of this chapter is a discussion of the internal domestic structure of authority and the complex of values and beliefs which the Bedouins of al-Qasr express about a desired social order in terms of their principles of organization. Associative relationships based on kinship, residence and contract are morally supportive and hence authoritative; they structure as well as reflect a world order. Such relationships validate traditional authority and contribute to a system of social control.

619 Lineage Structure and Formal Categories

Not all residents of al-Qasr are members of the Awlad

619 'Ali tribe. There is one lineage, the Sulwatiyya shown in *[613] Figure 7a, which does not claim descent from Sa'ada and hence are no relations of the Awlad 'Ali Bedouin. Nor are any serious ideological claims for tribal membership provided by them or their Awlad 'Ali neighbors. The first social differentiation found in al-Qasr, then, is between those who belong to the Sa'adi tribes and those of the Marabit tribes. In terms of Bedouin social ideal types, the Sa'adi tribesmen are warriors, known for their courage and generosity; the Marabit tribesmen are weak and dependent on the protection [992] which the Sa'adi offers them. The Marabit tends to specialize in the role of "holy man." The dichotamy here is a reflection [171] of the structural differentiation, common to North Africa, between sacred and secular tribes, or client and protector tribes.

619 173 539 The Sa'adi-Marabit division in al-Qasr is defined geographically, in name, and in Bedouin tradition and myth. Here is the way in which the Marabit "holy man" of al-Qasr conceives of the difference between the two types and its origin:

> They are brothers and there is no difference. The Sa'adi is always one step in front of the Marabit, he handles things for the Marabit and helps him. In political matters the Sa'adi is more advanced . . . When the Marabit is in trouble, the Sa'adi will defend him. They are two different groups because the Sa'adi are from one mother. Once Sa'ada was riding in a caravan through the desert.

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> Her riding booth struck a tree and she found herself stranded there in the tree; her camel had gone and the rest of the caravan noticed nothing and continued on. Then a Marabit passed by and saw her there. He helped her down and they later married. She already had three sons to a former husband: Ali Ahmar, Ali Abyad and Sinaina. The Marabit also had children from another marriage. He was very rich and they could afford to live together. One day thieves began to harrass the man, but when the three Sa'adi sons offered him their help he told them not to bother with the thieves, that they would go away. But they did not, and they continued to harrass the man for a long time. The three sons were still very young at this time. When they grew up they asked the Marabit for arms and horses with which to fight off the thieves. They received them and succeeded in driving off the thieves. The Marabit was very happy and offered the three sons one-half of his wealth, and he was very rich. The sons refused this generous offer saying to the Marabit that they were no different from his other sons and would take only one-tenth of his wealth.

619 The differentiation between the Sa'adi and Marabit has structural consequences only in that it defines psychological types and tends to assign them to certain roles in society. By his [181] psychological make-up, the Marabit, who is weak and retiring, is unfit for the tasks which the Sa'adi undertakes, i.e., war, trade, and politics. It is, nevertheless, expected that the Marabit will act as a support mechanism for the secular operations of the Sa'adi. Usually, this support takes the form of financial contributions.

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675 Each Marabit group is related through contractual agreement to a Sa'adi group. For instance, the Sulwatiyya lineage of al-Qasr are members of the Jumi'at tribe, a Marabit tribe; when identifying themselves they will say

619 675 "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar."
All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as
*[613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary
group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of
the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with
Sa'adi tertiary groups. Traditionally, the Marabit group's
[682] main support activity was to share in the payment of the
blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the
Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory
and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit
blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the
[628] [682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his
client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a
[608] tribe." But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship
links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi
and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in
the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of
conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual
obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms.
[648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian govern-
ment, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective
[666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might
enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few
examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

619 675 and the Marabit.

The Qit'an tribe, based partly in Libya and partly
*[613] in Egypt, is a tribe in the same sense that the Awlad 'Ali
is one, i.e., at the secondary level of the lineage system.
[166] This tribe moved into Egypt sometime around 1900. The
[175] Bedouins of al-Qasr estimate that "50% of the Qit'an are
with Ali Ahmar,.30% with Sinaina, and 20% with Ali Abyad."
619 In 1956, certain events occurred in Libya which brought about
675 a declaration of independence from Sa'adi domination by the
578 Qit'an in that country. The Qit'an felt that their numbers
were sufficiently large enough that they should represent
themselves in the Libyan parliament. In other words, the
Marabtiin were no longer willing to settle for the traditional
social categories and role structures allotted to them. After
these events in Libya, some members of the Qit'an came to
Egypt and informed their brothers about the formation of the
tribe as a separate entity, and convinced the Egyptian Qit'an
to do the same--which they did.

The Bedouins say that the Governor of Marsa Matruh encouraged the Qit'an tribe to increase their numbers in the area after he learned of their desire to be free from Sa'adi domination. There had been a small number of Qit'an in the town of Marsa Matruh. This number quickly grew in size and political strength so that it could challenge the power of the 'Ali Ahmar who are considered the dominant tribe in this

619 675 578 area of the Western Desert. And, according to the Governor of the province, it is the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr who are the most powerful of the three primary segments of the 'Ali Ahmar; for example, they have succeeded in sending their 'umda (chief) to the National Assembly in Cairo. In fact, it was over the [666] election of the 'umda in 1964 that the split between the Marabit Qit'an and the Sa'adi Ali Ahmar became an open one and produced political rumblings among the tribes. This case makes explicit the relationship between the two types of tribes in the Western Desert, and gives an important instance of the operation of structural principles in defining groups and group relations.

619 675 666 578 During the national elections of 1964, it was the traditional duty of the Marabit to vote for his affiliated Sa'adi candidate. Since the Qit'an are allied in a client-protector relationship with the Ali Ahmar, all of the Marabtiin of this tribe should have given their votes to the 'umda of the 'Aishaibat who was seeking office to the National Assembly. But, instead, the Qit'an ran a candidate of their own--largely at the urging of the Governor, it is said. But, despite this Marabit opposition, the 'Aishaibat were successful in getting their 'umda elected. Furthermore, 619 675 578 626 the 'Aishaibat said that this rebellion of the Marabtiin could not go unpunished, that reprisals would be taken. The type of sanction which the 'Aishaibat directed against the

619 Qit'an is one which is employed in both the internal and
675 the external systems of political relations: it is an or-
578 626 ganized sanction taken by the corporate representatives
against socially disapproved behavior. Against the Marabtiin,
619 it involved a closure of group affiliation and protective
675 578 alliance usually obtainable through affinal ties. The Qit'an
*613 were prohibited from marrying into the 'Aishaibat primary
626 segment. The sanction was tested while I was in the field.
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> In March of 1965, 'Umda Ziyad of the Qit'an contracted a marriage for his son with one of the secondary groups of the 'Aishaibat. He went through all of the marriage preliminaries and paid a brideprice of 70 E.L. (Egyptian pounds). But afterwards, the girl's family, following the advice of the 'Aishaibi corporate heads, returned the brideprice and refused his offer. The 'Umda of the Qit'an then went to talk to the brothers of the girl (for her father was dead) and told them that he would pay a brideprice of 1000 E.L. "but I want the girl." He paid them part of the brideprice (for they had agreed in the face of this unusual offer) and sent a car to pick up the girl. The arrangement did not succeed, for the paternal cousin of the girl who, according to Bedouin custom and tradition, had a prior claim on her, stopped the car at gunpoint. The corporate heads had told the cousin that this was his right, and in this case, his duty. Then the corporate heads of the 'Aishaibat called a council, and the members met with the brothers of the girl. They told the brothers: "You know what happened at the time of the election. 'Umda Ziyad is 'Ali Ahmar and he should have voted for our _'umda_, but he tricked us." The brothers refused to be persuaded by the tribal leaders. They said that if anyone from the 'Aishaibat would pay them more than 1000 E.L., they would give their sister to him. The leaders warned the brothers that if they went through with this marriage they would each be fined 200 E.L. Finally, and after this meeting, the leaders went to 'Umda Ziyad himself with the threat, that were he to go through with this marriage "all of the 'Aishaibat will begin to fight you." The _'umda_

> 619 could not afford to risk such large scale conflict
> 675 and so he withdrew his offer of marriage to the
> 578 brothers. After this, as a display of authority and
> *613 an attempt to maintain something of the alliance
> 626 between their group and the Qit'an, the 'Aishaibi
> 582 leaders made the public announcement that the girl
> could marry anyone else, but not the son of 'Umda
> Ziyad.

619 The various sets of authority relations operative in the al-
675 Qasr area are obvious from this account, but they will be
*613 better defined as the discussion proceeds. Here, I only
wanted to make clear that the relationship between Sa'adi
and Marabit is one based upon contract and local contiguity,
and reinforced by cognation. There is no unilinear basis
for the relationship and no attempt to fit it into a "unilinear
[582] genealogical mould." The structural differentiation between
Sa'adi and Marabit seems to reflect a dominant-subjective
relationship, in the sense discussed by Weber (1947) and
Southall (1956), but its possible class overtones are played
down by the fact that there are normally no objections to
[851] intermarrying between groups. The Bedouin of al-Qasr say,
"what is the difference, the children from such a marriage
will be Sa'adi anyhow?"

619 The Sa'adi-Marabit differentiation is relatively
*613 unimportant for a study of al-Qasr itself, since the Marabit
number is so small--one lineage consisting of five brothers
and their families. The contrast between Sa'adi and Marabit,
secular and sacred tribes, becomes more important for a

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*613 study of the whole Western Desert, or in an analysis of contemporary politics in Marsa Matruh.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are, in this study, the 'Aishaibat of the 'Ali Ahmar of the Awlad 'Ali tribe. The [191] Bedouin tribal unit throughout the Middle East is described as a segmentary lineage system. Something of the meaning of this concept has already been made clear in our discussion of the structural principles of Bedouin society. This type [114] of society has been adequately analyzed by Evans-Pritchard (1940), Fortes (1945 and 1949), Smith (1956), Middleton and Tait (1958), and Peters (1960). My own ideas about the segmentary lineage society as it functions in al-Qasr derive from these sources.

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[642] Politically, the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr are a stateless society; they have no centralized political institution. The lineage system is the structural framework for social and political relations. The basis of government, i.e., the regulation of authority relations, is the balanced protraction of corporate groups which support institutional uniformities in the form of similar organization, ideology and procedure (Smith 1956). Although the various groupings of the segmentary system can be analytically identified, and each grouping thinks of itself as a distinct group, in actuality, it is difficult to define the groups because of the way in which each fuses into lesser or greater differentiated units in one

*613 situation or another (Middleton and Tait 1958:11). The most
571 effective approach to understanding the segmentary society,
121 in view of this dynamic situation, is to isolate the function-
*613
571 ally significant unit and to analyze its social and political
relations (Fortes 1945). This is what I attempted to do in
my study of the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr.

*613 In al-Qasr, the secondary segment, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is the basic unit of the social structure. This statement must be qualified seeing that this unit consists of a balanced opposition of smaller tertiary segments, and action at the secondary level is a resultant of political consensus at the tertiary level. However, the ties which emerge from descent, residence, marriage, and contract are highly moral and utilitarian ones; with reference to tribal politics, we can state that corporate action is consensual and most functional at the secondary segment level. We may consider this group, in terms of two levels of corporateness, the basic unit of 'Aishaibat political structure.

*613 All of the segmentary groups of the 'Aishaibat are
619 bound together by the same patrilineal principle; they all
trace descent to 'Ali the son of Sa'ada. This principle also links them to the "noble tribes" of Cyrenaica who claim descent from this same ancestress. This principle is the genealogical and ideological basis of a man's claiming to be "Sa'adi," or "Awlad 'Ali," or "Aishaibi," etc. In theory,

619 the segmentary system is considered by the Bedouins to be a
*613 monolithic unit: "The Awlad 'Ali are one." But, as with all
other segmentary lineage systems, in al-Qasr levels of segmentation reflect degrees of corporateness.

*613 Furthermore, the ideology of structural unity dissolves
178 before the empirical evidence of fission and fusion, processes
619 characteristic of the segmentary society in general. These
processes are not common in al-Qasr during the present time.
But they must have been in the past, because the segments
which Murray (1935) names as making up the Ali Ahmar include
only one of those which currently comprise the tribe. The
[578] only admission of fission which I could obtain from my informants was that, at one time, 'Ailit Ma'fas was a tertiary
[124] segment of 'Ailit Lazumi (see Figure 3). I received this
information from a number of my key informants so that it can
be accepted despite a denial to the contrary by some of my
other informants. There is no empirical link below the
secondary level to be discovered in the genealogical maps
of these two groups; kinship ties have been manipulated to
coincide with ideological claims. The fact that these two
lineages are now the wealthiest and most powerful in the al-Qasr area may be an indication that economic and political
motivations undermined the unity of 'Ailit Lazumi in the
*613 past. We shall have occasion to return to this opposition
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578 between the Lazumi and the Ma'fas when we discuss political

*613 178 578 [194] office in modern Bedouin society. Also, we will return to the processes of fission and fusion when we discuss Bedouin law. I will be able to show through the use of legal documents how one tertiary unit went through a process of fission, fusion and re-fusion with its secondary unit.

The capacity for fusion and fission is a result of a number of structural situations. First of all, it is the exercise of choice on the part of the tertiary segment members who have contracted alliance in the form of collective responsibility with other tertiary segments of the lineage. The choice to break off from the major group may be of two kinds: a severence of political ties with one group in favor of a new group or the natural process of segmentation as a response to ecological conditions. In the latter case, no new political alliances are formed, and it usually involves a married son going off to begin his own camp. It is only an expansion of the major or secondary group. But the former case is one of decimation: the secondary group contracts. In both cases, authority is exercised, either between father and son, or, between heads of corporate groups. *613 578 177 178 In al-Qasr, the capacity for either type of fission is limited by the political environment of the Egyptian nation-state, the highest level of authority which the Bedouin encounters. The classic functioning of the segmentary lineage system is, in the case of al-Qasr, being changed by extra-system factors. The

*613 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing
178 a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since
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578 that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959)
emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting
society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing;
depending upon the situation they use the concepts of *bait*,
'ait, *'aiela* and *qabiila* interchangeably. The term *bait*
literally means "house," the term *bait al-'Arab* may mean
"the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent"
[594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the
nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and
[596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the extended
[621] family is referred to as the *naja'*. A *naja'*, or camp,
usually consists of three or four tents. The word *bait* may
196 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and occasionally
*613 one might even refer to the secondary group as a
bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness.
The term *'aiela*, literally "family," is the word used most
often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The diminutive
of this word, i.e. *'ait*, usually refers to the subtertiary
group but it commonly designates the secondary group
[619] also. The term *qabiila*, "tribe," is the only word used for
the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are
196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

196 only from area to area but also from person to person.

121 In terms of the Bedouin social structure, it is useful
*613 to discuss politics as a set of authority relations operating
571 in a problem-solving situation. This operation takes place at all levels of the lineage system with the exception of the sub-tertiary group; below the tertiary group level authority is purely a function of certain kinship roles. Since we cannot analytically separate the political aspect of the role "family head" from the moral aspect of the role "father," it seems best to designate this type of authority as being something distinct from political authority. We will call this type of authority either "familial" or "domestic," and "political authority" will be considered to exist in cases where there is some degree of role specialization and role differentiation with respect to decision-making and problem-solving. As I conceptualize it, then, the tertiary group is a political group because it is structurally identified with a corporate office, or institutionalized role of leadership. At the end
[128] of this chapter, and in the next chapter, I will elaborate on this because it is a focal point of the study.

121 Structural principles designed to promote integration
571 in a society also shed light on the degree of coercion and
181 conflict in social "organization." Individuals and groups in society have interests and values which they seek to maximize in the face of competition and opposition from other individ-

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uals and groups. Radcliffe-Brown (1952:199) spoke of social relations existing where there was "some adjustment of respective interests, by convergence of interest, or by limitation of conflicts that might arise from divergence of interests." When a person or group has an interest in an object, material or immaterial, that object has a certain value for the person or group. Thus does the study of social structure become, for Radcliffe-Brown, "the study of interests and values as the determinants of social relations." Convergence of interests side by side with a divergence of interests characterizes any society, and all societies are segmented on one basis or another.

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I have found it enlightening to consider the segments of al-Qasr Bedouin society as "interest groups." Interest groups are the real groups which one can observe in either integration or conflict. They are real in the sense that their behavior can be observed. They are real in that they can be defined by a stable pattern of authority relations whereas other groups are non-existent in this sense. The tertiary group and the secondary group, in so far as it is a coordination of replicate corporate groups, are real groups in al-Qasr whereas the primary and tribal levels are theoretical or quasi-groups. That is, they are only potentially interest groups, seeing that, for the time being, they lack the common interests and coordinated activity to be classified as an authority, or political, or interest group.

Familial Authority and Rights and Duties in Kin Relations

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554 The analysis of authority structure, whether it has reference to a group as small as the family or as large as the nation, assumes as its unit of study the social position or the role. The role is the organized complex of rights and duties by which individuals, or categories of individuals, participate in an interactive process. Roles are linked together into a set, or a structure, by the rights which incumbents claim and the duties they fulfill (Linton 1936:113; Parsons and Shils 1951:23; Gluckman 1963:185). The heuristic value of role analysis is well established. Role theory has been referred to as "the highest level of generalization about social phenomena that has yet become in any sense operational (Southall 1959:17). 6

Since all social roles possess rights and duties just because they are defined with respect to other roles, we may assume that each and every social role has an authoritative aspect to it. The authoritative aspect of roles refers to the way in which authority positions relate in order to give form to an authority structure. We want to know how the authority positions at all levels of the authority structure function, but for the time being we are concerned with familial authority relations. Until we understand the operation of authority at the familial level, which is the source of legitimate political authority in a kin-based

121 571 moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the
554 internal and external systems of political relations.

577 As a result of the socialization process, and through
181 relations with other members of the family, an individual
[867] comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are intrinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience to the authority representing these standards is interpreted
[596] as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it represents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrangements central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

577 The value placed upon social order, and the structural
571 mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship,
181 residence and contract--inform an authority structure which
182 ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of legal norms at the level of the external political system. The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in integrating a larger population into their authority structure means that a common value is operative in the range of it; also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.
[593] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for
[691] the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

577 571 high value placed upon conformity to rules governing authority
181 relations makes Bedouin society of al-Qasr less individualistic
182 than, for instance, the Iatmul of New Guinea who "set no
exaggerated value upon extremely orderly behavior" (Bateson
1958:31). Social cohesion in al-Qasr is sustained through
what Durkheim called "mechanical solidarity."

593 The Bedouin father is in a disciplinary position over his washuun, his wife (wives) and his children. (The word, washuun, must be of Berber origin for I am unable to trace it in Arabic.) Although the father has the right to beat his washuun, the Bedouins say that he does so "only in rare cases, when it is necessary." During my time in the field I heard of no physical punishment being dealt out by a father.

The dyadic relationship of father and son roles is
the focal field of authority in the family. The pattern of
behavior in this relationship is marked typically by restraint
on the part of the son. The father orders and the son obeys
unquestioningly. If the father accidentally uses a taboo
[192] word, such as 'ammar which in standard Arabic means "to fill"
but in the Bedouin dialect means "to have sexual intercourse,"
the son will immediately depart the scene in a high state of
embarrassment. In this way, the boy is not only excluded
[561] from gatherings and activities in which his father participates,
but he is also made to maintain a respectable social
distance from his father's age-set. There are other ways of

593 handling the potential conflict between father and son and the successive generations which they represent; these are mechanisms which preclude intimacy between the father and the son. The social statuses of father and son are not

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permitted to overlap by their being participants in, or even present at, festive occasions, such as circumcision and wedding parties, occasions which are marked by erotic poems and lewd songs. It would be "wrong" for a father to accompany his son to one of these parties. In the one instance that I did observe a father and son together at a wedding party, the Bedouins explained the rare occurrence by pointing out that this was the man's only son, and so he treated him "like a brother."

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The Bedouins of al-Qasr recognize the aloofness of the father from the son and justify it as a training period to prepare the boy for the time when he will be on his own. One young man explained the underlying rationale of the father-son relationship in this way:

> There are different kinds of fathers. One wishes to make his son a man, to make his son self-dependent at an early age. Other fathers destroy the personalities of their sons. For instance, the first type of father gives his son the responsibility of selling something, or buying something, or of supervising a chore in his own place. But the second type of father is usually soft with his son; he doesn't depend on his son due to his young age. He is very cautious with him and will not send him anywhere, and if he does he will ask someone to look after him. Of course, the first type of father is good and the second type is bad.

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a reflection of the division of labor since the son, once grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 The most important duties of a father toward his
867 son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and
584 courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran, and he
872 must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to
593 Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend
852 [872] to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his
[583] education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries.
In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in
[177] showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family
593 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still
852 see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no
178 longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In
[626] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways
[431] by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing, or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

During the
593 [207] present time when most of the Bedouins own a transistor radio,
[177] a son will not even listen to songs or poetry broadcast over
the air if his father is within hearing distance. I once
witnessed a well-meaning father try unsuccessfully to get his
ten year old son to sit down and listen with him to the news
593 on the radio. This automatic deference paid to the father
561 is extended to all male elders: the father-son relationship
is the model for authority relations between generations.
[276] But there are degrees in which the model is applied to behavior; for instance, a boy will not smoke in front of his
older brother, his uncles and grandfather, but will feel no
uneasiness about smoking in the company of an elder with
whom he has no immediate authority relationship.

593 The filial piety which marks the father-son authority relationship is owed to the father until his death. As the son grows older, he may show a little less constraint but he still plays the role of the subordinate. For example, I never saw a son argue with his father over anything during my stay in the field, with one serious exception. One man who had broken off friendly relations with his brother objected to the presence of his brother's sons at the wedding of his own daughter. When he threatened to cause a public scene to embarrass his nephews before the other guests, his own sons defended the right of their cousins to be at their sister's wedding. They told their father that his quarrel

593 was with his brother and not his brother's sons. When the
father persisted with his intention to embarrass his nephews,
his sons, as a last alternative, threatened to leave him.
In the face of this threat, the father capitulated.

The rights and duties of the father-son relationship,
although they do not change in sentiment, will change in
content during the lifetime of the father. The main change
[421] in content will be a reflection of a change in property relations.
593 The Bedouin believe that this is the way it ought
577 to be; they say that

> A son must respect and obey his father. The son must do anything that he can to help and please his father. When the son grows up and begins to earn money, he must contribute generously to his father. A son pleases his father by giving him money and helping him to be comfortable.

593 In boyhood and manhood, the father has disposal over his son's
596 labor. As long as a son lives in his father's naja' this is
[464] so. One son, who worked for an American oil company in the
desert, regularly turned over his pay check to his father.
It is the father who decides where the son will live, and,
whether or not he will have his own domicile away from the
[591] main naja'. When the son marries and brings his wife to the
naja', he will usually set up his tent next to his father's
tent. The tent is given to the boy by his father. During
593
431 the son's growing-up period, he will be given, as gifts on
various occasions, a sheep or a number of sheep which will
be kept with the father's flock.

593 be kept with the father's flock. Only in the case of a
[591] man's owning, or using, a large piece of land in the pasture area of al-Qasr will his son live away from the main part of the _naja'_, i.e., away from his father's tent. The son then serves as his father's shepherd.

593 In the _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr, the pattern is gener-
591 ally the same except that the son will be given a room in
184 the house rather than a tent when he marries. Since the land in this area is more scarce and a matter of official ownership, the son is not likely to have his own house during his father's lifetime.

593 When the son does marry, the marriage proceedings may
584 be initiated by either the son or the father. But, under no circumstances that I heard of, would the son approach the father with the idea of his marriage; the son should communicate his desire to marry, first of all, to either his father's brother or his mother's brother. As the Bedouins
593 say, "Marriage is an agreement between fathers." What they
584 mean is that marriage is an agreement between tertiary groups.
*613 A father upon hearing of his son's wish to marry, for the boy's uncle will immediately tell the father, consults with the head of his tertiary group about such a proposed marriage. This is not a formal procedure but, certainly, the father would not go ahead with the marriage without making the matter public. In other words, marriage in al-Qasr is a

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*613
[593] public corporate affair and not a private one.

The head of the boy's tertiary group then relays the information about the marriage to the heads of the other tertiary segments which make up the secondary group. Again, this is an informal procedure but all corporate representatives must be informed of, and must approve of, the proposed marriage. Thus is the corporate channel of communication kept open and the corporate network of authority relations maintained through a reciprocal exchange of rights and duties. It is, as Fortes (1949:209) has noted, the lineage principle which compels a man to consult and gain the support of his lineage-mates in any matter of importance, or even in trivial matters. Demands are channeled through the corporate lines, "for no jural act takes place except in the framework of the lineage system."

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[593] If the father should not consult the secondary group concerning his son's marriage--he may anticipate objections and consider his son's desires above those of the group--there are sanctions, forms of moral coercion, which can be applied by the group. First, a man may be fined if he goes through with an objectionable marriage; added to this, the man may be denied access to the preferred channels of marriage which exist within the lineage; lastly, dependent upon the gravity of the situation, the man may be threatened with expulsion from the lineage group.

593 The daughter and wife roles are also subject to the dominant role of father in al-Qasr Bedouin society. The father has virtually the right of life and death over his daughter in certain situations. But in no case does he have
593 this right over his wife. The differentiation in right here
*613 is again a matter of the authority principle operating within the framework of the lineage system. A man's daughter belongs
[851] to his patrilineage or authority group while his wife belongs to the authority group of her father. There is an obvious
[582] exception to this statement about Bedouin society, for given the practice of parallel-cousin marriage a man and his wife can belong to the same authority group, the same tertiary
593 group. Even so, only the father has the right of life and death over the girl who is his daughter. The Bedouins say, "The bones of the girl belong to the father." There are two
593 situations in which a father may rightfully put his daughter
684 to death: when she is found guilty of pre-marital intercourse (loss of virginity), or if it is proved that she has had any extra-marital sexual activity. In either case, if the husband were to kill the girl he would be guilty of murder and his group would have to forfeit blood-money or be threatened with retaliation. I heard of no such actual cases.

593 The father's major duty toward his daughter is to
584 provide her with "a good marriage." This, of course, parallels his duty toward his son and emphasizes that a father is con-

593 cerned with his own and his group's status in marriage arrangements.
[584] One informant said that a rich man must marry into a
[581] rich group. The Bedouin have a saying which is relevant here:
*[613] "Your bait is equal to the bait into which you marry." Before
her marriage the girl's duty toward her father is to respect
and obey him. After her marriage "her only duty is that she
[958] must visit him from time to time. If he becomes sick, and
he has no wife, she must care for him and nurse him."

593 It was a common sight to see a Bedouin father fondle
834 his daughter of age six years or younger, but beyond this
age physical intimacy ceases. The Bedouin say that a father should not kiss or hold on his knee a daughter over the age of eleven. After the girl marries, a definite avoidance custom characterizes the father-daughter role relationship. The Bedouin say that the father will not see the face of his daughter after her marriage. This means that the married daughter remains veiled before her father, and even before her older brothers. This type of avoidance custom is rare by comparison with the cross-cultural data (Driver 1966).

593 A wife obeys her husband concerning all matters: "she does not even leave the house without his permission." A woman may go and complain to her father if her husband does not provide for her, i.e., with food and clothing, or if he unjustly beats her or continually threatens to beat her. On the other hand, if a woman is in the wrong "it is

593 not considered bad for a man to beat his wife." In the case
593 of ill-treatment by the husband, her father may take the
*613 matter to the corporate head. Traditionally, the corporate
[792] head would order the husband to move his tent next to the
tend of the "holy man" or some other third party, so that
he would be dissuaded against such behavior. Another reason
[586] for this is so that the girl might have witnesses to support
her petition for divorce should the husband continue to beat
her. I heard of no wife-beating while I was in al-Qasr.

595 The Quran states that a man may lawfully take four
[779] wives, but that if he feels he cannot treat each of them
equally, he should take only one (Sura IV:3 and 129). The
Bedouins are conscientious in practicing this rule, though
595 perhaps not for religious reasons. If a man has more than
593 one wife, he must spend an equal amount of time with each.
Conflict between co-wives is lessened by the fact that a man
will have separate tents, or rooms in the case of a house,
for each wife. A man will not buy a dress or a piece of jewelry
for one wife without buying a copy of it for all other wives.
595 On a trip to the Siwa Oasis, I was accompanied by a man who
593 had three wives and wished to bring them a gift of basketry
114 upon his return. He was successful in buying two baskets
which were similar but could not find a comparable third in
[431] the oasis market. In dismay, he made a gift of the baskets
to me and returned with no souvenirs at all. One of my in-

One of my in-

595 124 formants, a wealthy man and a poet, said that since he could not love two women equally he would never take a second wife. He also said that he was unwilling to give his daughter to a man who refused to promise him that she would be his only wife.

593 Throughout his life, the father is dominant and his washuun is subjective. He is the master of his naja' and the [596] social behavior of his wife and offspring toward him has both a moral and a pragmatic aspect. They show respect and obed- [768] ience because "it is the decent thing to do;" further, just as he provides for their material needs while he is alive, so the property which he leaves them will sustain them after 428 his death. As we have already noted, in theory, the daughters [562] inherit one-half of the shares which the sons receive; in fact, females inherit only if they are the sole survivors of the male. But the surviving wife, or wives, will take a cash amount equal to their brideprice from the husband's estate. The Bedouins say that this price will be paid before any other inheritance shares are distributed. In addition, the 768 wife has the right to remain in her husband's house or tent, and it is the duty of the eldest son to look after her. She may remain at home until death, provided she never brings a man who may be considered a prospective husband into the house.

593 The rights and duties involved in the father-washuun relationship show that the ideal authority structure of the

593 family is a dominant-subjective one. But the rights and
duties of the father have no legal sanctions. His authority
grows out of the moral and mutual dependence, the common
interests and value, which hold the family together. The
593 authority relations learned in the family become the norms
183 of behavior to be applied by the individual in a wider-scale
867 network of social relations. The son learns the discipline-respect
relationship which is the model of behavior between
generations. The subjective role which the daughter plays
in the father-daughter relationship prepares her for the
role of wife.

Marriage and Kinship Relations

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The parallel-cousin, the father's brother's daughter,
is the preferred mate in Bedouin marriage. Parallel-cousin
marriage in al-Qasr is more of an ideal than a practice. In
fact, parallel-cousin marriage is not practical in the case
where social order depends upon the integration of a larger
and clearly segmented population. Endogamy of this kind in
this type of society works against survival in a double-edged
way: economic security through cooperation with a
larger group is discouraged, and political security through
171 coalition is undermined. In the Middle East, as elsewhere,
582 cross-cousin marriage is the normative practice which functions
"as a counterweight to the tendency of unilineal descent group-

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ing to harden social barriers" (Fortes 1953:29).

Wood (1959:74) notes that only 13.3 per cent of the marriages in a Palestinian Arab village, and 9.1 per cent of the marriages in a Syrian Druze village were parallel-cousin marriages. But although parallel-cousin marriage was infrequent, marriage within the secondary group was consistently high. This is true in general for the Middle East. Baer (1964:64) reports that 62.2 per cent of all the marriages in a southern Iraqi village were between members of the secondary group. Rosenfeld (1957), in a comparative study of three Palestinian villages, found the frequency of parallel-cousin marriage to be less than 13.0 per cent in all three villages while the frequencies for intra-secondary group marriage were 33.7 per cent, 31.5 per cent, and 55.8 per cent.

The function of parallel-cousin marriage has been variously explained. The early Orientalists claimed that this form of marriage "strengthened kin ties and kept property in the family" (Westermarck 1925:151). It was noted that the ties between cousins are stronger than those between spouses, that "blood ties are indissoluble but that of matrimony is very precarious" (Lane 1908:161). Patai (1962:170-173) seems to make parallel-cousin marriage a condition for society in the Middle East: this type of marriage functions to keep property in the family; it assures continuation of group harmony in that it presents no new adaptive social situations;

582 and, the individual has been socially conditioned to prefer
171 his father's brother's daughter.

582 All of these explanations are as plausible as they
183 are obvious. They are, in fact, the same explanations which the Bedouins themselves offer for their marriage ideal. But one cannot help noticing that the explanations offered actually concern an ideal in Bedouin social behavior, and not a practice. Theories showing the logic of parallel-cousin marriage are placed along side the fact that this type of marriage is statistically atypical.

582 If, as Islamic Law decrees, the daughter did inherit
428 some share of her father's property, then parallel-cousin
[671] marriage as an attempt to keep land in the tertiary group would be logical. But we know that usually the sons inherit all of the father's property, Islamic Law to the contrary (Levy 1957:245-246). In this case, parallel-cousin marriage can only be seen as an ideal which functions side by side with the other ideal of a girl's right to inherit.

582 Barth (1954), and Murphy and Kasdan (1959) have
171 stressed the political advantages which attach to parallel-cousin marriage in the context of factional struggle. The general idea is that political differentiation between collateral branches of the lineage structure is intensified and political autonomy enhanced by the practice of turning affinal bonds inward. Parallel-cousin marriage then has the opposite

582 171 effect of cross-cousin marriage which is a way for kinship groupings to interrelate and to increase the integration of a larger population.

582 171 114 Such an explanation of parallel-cousin marriage may suffice for an analysis of politics in the tribal mountain villages of Kurdistan. Because Barth (1954:68) found that 48.0 per cent of the Kurd marriages were with the father's brother's daughter, we must assume that this type of relationship is politically significant. But we must question the fact that Murphy and Kasdan arrive at the same conclusion when dealing with parallel-cousin marriage as an abstract concept. If this type of marriage is really politically rational behavior, then it should be the normative practice in the Middle East. In other words, Murphy and Kasdan are explaining a phenomenon which exists only as a cultural ideal, and one which may have never really been a general practice at all--except in those few cases of adaptation to ecological extremes, such as pure nomadism and mountain tribalism. The few records which we have on the marriage practices of pre-Islamic and early Islamic Arabia indicate that parallel-cousin marriage was highly atypical in the Mecca and Hijaz areas. For instance, of the 71 marriages recorded for the Quraish only 9 were with father's brother's daughter and 32 of them were within the secondary group. In the Hijaz, only 15 of 113 marriages, or 3.3 per cent, were with the parallel-cousin (Patai 1962: Ch.6).

582 (Patai 1962:Ch. 6).

171 The point of this is that most of the Middle East's inhabitants are villagers dependent upon agriculture. The dominant form of marriage is not parallel-cousin marriage. As a matter of fact, marriage may or may not be considered exogamous depending upon the level of segmentation at which one wishes to draw the line for his definition of endogamy. Ayoub (1959) suggests that parallel-cousin marriage be considered only as an extreme expression of an overall preference for endogamy. She found in a sample of 514 marriages from a Syrian village that 9.1 per cent of them were with the parallel-cousin while 63.4 per cent were within the secondary group. She concludes from this that intra-lineage marriage is frequent enough that it cannot be accounted for by random mate selection.

582 In 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-Qasr, out of 197 recorded
162 marriages over a period of five generations the frequency of
*[613] parallel-cousin marriage was 11.1 per cent and marriage within
the lineage was 41.6 per cent of the total. Of these 197
[595] marriages, only 39 were cases of polygny and most of these
involved a man taking two wives (see Table 5 below).

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196 The confusion over the presence or absence of parallel-cousin marriage in the Middle East is related to the question of whether or not the researcher and the native are talking about the same thing. In Qasr, for instance, the term

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 116]

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	GENERATIONS					
	5th	4th	3rd	2nd	1st	Total
EXOGAMY						
Extra-Awlad 'Ali	3	11	20	24	3	61
Extra-'Ali Ahmar	1	2	2	1	0	6
Extra-'Aishaibat	1	3	6	4	1	15
Extra-'Ailit Ma'fas	0	1	15	12	5	33
	5	17	43	41	9	115 (58.4%)
ENDOGAMY (within 'Ailit Ma'fas)						
FaBrDa	1	2	8	10	1	22
FaBrSoDa	1	3	3	2	0	9
FaFaBrSoDa	0	0	3	10	5	18
FaFaBrSoSoDa	0	3	1	7	0	11
FaFaFaBrSoDa	0	0	0	0	3	3
FaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	3	4	3	10
FaFaFaBrSoSoSoDa	0	0	1	2	0	3
FaFaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	0	3	0	3
FaFaFaFaFaBrSoSoDa	0	0	0	0	3	3
	2	8	19	38	15	82 (41.6%)
Total	7	25	62	79	24	197

TABLE 5

HISTORY OF EXOGAMY AND ENDOGAMY FOR 'AILIT MA'FAS

582 "parallel cousin" (i.e. *bint 'amm*) is perfectly interchangeable
114 with the term "parallel-cousin once removed" (i.e. *bint ibn*
196 *'amm*, "daughter of the father's brother's son"). After I
[124] had familiarized myself with the genealogies of al-Qasr, I began to realize that many of my informants were using the term *bint 'amm* to refer to the parallel-cousin once, twice, or even thrice removed. When I pointed this out to one of the Bedouins, he replied: "So what, there is nothing forbidden about this type of marriage." Table 5 shows that this is
582 indeed the case. There are a number of cultural ideals
183 which influence the practice of marriage in al-Qasr: endo-
182 gamy is encouraged because it cements and intensifies corporate ties; exogamy is desired because it widens the web of kinship; men prefer younger women to older women and may utilize their cousin-right privilege to realize this preference.

582 The Bedouins of al-Qasr define the *bint 'amm* over a
829 wide range. One informant said that "all of the girls of the Awlad 'Ali tribe are my *bint 'amm*, we are all one." Another said to me, that "any girl of the 'Ali Ahmar is a man's *bint 'amm*." And yet another informed me that "a man of the Qinaishat tribe will reserve his daughter for me before he will give her to an outsider." Ideologically, a *bint 'amm* seemed to be anything except the father's brother's daughter. This is quite convenient for the Bedouins because an ideological concept can be placed anywhere along the scale of actuality

582 depending upon the needs of the situation.

829 But one is able to differentiate between the various 582 meanings of bint 'amm in al-Qasr. First of all, the Bedouins 196 make an initial dichotomy between the bint 'amm daira (daira = *613 "homeland") and the bint 'amm shaqiiqa (shaqiiqa = "full sister"). The first term refers to any girl within the primary level of segmentation, i.e., the 'Aishaibat, and the latter term refers to the actual father's brother's daughter. Any marriage within the secondary group, i.e., 'Ailit Ma'fas, is referred to simply as a bint 'amm marriage--even if it is really a bint ibn 'amm marriage. A man has an actual moral claim upon his bint 'amm shaqiiqa: such a marriage is an agreement between their fathers who are brothers. A man cannot claim his bint 'amm daira but he might assume that if she is not claimed by her father's brother's son (ibn 'amm), his claim will be favored over that of an outsider.

582 The differentiation between these two types of cousin role is made in terms of rights and obligations which define social relations in al-Qasr. Social action is based upon these expectations of behavior. In al-Qasr, a man really does claim his bint 'amm shaqiiqa. If his claim is thwarted, he will attempt to do something about it, and whatever the consequences, his group is committed to back him in this [182] matter. Parallel-cousin marriage may be an important basis [578] for integration, or it may be the cause of bitter conflict.

584 A girl has the right to refuse to marry her ibn 'amm. 582 But if she exercises this right, he can actually insure that she remains unmarried for the rest of her life. While I was in the field there were three cases of a girl refusing to marry her cousin. In one, the boy was persuaded into allowing the bint 'amm to marry his rival. In this case, the rival presented the girl's cousin with a sheep and a small cash sum. The Bedouins say that a man will claim his cousin even if he does not wish to marry her. He will wait until someone does wish to marry the girl, and then he will demand a payment from the suitor for the right to marry his cousin. In another case, a man and his daughter of a Marabit tribe came to al-Qasr to plant a small patch of barley during the rainy season. While they were there, the father married the girl off to a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas. The father did this despite the fact that her cousin back in her own territory had made explicit his claim to her. *[613] [686] The father, when he returned home, was fined 30 L.E. by his lineage, the money going to the girl's cousin as a "expiatory payment." The father could afford to do this considering the large brideprice which he received from 'Ailit Ma'fas, and the fact that he had no other sons or daughters to marry off meant that he need not fear the closure of marriage channels by the group. In the third case, a girl openly refused to marry her cousin because she loved another man. To avoid conflict, her father said that

582 [584] she could marry no man.

582 Most of the older Bedouins say that bint 'amm marriage
578 as it is practiced in the desert is an evil, that it causes
nothing but trouble. They say that if there are bad feelings
between two men they will place claims upon each other's
sister with the intention of preventing the girls from ever
marrying. The younger Bedouins say that "it is better to
marry the bint 'amm than to let a stranger take her." The
[182] claim on the bint 'amm, of course, should be seen as a basis
[571] for social relationships between groups, regardless of any
[586] conflict it may or may not lead to. This is why the Bedouins
say that a man "will never divorce his bint 'amm, because if
he does that means that she is no good." It follows, then,
that if "she is no good" none of her other paternal cousins
will marry her. Implicit here is the reference to the making
[182] and breaking of group ties. Similarly, to regulate and to
maximize kinship ties, a man can claim only one of his
father's brother's daughters. In the case where there is
only one bint 'amm, her eldest cousin has first claim to her.
582 This sometimes causes conflict between brothers as the fol-
578 lowing informant's story indicates.
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> The father of Salih and Aziz was dead which meant that Aziz, being the elder, would have to furnish the brideprice if Salih were to marry first. In fact, Salih wanted to marry his bint 'amm. Aziz refused him permission to do so: Aziz had first claim to the bint 'amm, and, also, he thought that the brideprice which

> 582 578 159 her father was asking was too high. Salih was angry, so angry that he swore to kill any man who tried to take his bint 'amm. He went away to the Nile Valley to earn enough money to pay the high brideprice. In the meantime, the cousin of the brothers came and paid Aziz for the permission to marry the girl. Salih returned, but, of course, he could not kill his own paternal cousin. He became ill and went into a sleep which lasted for three days. Salih had always been known for his powerful voice but when he awoke he had a very weak voice. Salih never spoke to his brother again. He died seven years ago without every marrying.

582 578 829 [182] This story has aprocryphal aspects which announce this to be an important issue in Bedouin culture. The subject of parallel-cousin marriage is a complex one surrounded by controversy and contradiction. The older Bedouins say that the practice is a source of conflict, but they will usually insist that at least one of their sons marry his bint 'amm to insure the corporate link with the brother. In support of their complaints, they say that bint 'amm marriage is not morally sanctioned: "We do not like it and it is not right. But if we try to stop our sons from taking their cousins they will put a gun on their shoulder and go after her." On the other hand, this is contrasted with the complaints of the elders that their sons no longer respect their marriage habits, that they are marrying anyone these days: "Our sons resent the bint 'amm marriage because it is an agreement between fathers." 582 While I was in the field, three marriages took place; one was with the bint 'amm, and the other two were outside the secondary group but within the primary group, i.e., inter-lineage.

585 178 Only one of the three weddings was conducted in the
traditional way with three nights of dancing previous to the
wedding and a large feast on the wedding day. The Bedouin
say that a man can no longer afford to do things the old way.
584 The procedure of the marriage arrangement begins when the boy
informs his uncle that he wishes to marry. Then the uncle,
[583] the father and other males of the group meet with the father
of the prospective bride to arrange the marriage, an important
part of which is the establishment of the brideprice (hulwaan
584 or mahr). Before going to see the girl's father, the boy's
*613 father consults with his secondary lineage group, as I have
already mentioned. Then he should wait for a period of
seven days, for the girl's father, "who has heard about the
marriage," must consult with his group and wait for a period
of one week during which time any member of the girl's
584 lineage may claim her. After this time, the ties proposed
[675] by the marriage are ritualized by two preliminary acts:
the writing of the contract (ma'azuum) between the fathers,
and the offering of a lamb by the groom which solemnizes his
intentions and the marriage (dabah fi-l-walliyya). After
[431] another waiting period of about two weeks, during which
time the boy buys gifts of clothing and jewelry and presents
them to the girl at her home, the wedding celebration begins.
585 On the day of the wedding, the girl is delivered to the
groom's residence. The girl remains in the groom's tent, or

585 room, until he arrives for the test of her virginity. The
groom "takes blood with his finger," wipes it on the white
toga which his bride had been veiled with, and hands it to
the older women waiting outside the tent. In the meantime,
[792] the two fathers have met with the _faqiih_ ("holy man") who
[675] witnesses the agreement on the _mahr_ payment. They read the
Fatiha of the Quran together and conclude the marriage contract.
The old women, carrying the toga with the virginal
blood on it--a symbol of honor to both of the groups concerned
with the marriage--parade around the guests' tent
showing it, while all the time letting out shrill victory
cries (_zaghaariid_ = "trilling cries of joy"). The toga is
then pinned-up on the side of the guests' tent for all to
585 see. Animals are slaughtered and the feast begins. The
574 central activity of the feast takes place in the guests'
tent, the tent of the male guests. The groom's father, in
[576] the traditional role of host, does not sit down to eat with
his guests but directs the seating and feeding of them.

585 Should it happen that the girl is not a virgin, the
684 wedding would end on the spot, and the girl would be sent
away or killed by her father. My informants said that this
has never happened in al-Qasr. One key informant told me
that such a thing never happens because the groom would never
permit it to be known that "his cousin was not a virgin." In
other words, the groom will get the blood from somewhere,

585 [684] probably by pricking himself, and will wipe it on the toga.

About two weeks after the wedding, the bride and
585 606 groom take a lamb or a goat and go to spend a few days with
[574] the bride's parents. The Bedouin say that the relationship
between the groom and his in-laws is extremely important.
The man should treat his wife's mother and father as if they
were his own. "When a man's father-in-law and mother-in-law
come to visit him, he must slaughter a lamb for them. He
must respect both of them. Remember, this man and woman are
the grandparents of his children."

585 The marriage, then, is only the first step in the
571 ritualization of new group bonds established between the
182 families of the bride and groom. Bonds are subsequently in-
[574] tensified through a process of visitation, gift-exchange and
[431] sacrifice. The most important factor linking the two groups
[782] is the actual presence of the bride in the midst of her hus-
*[613] band's group, for she remains, in terms of the patrilineal
585 principle, a member of her father's lineage. This is made
*613 perfectly clear by the fact that she is referred to, never
551 by her name but, by the name of her tribal grouping if she is
571 other than 'Aishaibi. If she is of the 'Aishaibat tribe,
182 she will be referred to as bint of so-and-so. Hence the
[193] Bedouins stress the importance of extra-group bonds by re-
ferring to the women in their residence group as al-Qinaishiyya
or al-Kamailiyya, for instance (-iyya is the Arabic feminine
marker).

182 marker).

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[585]
In al-Qasr, if a man's mother is 'Aishaibiiya, he will refer to her as ummi ("my mother"): if she is otherwise, he will refer to her by the tribal tag, i.e. al-Qinaishiyya. A man will also add the name of his mother's tribe, to identify himself with the tribe and to symbolize tribal links, as an appendage to his own full name. The use of the maternal appendage by an individual links him to his mother's tribe through the idea of what Peters (1960:29) has called "the concept of the one womb of maternal origin."

In the case of al-Qasr, this maternal appendage refers to links with the mother's tribe at the primary level (see Figure 9). For instance, two brothers of the Bait Abd al-Malik might wish to differentiate between their maternal origins for some reason or other; one would refer to himself as Yunis Abd al-Malik al-Kamailiyya and, the other as Jabril Abd al-Malik al-Qinaishiyya. This is shown in Figure 9, page 125.

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[182]
Although a person is obviously related to the mother's tribe through the mother, this matrilateral structural relationship is expressed as one between the individual and his mother's brother's tribe. The set of relationships surrounding the sister's son-mother's brother dyad is central to Bedouin political organization; it is the basis for the formation of relations of alliance along cognatic lines.

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FIGURE 9 - USE OF MATERNAL APPENDAGE OR SUFFIX


WIFE FROM KAMAILAT TRIBE
ABD AL-MALIK
WIFE FROM QINAISHAT TRIBE
YUNIS ABD AL-MALIK AL-KAMAILIYYA
JABRIL ABD AL-MALIK AL-QINAISHIYYA

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182 The sister's son-mother's brother relationship receives a high degree of attention in al-Qasr. No other kinship relationship except for that between the father and the son is better defined. Peters (1965:135) sees the importance of the sister's son-mother's brother relationship to be based on the need for economic symbiosis. This factor, but also the necessity for political cooperation, probably account for the central significance of this relationship. One chief politi-
[181] cal value, i.e., one type of behavior valued by the group and
[867] relevant to the political process (see LeVine 1960), which
[865] Bedouin children learn relates to the desire to avoid conflict, especially if it concerns their mothers' tribes. Children are taught that any quarrel, however slight at first, could conceivably grow to become a large-scale tribal war.

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war.

The Bedouins of al-Qasr are conscious of the practicality of external kinship ties. The role of mother's brother becomes a significant symbol for the maintenance of these ties. Boys are supposed to respect their khal ("mother's brother") in order "to avoid wars which could end the world." The Bedouins claim vehemently that "no quarrel can happen between me and a member of that tribe because my brother has married into that tribe." They make the value of the mother's brother link very explicit: "Marriage into other tribes makes quarrels impossible."

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[181]

There are many Bedouin proverbs pointing to the place of the mother's brother in the social structure. Proverbs, in any culture, trace out areas of behavior which have become important. Kenneth Burke (1957:256) says of proverbs, that they are "strategies for dealing with situations. In so far as situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes." The Bedouins likewise look upon proverbs as templates for behavior. They say that "we should heed proverbs because they are the words of the elders; they are like a white flag which marks the way, and people should not go beyond these flags."

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[829]

A most common proverb which elevates the mother's

604 538 brother to special place in the social structure states that
[539] "Two-thirds of the boy belongs to the khal, and he is like the
father: the remaining one-third is divided equally between
the father and the khal." The Bedouins are always quick to
point out to the stranger, such as I was, that this means
there is only one-sixth of the boy which belongs to the
father. A clearer case of the ideology of kinship versus
[539] descent could not be had. Another proverb has it that "the
good which you see in a boy comes from khal khalu ("the
maternal uncle of his maternal uncle"). Any kinship relation
may be the basis for a new network of social relations by
making use of the classificatory principle. The Bedouins
[539] exaggerate the status and role of the mother's brother by
saying that "when a boy does good or bad, one wants to know
the name of his khal not the name of his father." This
statement, which favors cognatic links over patrilineal ties,
is not true but such an attempt at emphasis indicates that
this relationship is something of value in the Bedouin society.

604 In the case of any conflict "between his tribes," the
578 Bedouins say, "the boy must support the tribe of his khal."
This, of course, does not mean that the individual should
take up arms against his patrilineal corporate group, but
that he should seek to mediate the conflict. The political
562 593 value of conflict avoidance and conflict control is also
554 182 578 conspicuous in the dual role which the mature female plays

562 in Bedouin society, that is, the role of wife-daughter. The
593
554 principles of patrilineality and cognation do not work against
182 each other when the girl marries outside her corporate group,
578 nor does her new dual role present a case of role conflict.

562 On the contrary, the wife-daughter role functions to bind to-
593
554 gether two groups which are structurally differentiated by
182
578 the rule of patrilineality. During time of peace, the wife-
*613 daughter acts as a bond-maker by carrying gifts back and
[431] forth between the two groups, often bringing some of her
[628]
[574] younger patrilineal relatives back to her husband's house or
tent for short visits. During a time of conflict or war, the
562
593 Bedouins point out, she is the only person who can cross the
554 battle lines unharmed. She is a match-maker as well as a
[726]
[584] peace-maker. Often she influences the selection of mates by
individuals in both her husband's group and her father's
562 group. The Bedouins say that "after the bint 'amm, a man
593 should marry his bint khal ("mother's brother's daughter")
554 because she is like his bint 'amm." Usually, over a period
582 of a few generations, a given direction in marriage is sustained (see Figure 10), and it is one function of this wife-daughter role to accomplish this important political action.

562 The role of wife-daughter, then, may be seen as one
593 important aspect of what Fortes (1953:33) calls, "complemen-
554 tary filiation," the essential mechanism which provides the
*613
182 link between the corporate groups of al-Qasr society and the kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent.

000 kin groups of the parent who does not determine descent. A
182 corollary aspect of the filiation principle in al-Qasr is the
601
602 practice of collaterally extending the term, *khal*, to include
604 many others besides the real mother's brother. This usage
[114] of classificatory terminology, like that in the case of *bint
601 'amm*, leads to confusion for the fieldworker. When an in-
604 dividual marries into an outside group, or even within the
561 secondary group, the wife's brother becomes *khal* not only to
182 the offspring of the marriage, but to all the children (*awlad*)
at the same generation level as the offspring. All boys of
the age of sister's son will refer to his mother's brother
as *khali* ("my mother's brother"). Besides extending the web
of kinship, this practice also has the function of uniting
age-mates of the local descent group.

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582 Throughout this discussion of mother's brother, I
[829] have been stressing the fact that the sentiment which a
Bedouin develops toward this person is to be construed as a political value, i.e., a behavioral disposition relevant to the political process. It is patent then that the sister's son-mother's brother relationship should be more crucial in exogamous marriages, for in these cases cognation becomes the principal mechanism for establishing authority relations and effecting political alliance. In endogamous marriages, cognation complements the other structural principles which define the corporate group, and makes it the corporate group *par excellence*.

000 par excellence.

604 829 867 The inculcation of political values is part of the socialization process. A Bedouin boy is taught that his khal is a very special person, and one whom he should admire. It is commonplace in al-Qasr to hear small boys matching the exploits and skills of their maternal uncles, bragging and exaggerating about their khal: this one is a great horseman, and that one is a great marksman with the rifle. On the other hand, if the mother's brother is from within the local group, rights and obligations toward him will be structured in terms of other kinship roles which take precedence according to the 604 602 582 rule of descent. For instance, in the ideal-typical case of bint 'amm marriage the mother's brother of sister's son would also be the father's father's brother's son in relation to ego. This would mean, in another way, that ego's mother's [605] brother is also ego's father's parallel cousin. Male parallel cousins "are like brothers," and so ego would be expected to behave toward this person not as a "mother's brother" but as a "father." Whereas the boy enjoys a certain freedom of expression and comradeship with his exogamous mother's brother, he would have to pay "father-like" respect and obedience to his endogamous mother's brother.

604 582 The crucial importance of the khal, and the political significance of the bonds which this role represents, is made clear in the following statement of an informant who contrasted

604
582 the exogamous and endogamous mother's brother.

> If the khal is from outside the tribe, we can do no wrong to him if he does no wrong to us. If the khal is a member of the tribe, he is respected; but not like the khal from outside the tribe. The feeling between a man and his khal is much stronger if the khal is from outside the tribe. Within my own 'aiela (secondary group), I respect the maternal uncles of Bait so-and-so as much as I respect the maternal uncles of my own bait (tertiary group).

[829] Ideas and sentiment about the mother's brother as they are related to complementary filiation should be interpreted as having a definite influence on marriage practice and politics in al-Qasr.

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*613 A sample from the marriages of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 10 below) shows that endogamous marriages are no more frequent than those which function to bring a new member into the corporate group--although the man's spouse never [589] really becomes a member of the lineage. Only five of the seventeen marriages were within the 'aiela, and one of these was a case of sororate which acted to maintain an already established tie. Six of the marriages were with groups not belonging to the Awlad 'Ali tribe. In each of these cases, with the exception of one, the marriage represents the establishment of ties between groups who live in areas contiguous with one another. Four of the marriages shown in Figure 10 were within the primary segment, i.e., with other lineages of al-Qasr; three out of these four were contracted with

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 133]

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
'Umar Hassan Ma'fas =
1. Lazumi of 'Aishaibat
2. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
3. Masamir in Libya
4. Kamailat of 'Ali Ahmar
Abd al-Malik =
1. Bait Kailani of Ma'fas
2. Kamailat of 'Ali Ahmar
3. Sister of #1
Yunis = 1. FaBrSoDa 2. Jumi'at
Jabril = 1. FaBrDa
Ya'qub = 1. Lazumi of 'Aishaibat 2. Suwaitat of Jumi'at
Abd al-Latif = 1. Harabi 2. Bait Braik of Ma'fas 3. Lazumi 4. Suwaitat of Jumi'at 5. Dawlat of 'Aishaibat

FIGURE 10

Endogamic and Exogamic Marriages in Bait 'Umar of 'Ailit Ma'fas

*613 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas, 582 considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth [423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this individual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his wife's lineage before their marriage. *613 In every case, with 582 one exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property 421 relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups become politically entwined, and property relations become a basis for authority relations.

*613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies: "The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). [533] As one Bedouin wedding song puts it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here symbolizing her tertiary group.

583 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to 554 pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider," 556 and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

583 554 556 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another. The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a "higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him. In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's place on the scale of prestige. On the other hand, in another "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.) for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was that of Bait Bu Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E. for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for strangers. This mahr is in contrast to the average for the area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group. 583 554 556 435

586 521 784 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr. Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered injudicious.

586 829 judicious. Another issue which enters here is the desire on the part of the individual to maintain his privacy--especially where an infringement of it could result in a change of his tax status. The Bedouins think that it is wise to keep the government uninformed about the exact size of their family. 586 829 123 When I first asked a question concerning divorce, I was politely taken aside and told that I do not speak about divorce to a man, and especially when his sons are present.

586 Two cases of divorce took place while I was in the field. In the one, the wife claimed that her husband was impotent. She took this complaint to her father who then confronted the husband with it; the result was a divorce. Although the man denied that he was sterile, this was his second childless marriage and he felt it wise not to contest the case. It becomes very important to know, in the case of Bedouin divorce, which partner cannot meet the requirements of the marriage. If it is the woman, she will return to her father's house and the father must then return the price of mahr (brideprice). If it is the husband, when his wife returns to her father's house he must pay her (not her father, in this case) a sum, called mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq ("the balance of the marriage contract"), which is equal to that of the original mahr. Actually, there are three times when a mahr [583] [768] [595] price may be paid in al-Qasr: the original mahr is paid at the time of the marriage; the mu'akhkhir al-sadaaq is paid

586 at the time of divorce (if the husband is in fault), and also
[583] at the time of the husband's death; and, sadaaq al-musaama
[768] ("price of friendship") is paid to the wife when her husband
[595] takes a second, third or fourth wife.

586 The second divorce case which happened while I was
158 in al-Qasr involved, what seems to be, an instance of psychotic
behavior. A girl, who had married shortly before I arrived
in the field, would fall into a deep sleep every time she
entered her husband's house. Each time her father would come
for her and take her home until she had recovered. But upon
her return, three different times, she became ill again.
Finally, her father and the husband agreed that this marriage
would not work, and the father returned the mahr to the man.
This case lasted over the period of almost a year while I
lived in al-Qasr. I suggested to the father that perhaps his
daughter did not wish to be married to this man but he assured
me that "she loved him very much."

586 If the girl's father is dead, so that she cannot
return to his house at the time of divorce, she will go to
live with the brother who needs her services. It then be-
586 comes the duty of the brother to make another marriage for
587
[593] his sister, and in the case that he does it becomes his right
[583] to claim the mahr for himself. The Bedouins say that virginity,
or the lack of it, in the case of the divorced woman is no
issue; just so a man knows "she is from a good family."

586 Naturally, according to the rule of patriliny, all
851 children from a marriage belong to the husband and become
*613 members of his lineage. Should divorce occur while a woman
is nursing, she will take the child with her and it will be
returned after weaning. Sometimes the husband will permit the
wife to keep one child--always a girl--in order "to keep her
company."

587 The practice of the sororate has been noted. The
Bedouins also believe that "a man should marry his brother's
widow so that she will have someone to help her with the
children." But I have no data on the frequencies of these
12 practices. When I gathered my data on marriage, my informants
58 would give me only the name of the tribe or lineage into which
a man married, and never did I get the name of a man's wife.
[829] (One lineage in al-Qasr, entirely refused to give me data
on genealogy or marriage because, as one leader said, "it is
not decent to speak of these things with people.") Sororal
595 polygny is forbidden (Quran IV:23), and the Bedouins say
that a man cannot marry more than one bint 'amm. Marriage
182 practices, such as sororate and levirate, I interpret as
[587] patterns which maintain structural continuity and political
advantage. The custom of permitting a man to marry only
[582] one of his father's brother's daughters may be seen as a
precaution against intensifying authority relations and the
degree of segmentation.

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this aspect of the corporation clearly.

The concept of the corporation as a sociological construct was first used by Maine (1904). The concept was a central one in the work of Max Weber (1947; 1954). As it was used by Maine, and later by Radcliffe-Brown, the corporation as a collection of rights and duties functioned primarily to maintain struetural continuity in society. Weber was concerned mainly with the political aspects of the corporation; this follows from his theoretical and empirical focus on political action and the exercise of authority. The two main elements of the corporate group as a social relationship according to Weber are that it is limited and defined by rules of admission, and that the administration of the group is carried out by functionaries, incumbents of political roles. An explicit structure of authority is the key to Weber's concept of corporate group: "Whether or not a corporate group exists is entirely a matter of the presence of a person in authority, with or without an administration staff" (1947: 145-146). Weber did differentiate analytically the corporate group from the other concept, first defined by Maine (1907: 108-110), the "Corporation sole" or "Public officer." However, he insisted that one could not exist without the other. Any analysis of the structure of authority in society must focus on both of these concepts.

The conditions for the formation of a corporate group

The Corporate Group

121 Two key concepts have derived from Radcliffe-Brown's
602 (1952:32-49) notion of kinship as a reflection of juridicial
*613 relations. Fallers (1956:14), discussing the expression of these concepts in segmentary societies, refers to them as "the lineage principle and its corollary, the corporate lineage group." For Radcliffe-Brown, kinship organization represented social order and this was the basis of societal survival: a social system in order to survive must conform
121 to certain conditions. Adaptive mechanisms, expressed through
602 the institutions of a society, consist of a "network of re-
571 lations between individuals and groups" (1952:43). These social relations represent a collection of rights and implied duties which reside either with an individual or a group. Though reference is made to the place of the individual in society, the idea of the group is central in the theory of Radcliffe-Brown.

121 Most important is the group referred to as "corporation:"
602 a collectivity of individuals "who jointly exercise some right
571 or rights," and who share common interests deriving from resi-
621 dence and kinship (1952:45). The corporation has rights _in rem_ over its members; thus, the group imposes certain duties and obligations on other persons with respect to the rights of a particular person who is a member of the corporation. The law of blood-revenge is seen by Radcliffe-Brown to bring out

121 602 571 621 are, as Radcliffe-Brown correctly stated, the existence of kinship ties and common residence. But, as Weber noted, the expression of corporation is absent without a structure of authority. The corporate authority structure functions to allot group membership and political status; to formulate and enforce a rule of succession governing the transmission of property and roles; and to define and assign rights and duties of group members toward others. Group rights over members, as rights _in rem_, produce mutual rights for members which entitle them to protection against external enemies. Hence the corporate group is characterized by internal functions which define and control relationships between members, and external functions which identify the group within a given structural context where it has jurisdiction and governs its relations with other elements in this environment. Within this context, the corporate group is representative of any individual member. Both the internal and external functional aspects of the corporate group operate through the office of a specialized role whose incumbent has authoritative and representative powers. This is the role, or office, which Maine referred to as the "Corporation sole," and which Weber later called the _Leiter_ ("chief").

*613 621 571 In al-Qasr, the corporate lineage group is composed of agnates who reside together in a _mintaqa_, and who accept as legitimate and morally binding an explicit process of

*613 decision-making which allocates values in society. This
621 process orders the internal and external political relations
571 of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to
regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in
external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only
one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the
corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate
sole (Smith 1966).

621 The corporate group, although based on common interests
626 and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of
571 consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships.
[183] Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951:
161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group
must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual
behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity.
Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durkheim
called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most
societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates
coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the
same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integration.
621 tion. The corporate group and its authority structure is the
571 mechanism which insures, through political means, the neces-
182 sary degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr
(121) society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social
change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

621 should be thought of as an adaptive mechanism. This will help
571 us to understand two structural features of the Bedouin political
182 system: the establishment of cognatic alliances and the
121 differentiation of political roles. In tradition and modernity,
the integration and the survival of the Bedouin social system
have depended upon the proliferation of these features.

121 It is quite obvious that "a corporation can only form
621 itself on the basis of a common interest" (Radcliffe-Brown
571 1952:45); that any social relationship, or political group
[626] is characterized by both "pragmatic contents" and "moral
aspects;" and that "political sentiments" as part of the
group's moral and legal norms are enforcible by secular
sanctions brought to bear on individuals or groups (Fortes
121 and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20). But the discovery of what
underlies a "common interest," "moral aspect," and "political sentiment" is a subtle problem which varies from culture to culture. It deals with what Weber referred to as "problems of meaning," and ultimately, the legitimation of the normative system. What makes morality and sentiments meaningful and sanctions legitimate is a value, a connecting element between the social and cultural systems, "the constitutive symbolism which grounds the identity and solidarity of the community" (Parsons 1966:17). It is unlikely that such a value will ever be obvious, no matter how essential it is, because

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> a tradition is not a mere observed fact like an existing custom . . .; it is an idea which expresses a value judgment. A certain way of acting is regarded as right; a certain order or arrangement is held desirable. The maintenance of the tradition is the assertion of this judgment (Radin 1935:63).

121 For al-Qasr, I have traced social ideas, social action,
181 and social order to a central traditional value which promotes
621 group consciousness, solidarity, and corporateness. Such a
571 value does not derive from Islam, for Bedouin tradition
171 preceded Islamic tradition, and much of the latter derives
from the former. According to Robertson Smith (1903:26-62), the structurally significant unit in pre-Islamic Arabia was the hayy: "a collection of people of the same blood" who lived together and fought together. But, that which actually bound the members with a sense of corporateness to the hayy was the law of blood-revenge. For Smith, the key element in the Bedouin corporate group was the existence of a covenant of blood responsibility. The group was bound by a compact of mutual responsibility, the group had rights in rem over its members, and within the group there could be no blood-feud. Around this idea of mutual responsibility revolve the traditional values which are the basis of corporate grouping in Bedouin society: "The greater part of the traditions of the Arabs turns on blood-revenge and war . . . " (Smith 1903:26).

Smith developed his analysis of Arabian society in terms of certain structural principles: patrilineal ideology,

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seen to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
571 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-
171 revenge." And it is important to note that the hayy was
characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided
in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights in rem
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or
there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority
and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group;
it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle
of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
675 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
608 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
597 noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases
[602] of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole
corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the
'Aishaibat tribe" (katab jinnsiyya 'Aishaibiyya). The integration or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

121 621 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
571 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
675 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
608 597 the jointure.

The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
621 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
571 *613 society is that of _'aqila_. The _'aqila_, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or _bait_. A
[884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man
621 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
571 *613 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
672 money" - _diiya_) of each other, and are under obligation to
[682] contribute equal shares to any _diiya_ which becomes due from
the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (_yamiin_) on the behalf of any who are accused of falsehoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and
obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an _'aqila_.

*613 The tertiary _bait_ is the minimal corporate group. It usually includes three to five generations of members. Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate group, the secondary unit or _'aiela_. Beyond the secondary level

*613 of lineage segmentation, ties based upon any of the structural principles may obtain, but they are not ritually legitimated by the principle of blood responsibility. A functional corporate group cannot be defined beyond the secondary level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr make an explicit distinction between a group which is _'asaba_ and one which is not. The term _'asaba_ derives from the verb, "to bind," and is translated as "paternal relations" or "agnates." The tertiary and secondary segments are considered to be _'asaba_. Only these segments can be represented by an _'aqila_.

[666] *613 196 174 682 The _'aqila_, the focus of authority in the corporate tertiary group, is an elected head. The concept of _'aqila_ is itself an expression which entails mutual support and collective responsibility: the concept of _'aqila_ is equivalent to that of corporate group. Wehr (1961) translates the word _'aqila_ as "a clan committed by unwritten law of the Bedouins to pay bloodwite for each of its members." In pre-Islamic Arabia, the _'aqila_ must have been "the juristic personality" (Weber 1954:157). In early Islamic Arabia, we know the penal codes of the ancient schools of law came to differentiate between the offender (i.e. the individual) and the _'aqila_ (i.e. the group) concerning the payment of blood-money. During Umayyad times, the _'aqila_ was the group listed on the _diwaan_ (account books), and was considered a tribal grouping of some order which was responsible for paying the _diiya_

*613 (Schacht 1953:207).

196 So, in pre-Islamic Arabia and later, the _'aqila_ and
174 not the culprit was responsible for payment of the _diya_ or
682 for retaliation. And the _'aqila_, which means every single corporate member, risked its life in the face of retaliation from without. According to Islamic law, only the killer may be retaliated upon. But in pre-Islamic Arabia and in al-Qasr, any member of the killer's corporate group may be revenged upon. The Bedouins say that revenge should be taken upon the best man of the family, for this will cause the most damage. Both the legal schools of Madina (Maliki) and Kufa recognized the principle of self-help, or collective responsibility, for payment or retaliation in cases of homicide and wounding. And, according to Coulson (1964:49), "they both called the group which shoulders the burden the _'aqila_."

*613 The _'aqila_ in al-Qasr, which is an uncentralized system, is a corporate sole and a political office. It functions both in internal domestic (i.e. within the tertiary segment) authority relations, and at the level of external authority relations. The _'aqila_ is a symbol of his corporation and, as such, speaks for its members in matters of social regulation and the enforcement of political decisions growing out of conflict situations. Political order in al-Qasr depends
[571] upon the values inculcated and the type of authority exercised within the corporate group (Southall 1956:27). The model of

571 The model of
*613 corporate authority structure, i.e., that which makes the
[593] corporation-corporate sole relationship meaningful, is the
[604] father-son-father's brother triad. The submission of the son in the fundamental dyadic and triadic relationships of Bedouin society is carried over to the, just as axiomatic, relationship between corporate member and corporate sole. Peters (1965:127) is enlightening on this point when he says

[593]
> All men of a corporation, in any event, "speak with one word" at a moot, and a son, by his assent to the common view, also supports his father; in so doing he yields to the political authority of his corporation, and not that of his father.

The structure of authority relations which obtains within and between the groups of al-Qasr, then, is reflected in the idea or concept of _'aqila_. It is meaningful to the Bedouins. The social order which it represents is legitimate because of the moral attribute and obligation which attaches to its symbolization in the political office. At the same time, this focus or office of authority tends to become pivotal for the extension of a sphere of moral judgments and authority relations along with the expansion of social structural relations and promotion of common interests. Easton (1959) has referred to this expansion as "the political community," and Middleton and Tait (1958) as "the jural community." At all levels of society, conflict and consensus take place in terms of certain ideas concerning good and bad, operational

*613 concepts of what is desirable and undesirable. "Every structural
571 arrangement," Raymond Firth has said, "has its moral
attributes of obligation" (1961:212). This is most essential
in an uncentralized system, such as that of al-Qasr, where
no institutions exist outside of the corporate group for the
introduction of new principles of organization and association.

181 Among the Bedouins, the conceptualization of an authority
578 structure in the role of *'aqila* relates to the high value which
577 they place upon a peaceful and orderly world. Children in al-
*[613] Qasr are taught that one of their serious duties in life is
[571] to mediate conflicts, especially, when they are potentially
[554] situations which may lead to protracted conflict. And, in a
segmentary society where a member's status links him to many
different groups in differing degrees of importance, all
quarrels are potential group wars. The Bedouin child knows
that his elders, and God, want him to follow "the path of the
good" (*tariiq al-khair*). Mainly, this involves helping others
to follow "the path of the good" by "bringing them back together"
when they are in conflict. When two individuals
quarrel and refuse to return to "the path of the good," this
brings *'aib* ("shame") to each of the persons. When two
*[613] individuals quarrel, setting off a group conflict, this brings
'ar ("shame") to the respective corporate groups of the
[626] individuals (Abou-Zeid 1966). Against individuals who persist
[784] in the ways which cause *'aib* to himself, or *'ar* to his group,

181 578 577 626 784 certain sanctions of both a secular and sacred nature may be imposed: expulsion from the group and the curse of God are ultimate coercive interventions in the process of conflict regulation.

*613 181 182 571 The role of _'aqila_ presents the corporate group as "one person" in opposition to other similarly defined groups. Thus, Fortes says (1953:25), "the way a lineage system works depends on the kind of legal institutions found in the society," and this is a function of its political organization. The Bedouin political organization is characterized by two aspects: the internal political system, and the external political system. Both systems are regulated by the same values and norms. Authority relations within the corporate level are founded on values inculcated in the socialization process, and prescribe political behavior for all who come under the jurisdiction of the respective _'aqila_. Authority relations outside the corporate level are conducted through the _'aqila_. This political role as a functional part of the lineage structure operates in terms of kinship values; politics at the external level are characterized by no new principles.

*613 571 182 Politics in al-Qasr, and elsewhere for that matter, is a process of problem-solving and conflict regulation between individuals and groups. Political action occurs at different levels of the lineage structure, and each is demarcated as a focus or sphere of authority. But all authority stems from

*613 571 182 the central value and traditional institution of 'aqila which has always existed and is still binding. All authority is referable in some way and in varying degrees to the office of 'aqila which alone represents "the legitimate exercise of imperative control" (Weber 1947:153). Because private interests clash with the duties and obligations of social roles and corporate interests, political action, or the exercise of authority and the regulation of conflict, may be assigned to levels of 128 the social structure and analyzed in this way. In this chapter we have discussed the social structure of al-Qasr, and have touched on what gives structure and meaning to political action. We have seen that the structure of authority operating through the office of 'aqila deals with both an internal and an external system of political relations, a corporate group and a societal unit. The purpose of the following discussion will be to make clear some of the abstractions and concepts used here in outlinging structure and authority in Bedouin society.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY

The 'Aqila as a Political Role

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The role of _'aqila_ is the single specialized role in Bedouin political organization. Although it is possible to differentiate another authority role, that of the _shaib_ (elder), this role is primarily a kinship role and in this sense is not an institutionalized political complex of rights and obligations. The _'aqila_ represents a unique political status in al-Qasr having one incumbent at a time: "The present incumbent is merely a link in a chain of indefinite extent, the temporary custodian of all the properties, powers and privileges which constitute the office" (Smith 1966;117).

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The role of _'aqila_ is instituted at the tertiary structural level of the lineage system. In theory, each tertiary _bait_ has its own _'aqila_. But, in fact, not every tertiary segment is large enough and, therefore, powerful enough to constitute an authority group in the political structure of the lineage. In the next section, we will draw a distinction between authority groups and tertiary groups. The _'aqila_ acts alone in juridical matters concerning his own

*613 segment. He acts in concert with other 'awaaqil (plural of
554 'aqila) of the tertiary segments of his secondary group when
571 lineage matters call for decision-making at this level.
*613 Tertiary segments are replicate groups descended from one
571 ancestor, they operate with a common ideology pursuant of
183 common interests and goals. As we shall see, this common
675 ideology is expressed in a kind of code, or contract, which
all members of the group swear to uphold and abide by according
to the principle of blood responsibility. Tertiary codes in
[181] al-Qasr are a reflection and an affirmation of a wider system
of values and norms which bind the Bedouins of the Western
Desert together into a political system. This wider normative
[671] system is expressed in the customary legal system of the
Bedouins known as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the
Awlad 'Ali tribe").

*613 The primary duty attached to the office of 'aqila is
578 the regulation of conflict. It is worth noting here that
571 conflict regulation is not equivalent to conflict resolution.
554 The latter process carries with it the intimation that the
causes of conflict have been treated and resolved, that conflict
has been eliminated. Nothing could be further from the truth
in a segmentary society where the various segments actually
constitute conflict groups; consequently, conflict between
groups or individuals who represent groups may be contained
but never forgotten. Conflict is an ongoing process among

*613
578 the Bedouins. Conflict regulation treats the expressions of
571 social conflict and not its causes.

554 The _'aqila_ regulates conflict between the members of
his tertiary segment, between this group and the other groups
of the secondary unit, and between secondary units of the
tribe. He operates in both the internal and external systems
*613 of authority relations. The _'aqila_ may pre-empt the authority
578 of the _shaib_ in the sphere of familial authority, though, the
593 Bedouins say, this seldom happens because the son is willing
554
[596] to obey his father. Having been reared in the culture, and
as a future father himself, the son supports the respect-discipline
*613 principle of Bedouin society. But in extreme cases,
578 such as the threat of a father to disown his son, the explicit
593 approval of the _'aqila,_ and of all the _'awaaqil_ of the secondary
428 corporate group, is necessary. This is the procedure in all
554 cases of banishment. In one case (which I document below), a
man disinherited his younger brother with the formal approval
of his _'awaaqil_.

*613 The tertiary group in Bedouin society is by definition
682 the blood-vengence group. However, in view of the common
578 values and pragmatic interests of its members, the secondary
[181] group fulfills this function. Traditionally, when revenge
[681] killings were carried out according to the _lex talionis_, it
was usually at the hand of some member of the victim's tertiary
group. In the case of protracted conflict, such as extended

*613 682 578 feuds or war, secondary groups, and even whole tribes, became
involved. If the tertiary group is in the structural sense
*613 554 682 578 a blood-revenge group, the *'aqila* is the corporate sole of the
blood-revenge corporation: an important function of the
'aqila's office derives from this. The *'aqila* is responsible
for the collection and distribution of the blood-money. It
is this specific authoritative function of the office which
is the necessary condition for the existence of a corporate
group. If there is no *'aqila* to collect blood-money, then a
kinship segment is not a corporation and it will merge into
another group headed by an *'aqila* in order to realize collective
benefits.

*613 554 Bait Braik of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) had no
'aqila while I was in the field. Their *'aqila* had recently
died and his office had not yet been filled. The person who
[666] would succeed to the office was known by all, but still his
election or formal appointment did not take place. In other
*613 554 578 words, the office of *'aqila* will remain vacant until conflict
and the need to regulate it force an election. The Bedouins
were pleased about the vacant *'aqila* office in Bait Braik:
"Thank God that it is vacant. When it is necessary, we will
meet and name an *'aqila*." Any of the *'awaaqil* of the lineage
[682] can mediate conflict, but no *'aqila* is willing to take the
responsibility of collecting the blood-money from another man's
bait.

*613 Each member of the corporate group contributes an
682 equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case.
435 The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at
436 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels.
178 [571] If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his
share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market
prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in
[231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance
of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there
[556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel
owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least
1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge
682 as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the *'aqila*
554 must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money.
571 Each *'aqila* of the secondary group does this, and together
their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For
instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage
group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E.
The *'aqila* must account for his own group's share even if this
means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for
this reason that the *'aqila* "should be rich." Though the *'awaaqil*
of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this
is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the
'aqila of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to
this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to
become an *'aqila*: "The *'aqila* is responsible for his *bait*.

*613 He must pay the *diiya* with the shares which he collects from
682 the others. It makes no difference if the *'aqila* must pay
554 with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before
571 the whole tribe."

*613 The collection of the *diiya* is only one aspect of the
554 process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the funda-
682 mental manifestation of the office of *'aqila*. In the course
[692] of office, an *'aqila* will spend much more time arbitrating
disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money
which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate
682 ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of
178 blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social
[626] control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is
not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative
[619] to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out
[721] tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with
[829] horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between
the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to
*613 "the end of the world." The *'aqila* as a representative of a
682 group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by
554 presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict
578 and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid
over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the
[571] notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized
social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political
order.

000 order.

*613 The _'aqila_ is elected by the elders of the secondary
554 lineage group. The election usually takes place when these
666 men are gathered for some festive occasion, such as a wedding.
[578] The name of the man chosen to succeed to the political office
will not be made public until it is absolutely necessary, i.e.,
in the case of conflict within the man's _bait_, or more especially,
in the case where blood-money is due. According to the Bedouins,
the only qualification for the office of _'aqila_ is wisdom--
*613 the ability to arbitrate disputes. On the other hand, it is
554 implicit that the _'aqila_ be a member of the "status group."
556 Prestige commands respect and obedience, and prestige in
al-Qasr usually comes with wealth. In general, the _'aqila_ is
an elder, i.e., one with wisdom, and a member of a wealthy
and influential family.

*613 Technically, the _'aqila-ship_ is not inherited, but
554 succession tends in this direction. An _'aqila_ must "speak the
[428] good and show men how to follow the path of the good." Not
all men have the ability to do this, and, the Bedouins say,
it is natural that such a great gift resides with a particular
family "because the son learns from the father." All of the
'awaaqil in al-Qasr claim that they knew how to settle disputes
before they became _'awaaqil_. If they had not, they would not
[428] have been worthy of the office. Actually, the choice of an
'aqila is a restricted one: the office may pass, according to

*613 554 428 [666] the unilineal rule, only to the son or the brother of the former 'aqila. In Bait 'Umar, for instance, the office went from father to son to brother (see Figure 8). The election amounts to a choice between the son or the brother, and partiality is usually shown towards the eldest of the two candidates.

The 'aqila's term of office may be terminated by the members of the bait. Such an action may be the result of *613 554 687 ineffectiveness due to old age, or it may stem from a violation of the norms of the office by the incumbent. Two cases of an 'aqila being impeached were reported to me. One, which did not take place in al-Qasr, was brought about when the 'aqila was accused of taking a bribe, and favoring one party to the conflict over the other. The second case, which happened about fifteen years ago in al-Qasr, involved an 'aqila from 'Ailit Ma'fas. This man informed Egyptian officials that his fellow tribesmen were storing guns and ammunition beyond the quantity permitted by national security laws. Not only was this man removed from his 'aqila-ship, but he was also expelled from his tertiary segment, and hence the tribe. *613 554 But, in most cases, term of office is ended by death or senility. The Bedouins say: "An 'aqila will be removed if he can no longer solve problems; if he says bad things about his tribe; if he is too old, or too lazy; in other terms, if he is not a good man, he is removed."

*613 554 578 692 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the province of the _'aqila_. All complaints should be taken before the _'aqila_. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights, and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises _haqq al-'Arab_ ("the right of the Arabs"). The _haqq al-'Arab_ is opposed to the _haqq Allah_, "the right of God," which concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy). The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society. [688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local _shaikh_ ("holy man").

*613 554 69 The litigation process is initiated when an individual appears before his _'aqila_ with a claim, and the statement: "I do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The _'aqila_ first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their respective _'awaaqil_, and other "third parties" who aid the _'awaaqil_ in their decision. The decision reached by the court is morally binding upon both parties. [671] [178] According to recent innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the litigation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

*613 554 69 [671] [178] on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector. In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court case in his files).

*613 695 692 [671] As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of appeals may even function at the level of familial authority, i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal a decision of his own _'aqila_, he will generally take his claim to another _'aqila_ of his secondary group. When an appeal is to be made, it is done with the permission of the _'aqila_ who rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case does so with the understanding that the decision returned by the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if [681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original fine), and also pays his own _'aqila_ an expiation fee (_kubaara_).

69 648 [682] [685] The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

69 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The *'awaaqil* of al-Qasr and the
648 police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are
the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police
will intervene only when their help is requested. The
Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do
away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code
609 to be inoperative in the desert. Against "outsiders," the
69 Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice
could not be satisfied. One *'aqila* said that "only the *'awaiyid*
*613 *Awlad 'Ali* can maintain order because it stops wars through
682 182 payment of blood-money." If a Bedouin, for some reason or
692 other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be
648 returned to his *'aqila*; he will be told that they can do
*613 nothing for him without the permission of his *'aqila*. There
are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin
692 judicial procedure. For instance, in cases which involve
685 government property, such as olive trees and government-
648 operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the
*613 police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a
number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that
the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In
another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in
such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto
his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the
obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

692 police and not to his *'aqila*. This was a serious case because
685 the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two
648 days before he would agree to their demands. The two men involved
*613 in the conflict were from different lineages, and it soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even after the matter had been settled by the police. The *'awaaqil* of each man met, along with other notables of the tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been; they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount of water which each man should receive. In the end, the decision of the police was upheld.

692 Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated
691 through the office of the *'aqila*, alternatives do exist. As
*613 noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the
[577] moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be moderated by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects prejudice on the part of his own *'aqila*, he may choose to take
627 his claim to another *'aqila*, or third party. The notion of a
554 third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the *'aqila*
692 or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder, the Bedouins call *rajal khair* ("good man") or *qawaal al-khair* ("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

554 1952:165), and the role *rajal khair* along with the other roles
627 concerned with political action, the *'aqila*, *shaikh*, and *'umda*,
692 represent political organization in al-Qasr. Although the role of *rajal khair* is not institutionalized to the same degree that the others are, we shall see in the next chapter that it is an important one for an understanding of power relations in al-Qasr. All of these roles carry with them some type of right to make binding decisions in matters regarding conflict regulation. That is, an individual should take his
*[613] claims to the *'aqila*, but may take them to any of the other political specialists. In any of the cases, the litigants concerned become bound by the decision of the third party.
*[613] But only at the hand of the *'aqila* can a decision be made
[695] which will effect a whole group, i.e., only an *'aqila* can
[682] give judgment against a corporation for the blood-money in a case of homicide (Schacht 1953:328).

691 If, however, blood-money is not an immediate concern,
692 the litigants may utilize any and all of the political roles
*613 available in the judicial system. A statement from one of my
554 informants, an *'aqila*, is useful here.
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[124]

> The *bait* is made up of thirty or fourty men, and there is one most important man (*rajal kabiir*), the *'aqila*. The *'aqila* puts an end to problems, he sees who deserves this and who deserves that. Problems must be settled. It happened five or six years ago that I and my paternal cousins quarreled over land at Wadi Raml. I went to the police station and complained to the *shaikh* of the 'Aishaibat. I asked him to choose a person to judge

> 691 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law
> 692 (*yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana*). I went to the *shaikh*
> because my cousins did not agree that we go to the
> *613 *'aqila* right away. We agreed that the *shaikh* would
> choose the third party, and the judgment would be
> 554 binding on both of us. The *shaikh* chose Bu Halaiqa as
> 629 the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as
> consultants. (Two of the three were *rajal khair*, and
> the other was an *'aqila*.) The judgment was that my
> cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E.
> and a *dhabiiha*("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and
> did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them
> write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel
> in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E.
> fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial
648 affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case,
696 an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his
'aqila; his *'aqila* wrote the decision on paper and sent him
to another *'aqila*. The second *'aqila* agreed with the first,
but the man also refused this decision. The second *'aqila*
wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the *shaikh* of the
'Aishaibat in Matruh. The *shaikh* summoned the culprit and
sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able
to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation
fee to his own *'aqila*. My informant said that this was a
minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed
by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from
the corporate group.

*613 As the corporate sole, the *'aqila* has political authority
554 which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to
571 maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

*613 554 571 or whole tertiary group may be expelled from the lineage group, or if they so desire, they may resign their status in the group. In either case, and both cases rarely occur, the permission and approval of the *'aqila* are required. Or, I should say, the approval of the *'awaaqil* is required, for both cases represent structural changes which affect the juristic personality and constitution of the maximal corporation. The legitimacy of the *'aqila* and the whole political structure are tied up together. Social structure and authority roles are both objects of legitimacy, as Easton (1965:278-301) says, and hence the legitimacy of the *'aqila* in al-Qasr flows from the structural legitimacy of a segmentary political system. Thus in al-Qasr, politics operates through authority groups in opposition to one another, each represented by an authority role. An *'aqila* once told me that "the tribe of the *'aqila* gives him the authority to judge between its members." Another *'aqila* said that "the *'awaaqil* are bound [675] by a contract (*rawaabit*) to perform their duty on behalf of their *bait*." The *rawaabit* ("bonds") we will discuss in the next section.

Spheres and Focus of Authority

121 Authority, as it is used in this study, refers to the Weberian notion of "imperative control" (*Herrschaft*); that is, "the probability that a command with a given specific

121 content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (Weber 1947:152). In the next chapter, it will be useful to distinguish between the concept of authority and that of "power." Mainly, we are concerned here with the legitimate exercise of authority in the regulation of conflict involving members of an "imperatively coordinated group" (1947:153), or corporation, at both the internal and external levels of the Bedouin political system.

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It has already been stated in the last chapter that political action occurs at all levels of the social structure; it is not peculiar to the external relational system. The tendency to differentiate structurally between "domestic relations" and "political relations" began with Evans-Pritchard (1940:148) who analyzed the Nuer political system as "an expanding series of opposed segments from the relations within the smallest tribal section to intertribal and foreign relations." This definition could serve as a description of the political system of the Bedouins of al-Qasr, or of any other segmentary society. Fortes (1949; 1953:26) first used the terms "domestic relations" and "political relations." He arbitrarily limited political action to the lineage structure, and assigned "person-to-person relations" to the sphere of kinship or domestic organization. Southall (1953), who applied the ideas of Max Weber, isolated what he referred to as two different types of authority: the "familial" and

121 114 *613 571 the "political." Previous studies, then, indicate that a conceptualization of a division between spheres or foci of authority relations is fundamental to an understanding of the political aspect of segmentary societies. There is no need, however, to relegate the political to any particular social area if "we generally mean by 'political,' things that have to do with relations of authority . . ." (Weber 1947:155). Conflict, and the need for it to be regulated, occur at all levels of the lineage system, from the family to the tribal level. Authority must be exercised if the system is to [554] persist. The legitimate exercise of authority in al-Qasr is expressed through two structures: an authority role and authority groups, the _'aqila_ and the tertiary segments, the corporate sole and corporate groups.

121 554 The analysis which follows considers society as a composite of authority groups and authority roles. Roles are the basic elements of social structures which "order the human beings who make up the society" (Nadel 1957:11). The authority role is a focus for the study of politics at all levels of the social structure, and, also, the basis for extending role analysis. For the most part, political action in al-Qasr, from the family to the tribal levels, takes the form of the exercise of legitimate authority. Power, as illegitimate control, exists in the form of extra-processual authority roles which we will discuss in the next chapter.

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Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups, and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the _'aqila_ as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

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*[613]
Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority groups, are identified by the status position, or office, referred to as _'aqila_. The political relations within a local tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority roles.

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In the domestic field of political relations, the authority of the Bedouin _'aqila_ shades into the familial authority sphere of the household head (_shaib_). The _shaib_, as senior agnate of his _naja'_, is dominant over the other males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary corporate group. A _shaib_, by virtue of his age, is supposed to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
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600 to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate conflict.
*613 Theoretically, as one *'aqila* said, conflict should be stopped
578 at the familial level, either by the father or the paternal
593 uncle, and should never reach the level of the *'aqila*. Once
[604] before the *'aqila*, conflict assumes new structural poses, or different orientation in authority relations. Authority here is differentiated in terms of the context: the father's authority relates to the familial structural level, and beyond this level the father *per se* cannot exercise legitimate authority.
*613 The *'aqila*, who is responsible for internal order and external
578 relations exercises legitimate authority at each level of the
182 political structure. The authority of the *'aqila* is checked and prevented from growing into naked power in that any single *'aqila* must consult with the other *'awaaqil* of the secondary segment concerning matters which may concern the structural nature and continuity of the group.

*613 In many respects, the authority structure in al-Qasr
559 corresponds to that defined for the Lugbara of Uganda
571 (Middleton 1960). The structural levels (see Figure 7 above)
171 of 'Ailit Ma'fas (secondary), Bait 'Umar (tertiary), and 'Ait Abd al-Malik (sub-tertiary) are approximately equivalent to Middleton's major, minor, and minimal lineages (1960:7-9). But
[596] whereas among the Lugbara authority roles are purely kinship roles, i.e., genealogically senior heads are responsible for internal control and representation, among the Bedouins of

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554 al-Qasr there is definite role differentiation between the
571 shaib and the 'aqila. The incumbents of the two roles may
171 have exactly the same genealogical position in the tertiary
596 segment, but they will never have the same social status.
There are as many elders as there are households, but there
is only one 'aqila for each group. Another difference between
the Bedouins and the Lugbara is that in the latter society a
kinship role which doubles as an authority role does not
occur above the familial (i.e. shaib) level.

*613 The difference between the shaib and the 'aqila is
554 the distinguishing factor between informal and formal social
596 control. The shaib acts in accordance with the values implied
by Bedouin authority structure: the action of the 'aqila is
legitimate in the explicit terms of the Bedouin authority
structure. These two spheres of political action represent
familial and internal (or domestic) levels of authority and
authority relations. Legal matters which affect the whole
tertiary segment are dealt with at the internal level.
627 Affairs of a purely personal nature and of lesser importance
596 are dealt with at the familial level of authority. For in-
685 stance, it happened that the dog of one man killed a neighbor's
chicken. No one sent for the 'aqila. They sent for the shaib
of the woman who owned the chicken, i.e., they sent for her
husband. He spoke to the woman, his wife, to determine the
value of the chicken and this price he demanded as compensation

627 from the owner of the dog. If the man had refused to pay the
596 price of the chicken, as demanded for settlement, then the
685 next step would have been to inform the appropriate *'aqila*
*[613] to bring greater force, and perhaps greater sanctions, to
bear.

*613 Bait 'Umar (Figure 8) is one of the authority groups
571 of al-Qasr, a corporate group represented by a corporate sole.
682 Both the tertiary corporate group and the corporate sole are
referred to, according to the ancient tradition of the Bedouins,
as an *'aqila*. This group is a blood-revenge group, and is
referred to as *'umraa al-dam* ("donator of blood"), or *waliiy
al-dam* ("executor of a blood feud"). It is the group which
[681] decides whether or not retaliation will be taken according
to *lex talionis*, or if blood-money as compensation for the loss of one of its members is acceptable. The Bedouins say that no amount of money can replace a human life, that blood-money is only a means to prevent the loss of more men. This group, when it functions as *waliiy al-dam* ("executor of a blood feud"), has the authority to demand retaliation; to waive it entirely; or to demand, along with blood-money, that the guilty party be punished by his *'aqila*. When this group pays or receives blood-money it does so as a partner in the larger corporate group, the secondary segment. The principle of collective responsibility interplays with the other structural principles of Bedouin society. The convergence represents

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the conversion of small authority groups into larger ones. Political order depends upon this convergence of principles and the affirmation of the values and institutions which the principles imply. In turn, the resulting political organization helps to maintain the "body of interconnected moral and legal norms" (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20).

When blood-money is paid out, all of the tertiary groups contribute an equal share. When blood-money is received, the group of the killed man receives one-half of the diiya and the remainder is divided equally among the members of the secondary group. The distribution of blood-money was explained as follows:

> The one-half of the diiya which goes to the murdered man's bait belongs to his sons. If the man was not married and had no sons, then the money goes to his brothers or those closely related to him (bi-dam), like his uncles or paternal cousins. If the man was married and had only daughters, and they had no brothers, these females can claim the diiya only if they are married to someone in the tribe. (Here the word tribe refers to the secondary lineage group.) If they are married to someone from outside the tribe, the female will take no money because her husband will not contribute to the next diiya in the tribe.

This is the ideal situation. But blood-money distribution is relative to the level at which conflict takes place, i.e., depending upon the nature of the relationship between the authority groups concerned. For instance, it means a great deal if the groups concerned are of the same secondary segment.

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In 1947, party A of Bait 'Umar, 'Ailit Ma'fas accidentally shot party B of Bait Muhammad, 'Ailit Ma'fas. Since both parties were of the same family, _'awaaqil_ from 'Ailit Lazumi, a third party, were called to adjudicate. The _'awaaqil_ decided that a _diiya_ of 400 L.E. should be paid to Bait Muhammad. Of the 400 L.E. _diiya_, Bait 'Umar was to pay 200 L.E. and the rest of the secondary group, with the exception of Bait Muhammad, was to pay 200 L.E. The brother of the killed man said that they would accept the 200 L.E. from Bait 'Umar, but would take only 100 L.E. from the rest of the family. The 300 L.E. _diiya_ then went to the brothers of the killed man who had no sons and whose father was deceased. The _diiya_ was paid in one week's time.

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Although I have tended to use the terms tertiary segment and corporate group interchangeably, the two are not structurally synonymous. Not every tertiary segment is a corporate group or authority group. Just as tertiary corporate groups combine into larger secondary corporate groups so do tertiary groups which lack size and property, i.e., political power, ally themselves together under one _'aqila_ to form corporate authority groups. Subsumed under the secondary segmental heading of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Figure 8) are eleven structurally separate tertiary segments, but the corporate authority structure of 'Ailit Ma'fas includes only five groups. Thus there are only five politically significant authority groups, or _'awaaqil_, which represent 'Ailit Ma'fas to the outside world. Six of the tertiary segments are numerically small enough that they have found it politically advantageous to consolidate "in sharing the good and the bad." The combination of tertiary segments into authority groups is as follows:

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Authority Group	Components	No. of Persons	Total Persons
I. Bait 'Umar	Bait 'Umar	73	73
II. Bait Kailani	Bait Kailani	67	67
III. Bait Firjani	Bait Firjani	31	43
	Bait Salih	12	
IV. Bait Muhammad	Bait Muhammad	27	30
	Bait Yunis	3	
V. Bait Braik	Bait Braik	6	32
	Bait Abd al-Hadi	6	
	Bait Fadl	3	
	Bait Mahaishi	8	
	Bait Maraja	9	
		245	245

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These five groups represent the political structure of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Authority relations between the 245 members, and between the five groups, proceed with reference to the five _'awaaqil_ of the secondary group. External relations of 'Ailit Ma'fas, either in the form of demanding rights from other secondary segments, or of meeting obligations toward these groups, proceed through the five _'awaaqil_ "speaking with one voice." One group in 'Ailit Ma'fas, Bait Musa, migrated to the Nile Valley sometime during the 1930's. Bait Musa no longer possesses jural rights or obligations in the lineage. But jural relations are not always severed as a result of moving. 'Ailit Shraif, another secondary group in al-Qasr, has one _bait_ in the Nile Valley which maintains its

*613 571 jural status in the lineage by contributing its share of the blood-money.

*613 571 178 The consolidation of tertiary groups into authority groups may shed some light on the dual process of fission and fusion common in segmentary societies. The structure of authority groups which make up a secondary group is a reflection of the way in which tertiary segments grow and segment, or decline and fuse, into other groups. In the process, one group, or many small groups of agnates, are incorporated under a name other than that of their genealogical ancestor. Through time, and in the interest of group solidarity and political order, real biological ties may be obscured: the regulation of political relations favors ideological jural ties over genealogical ties which indicate lineal differences. With reference to 'Ailit Ma'fas, perhaps in the future, Bait Yunis, with only three members, will be totally submerged into the authority group, Bait Muhammad, so that the individual, Yunis, will be dropped from the genealogy of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Then the descendents of Yunis will be linked to Muhammad, the founder of Bait Muhammad, by an artificial link, though the patrilineal ideology will define it as a descent link. During the period of solidification, there is apt to be confusion concerning the exact nature of kinship ties. For instance, in al-Qasr, there was a great deal of argument about whether or not 'Ailit Ma'fas was once a segment of 'Ailit Lazumi. As I

*613 have noted previously, informants very definitely disagreed
571 over the matter; by looking at the two genealogies one is
178 unable to say one way or the other. The process of fission
and fusion in the form of secession and adoption is another
instance of genealogical manipulation through patrilineal
ideology. In this case, patrilineal ideology also may succeed
in concealing real biological links in favor of political relations. We shall see below how secession and adoption actually
function in Bedouin society.

*613 We have said that the authority of the _'aqila_ is
675 legitimate at each structural level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr
554 often legitimate the authority of the _'aqila_ in writing, and,
571 at the same time, make an explicit statement of social compact
which outlines the pragmatic and moral values of the corporate
group. The corporate charter in al-Qasr is a document of self-interest which defines expectations and consequences for corporate members: it governs the conduct of members in situations relevant to internal order, and gives the _'aqila_ powers
of representation in external affairs. The charter is a
[181] reflection of the high value the Bedouins place upon security
and order, and is a condition for a legal system of wider
*613 scope. Max Weber (1947:120) has expressed the idea of social
675 relationship as contract so well that it is worthwhile to
571 quote him extensively here.

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> The meaningful content which remains relatively constant in a social relationship is capable of formulation in terms of maxims which the parties concerned expect to be adhered to by their partners . . . The more rational in relation to values or to given ends the action is, the more is this likely to be the case . . . The meaning of a social relationship may be agreed upon by mutual consent. This implies that the parties make promises covering their future behavior, whether toward each other or toward third persons. In such cases each party then normally counts, so far as he acts rationally, in some degree on the fact that the other will orient his action to the meaning of the agreement as he (the first actor) understands it . . . But in part also they are motivated each by the value to him of his "duty" to adhere to the agreement in the sense in which he understands it.

The idea of "duty" makes collective responsibility meaningful, and the authority of "the third party," or _'aqila_, legitimate.

The ties which bind the corporate group may be defined in terms of the structural principles of kinship and residence. But these ties must be affirmed and further defined by contractual obligations which inform an authority structure. Further, the legitimacy of authority relations beyond the tertiary level is based mainly upon contractual alliance. The relationship between contract and the other structural principles is a mutually reinforcing one. Kinship and residence alone cannot be the basis for the existence of a corporate group. The Bedouins of the Western Desert in their statements of contractual alliance not only proclaim the conditions for brotherhood, but, also, the consequences for those who do not meet these conditions. A Bedouin, or a whole corporate tertiary

*613 695 571 segment, may choose to belong to, or to secede from, the larger corporate group. This element of choice helps to define the authority of the corporate sole. Authority is illegitimate, i.e. it is mere power, when control is exercised against the will of the subjects (Weber 1947).

Above, I have said that authority is legitimated beyond the tertiary level, i.e., at the secondary level, through contractual alliance. By that I mean the same agreement on values is replicated by the authority groups of the lineage. The five authority groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas are bound together by what the Bedouins call "the bonds of the _'awaaqil_" (_rawaabit al-'awaaqil_). Below I present a number of examples of the _rawaabit_ from al-Qasr. Then I continue on to show the nature of the corporate group, and the dynamics of structure and authority in Bedouin society.

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BONDS BETWEEN THE 'AWAAQIL OF 'AILIT MA'FAS

1. Every member of the tribe who has proved against him an intrigue concerning the _'aiela_,
2. every member of the tribe who claims against his brother a case which has no basis,
3. every member of the tribe who shifts a border of the borders of a land from one place to another place,
4. every _'aqila_ is responsible for his followers and must present each with the right direction if he does not convince him first (i.e. if he fails at moral discourse, he must arrange the court session),
5. every member of the tribe who departs from the opinion of his _'aqila_ and who follows the wrong and erroneous

*613 6. every member of the tribe who submits a complaint
675 without first consulting his _'aqila_, (i.e. who
571 goes to the government before the _'aqila_),

539 7. every member of the tribe shall back the members of his _bait_ against an opponent without right,

8. every member of the tribe who has proved against him the showing of sympathy toward another tribe knowing that this tribe is antagonistic to his own tribe,

9. every member of the tribe who has proved against him that he helped a relative in payment or in a quarrel against his brother.

we signed this document and declare that these customs are valid from the date of today and everyone who disobeys them pays a _dhabiiha_ ("lamb") and 10 L.E. without any objection if any of the items of the above items is proven against him.

Date: August 8, 1953
The _'awaaqil_ (signatures or stamps):
Abd al-Ruwaf (Bait Firjani)
Hussain 'Umar (Bait 'Umar)
Shi'ath Abd al-Hadi (deceased, Bait Braik)
'Atiya 'Umran (Bait Kailani)
Khalid Idris (Bait Muhammad)

114 In the _rawaabit_, or contract, just noted the term
619 "tribe" refers to the secondary segment (_'aiela_). Murray
675 (1935:315n) has also pointed to an instance of the Bedouins'
*613 use, in a formal document, of the word _qabiila_ ("tribe") when
reference to "some smaller division, such as _'eila_ is clearly
meant."

675 Through the _rawaabit_ norms are expressed and action
681 is oriented with respect to them. If it is otherwise, sanctions
[183] may be brought to bear to insure conformity to norms. The
*613) minimal sanction which the _'aqila_ may impose is the _dhabiiha_

675 ("blood sacrifice") and a fine of 10 L.E. The most serious
681 sanction which the group, through the 'aqila, can administer
*613 is banishment. In this case, the decision "to wash one's
hands of another" may originate with the 'aqila but must be
executed by the next of kin, or the process can originate
with the next of kin and be carried out with the approval of
the 'awaaqil. In any case, it is an ultimate negative sanction
which ranks with blood-revenge in degree of seriousness, since
social and political status is withdrawn from the person. A
banished person is no longer protected in accordance with the
principle of collective responsibility, and his group may no
675 longer demand blood-money for his life. The charter of 'Ailit
*613 Lazumi presented below is similar in most respects to that of
571 'Ailit Ma'fas with the exception that it makes provision for
681 the barawwa, the act of banishing from the group. The document
was issued in four copies to each of the 'awaaqil of Lazumi.
Note that in both charters thus far shown, not only are the
individuals of the group bound by the rules but, also, the
'aqila comes under the rule of law.

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BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT LAZUMI AL-'AISHAIBAT, (Wednesday, January 19, 1952)

In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate

In the presence of 'Umran Kailani, Hajj 'Ali, the 'awaaqil and individuals of Bait Bu Jafaila who signed below, this agreement took place and the 'awaaqil of this 'aiela are:

675 1 - Hajj Salah Bu Jafaila, 'aqila of Bait Bu Halaiqa
*613 2 - Kuraim Juhami, 'aqila of Bait Uthman
571 3 - Ruwaf Jadalla, 'aqila of Bait Jadella
4 - Muftah Tahir, 'aqila of Bait Tahir

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Every 'aqila is responsible for his family whether conconcerning the occurrence of problems, and collecting money from his family, or other matters. Every person who rejects the opinion of the 'aqila, or reports to the government without the consent of the 'aqila will be subjected to a fine of 10 L.E. and a dabiha according to the 'awaiyid. And every person who delays in carrying out the decisions of the 'aqila and all that he indicates will also be subject to the same fine. And also, any one who delays in swearing the oath or in supporting his family, and in so doing loses the interest which belongs to the 'aiela, he will be subject to the same fine. Any of the 'awaaqil who cause the loss of any right of the rights of the members of the 'aiela will also be subject to the same fine. And any member who makes false claims against any of the other members of the 'aiela is subject to the same fine. And any 'aqila or member from the members of the 'aiela who has proven against him an intrigue, or a quarrel, or prejudice between him and his brother or paternal cousin is subject to the same fine. He is also subject to the same fine who has proven against him prejudice in favor of another party against his paternal cousins, that is to say, the members of this 'aiela. And every 'aqila or individual who delays in signing and accepting these bonds, or in executing them, is considered an outsider by this 'aiela and the 'aiela will not be responsible for him in the future, and this will be considered a barawwa for him from the 'aiela.

This was issued in four copies to the 'awaaqil, and all previous bonds are cancelled from this date and are no longer effective.

Signatures and stamps of 'awaaqil and witnesses.

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The barawwa (literally: "the act of putting outside") is a formal procedure, formal enough to entail having the process notarized as a legal document according to Egyptian civil law. The Bedouins say that the legal document of barawwa is "to show that we have washed our hands of the

675 culprit, and are no longer responsible for his acts." The
681 barawwa is not only the imposition of a most severe sanction
675 by the group, but it is also the withdrawal of all positive
681 sanctions which would apply to an individual as a member of
571 the group. The withdrawal of sanctions means the withdrawal
of the right of reciprocity; consequently, the banished no
longer comes under the rule of succession, and he has no
[421] rights over either persons or things. The banished may claim
no property of the property of the group other than that which
he takes with him, and he may claim no women from the group.
675 The barawwa, naturally enough, is uncommon in al-Qaṣr. The
681 last occurred in 1957, the declaration of which is reproduced
below.

DECLARATION OF BARAWWA

Law Office of Abd al-Rahman Marsa Matruh	50 milleme tax stamp

On this date the following came: Kuraim Juhami of the 'Aishaibat on behalf of himself and his paternal uncle, and their 'umda, the first party. And there also came Sa'ad Uthman on behalf of himself and his children, the second party. The reason for the coming together of these two parties is in order to ask the barawwa from each other. Since they have all agreed by their own will without any force or ill feeling that the two parties shall not be responsible for each other's actions, it is a valid agreement that can never be rejected. No one from either of the parties is responsible to the other in supporting oaths, in paying for wounds, or in paying blood-revenge (diya), and no one from either party involved in barawwa will take girls from the other. This barawwa became a dividing line between the two parties, and if later there appears a fraternity paper, the barawwa will be cancelled and be to no avail. This paper is signed

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681 by us and by the below mentioned witnesses to be used when it is necessary. This barawwa was issued in two copies at the hand of each of the two parties to be used in time of necessity.

Approving what is included,	Approving what is included
the first party,	the second party
Kuraim Juhami (stamp)	Sa'ad Uthman (stamp)

Witness to this:
Abd al-Rahman, the lawyer
Date: September 24, 1957

STAMP OF MINISTRY OF WAR
BORDER GUARDS
MATRUH SECTOR

Signatures or stamps of eight witnesses.

1 - Copy to Marsa Matruh Police Station
2 - Copy at the hand of the first party
3 - Copy at the hand of the second party

Seen and the original must be kept in the files of the administration of complaints, and a copy must be delivered to each of the two parties.

Signed: Colonel Ahmad Sa'ad
Marsa Matruh Police Station

Date: October 12, 1957

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571 The rawaabit in Bedouin society is essentially a charter at the tertiary level, but it structures relations at the secondary level. At the tertiary level, the charter functions to establish group boundaries and identity, and to
*613
571 express the conditions for membership. Group solidarity and maintenance at the tertiary level is a necessary condition for structural continuity of the larger secondary corporation: the lineage persists through these groups with replicate
060 functions, structures, and a common ancestor. That the

*613 173 That the secondary segment is as significant as the tertiary group seems to be indicated by the Bedouin tendency to mythologize the founder of the secondary group. For instance, Ma'fas is a nickname literally meaning "the big-footed one;" the Zagharat take their name from a man who used the zaghaariid ("shrill cry of joy" used by women) as his battle-cry; Abu Qarasa means "father of bread-loaf;" Sayyid Shraif was a very "noble" (shraif - "high-bred, noble") man. Along with each name there are a number of different myths to explain it: hence Ma'fas was a cattle thief who left large footprints in the mud so that all would know of his daring exploits; Abu Qarasa baked hugh loaves of bread to honor his in-laws when they visited him. On the other hand, there are no myths about

*613 178 founders of tertiary segments. Tertiary segments might, in the future, disappear from the Bedouins' genealogy, either because of death, barawwa, or secession, but the secondary group survives these events. It is the secondary segment, as we shall see in our discussion of law and sanctions, which is structurally important for the political community of the Awlad 'Ali.

*613 571 Because the secondary level is the more structurally important, seeing that the greater benefits of collective responsibility derive from it, the tertiary group surrenders part of its autonomy to it. The tertiary group does so in just the way that the individual member of any polity allows

*613 public obligations to temper private interests. This temper-
*613 ing process in Bedouin society is effected through the agree-
571 ment, or bonds, between the _'awaaqil_ of the secondary group
675 as representatives of the members of the tertiary groups.
The _'aqila_ and the members of a tertiary group submit to structural arrangements of organization and procedure at the secondary level of interest and authority. All this is symbolized in the duplicate copies of the _rawaabit_ and the name of the "famous" ancestor.

*613 I do not underestimate the importance of the tertiary
571 segment. I realize that internal order at this level is what prevents anarchy at the secondary level. And I do not mean to imply that integration is necessarily any greater at the tertiary level than at the secondary level--it may or it may
*613 not be the case. Conflict is more difficult to detect at the
571 tertiary level than at the secondary level due to the practical
578 value which the Bedouins place upon stable relations between brothers and immediate relatives. But conflict does take place, and the Bedouins do attempt to regulate it at this level.

*613 The Bedouins say that blood-revenge and the feud
682 cannot possibly operate at the tertiary level. On the other hand, homicide does occur "between brothers." We have already described the case of manslaughter in 'Ailit Ma'fas and the manner in which it was dealt with: no retaliation would have

*613 been justified in this case since the killing was accidental.
682 In another case of killing which occurred between tertiary
units of the same secondary group, we see what happens in the
*613 case of intentional killing. This case of murder in 'Ailit
682 Lazumi is interesting and valuable because it illustrates
571 the dynamics of authority relations within the secondary
segment, and the degree to which authority relations are
manageable without a resulting structural change.

> *613 In 1959, a rearrangement of authority relations took
> 682 place within 'Ailit Lazumi: Bait A and Bait B agreed
> 571 that they would be collectively responsible for each
> 675 other, and Bait C and Bait D made a similar compact.
> The compacts involved the sharing of diiya and kubaara (expiation) payments. Shortly after 1959, Bait A and Bait C quarreled, and the result of the litigation was that the 'awaaqil ordered Bait A to pay a kubaara of 20 L.E. to Bait C. Bait B, as the partner of Bait A, decided to pay 10 L.E. of the kubaara and Bait A paid the other 10 L.E. But Bait D protested this sharing of the kubaara saying that Bait B is a third brother and, as such, should act as a quwaal al-kahair ("a speaker of good"); that no brother should take sides against the others. As a result of this incident, the split between the two groups (A-B and C-D) became deeper. Afterwards, one group would not contribute to the diiya involving members of the other group even if it concerned external conflict with other secondary groups. This division in 'Ailit Lazumi was finally ended in 1960 when a member of Bait A killed a member of Bait B--the killing was within the same contractual alliance. At this time, the whole lineage decided to forget its differences and, all together, paid Bait B its diiya.

*613 Ideally, conflict should not be permitted to threaten
578 the structural continuity of the secondary corporation, but it
[681] happens. Usually, however, safety mechanisms such as the
barawwa and the right to secede are effective enough to prevent
structural deterioration.

*613 structural deterioration. Secession, the right to break
571 authority relations, and adoption, the right to contract
675 new authority relations, are rights of the authority group.
681 This can be noted in the "Declaration of Barawwa" presented
578 earlier. It was stated in that document that "the reason
[597] for the coming together of these two parties is in order
to ask the barawwa from each other." Further, mention was
made of a "fraternity paper" which would cancel the effects
of the barawwa. So, secession can be a means of regulating
[597] conflict, and it can become the basis for a re-integrative
move; that is, an adopted party may decide to secede from its
foster lineage and return to its original lineage, or secondary
group.

*613 Secession, as distinct from segmentary fission as a
571 response to ecological demands, represents a structural
[578] change in authority relations short of distrubing the structure
of the secondary group. In a process of secession, i.e.,
breaking with the secondary group, joining a new secondary
group, and returning to the "blood-brother" group, the fundamental condition of "belonging" is the acceptance of collective
responsibility. This is a most important point. The office
*613 of 'aqila, the Bedouin charters, and the raison d'etre of the
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681 corporation revolves about the notion of sharing in the blood-
675 money. This can be shown by an extremely interesting document
belonging to 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of al-Qasr. Here the process

*613 of secession, and the nature of the collective responsibility
571 principle in Bedouin society are made clear. The occasion of
681 the writing of this document was the issuance of a "fraternity
675 paper."

BONDS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF 'AILIT ABU QARASA

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Thanks to God alone and nothing survives but His kingdom, praise and peace to Him Who will never have a Prophet who is greater than Himself.

It came into our hands on 10 Shawal 1363 (September 9, 1944), the _'awaaqil_ of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat; and the reason for their coming together is in order to merge 'Ailit Abu Qula with the other _buyuut_ as they were in the past. And this is in accordance with the agreement of all the parties to this paper. By the free will of all it became, as of this day, that all of the mentioned _buyuut_ will be connected with the other _buyuut_ in receiving and giving. But all blood-money of the mentioned _buyuut_ which was due before the date 3 Shawal 1361, that is to say all debts for past offences, they and their former relatives will be responsible for. After this date, which is 3 Shawal 1361, each of the mentioned _buyuut_ will share the good and the bad equally. And the _'awaiyid_ which the mentioned _buyuut_ agreed upon are the following:

1 - First, he who intentionally beats his brother in the _'aiela_ will pay by himself and no one from the _'aiela_ will pay anything with him.

2 - But the offense which takes place within the _'aiela_, the fine for it will be distributed in such a way that the first half of the payment will go to the offended _bait_ and the second half will be distributed among all of the mentioned _buyuut_.

3 - The offense which happens to the _'aiela_ from an outside party, half of the payment goes to the _'aiela_ and the second half to the offended _bait_.

*613 571 681 4 - The thief from the mentioned buyuut will be responsible for himself alone, and his relatives in blood (i.e. his bait) will be responsible for him.

539 675 5 - The one who is known to lie under oath from the mentioned buyuut, everyone who supports him must be a blood-relative from his bait.

6 - The one who delays paying the share which is requested by the 'aiela, his rich relative will pay.

7 - The one who asks for a barawwa from the 'aiela will pay what is asked for, and at the same time will also pay 20 L.E. barawwa fee for every man who fasts.

8 - The one who supports his relative from some other 'aiela against his paternal cousin will be required to pay 10 L.E. as a fine.

Signatures or stamps of the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and the 'awaaqil of 'Ailit Ghriba (who are the former relatives of Bait Abu Qula, the reconciled bait).

*613 554 571 [675] Every point of the above rawaabit shows the moral and political significance of the secondary group in the Bedouin community. Membership in a secondary compound authority group entitles one to political status without which the individual could not survive. The Bedouin community shares certain activities, relationships, and goals so that the aims of any individual can be achieved only by participation in social action with others: this the Bedouins have in common with every other human community (Firth 1951:41). Specifically, in considering society in terms of authority roles and authority groups, we are interested in the political community in which the Bedouins participate.

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The boundaries of the Bedouin political community may be defined so as to include all of those authority groups which operate in accordance with the recognized legal code of the Western Desert. This code is referred to as 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali, i.e. "the customs of the sons of 'Ali." The members of the Awlad 'Ali tribe identify with each other as a group. They recognize their common heritage and speak of "the Awlad 'Ali as one." But more importantly, the Awlad 'Ali represents a political community because they are "prepared to regulate their differences by means of decisions accepted as binding because they are made in accordance with shared political norms and structures" (Easton 1959:229). Recalling the discussion of familial authority and internal and external systems of authority relations, we may think of the Bedouin political community as a composite of authority or jural groups "within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (Middleton and Tait 1959:9).

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In al-Qasr, political order and the articulation of political relations between secondary corporate groups depend upon something besides structural and ideological uniformities. Although blood-revenge and feuding do not take place at the internal system of authority relations, they are common means of controlling the distribution of authority and power between secondary units. Though these mechanisms or sanctions are considered "the right of the Arabs," since they do threaten

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*613 571 peace and security in the desert they are discouraged by
681 means of the moral and legal norms expressed in the _'awaiyid_,
628 626 or law of the Bedouins.

671 Conflict regulation between secondary groups is the
*613 function of the _'awaaqil_ who act as legitimate representatives
571 in terms of the _rawaabit_, and as legitimate judges and decision-
578 makers in terms of the _'awaiyid_. Not all conflict in the external political system is, in terms of our structural levels, between secondary authority groups, but seldom is any group larger than the secondary unit mobilized for political
619 action. In other words, even where we note that conflict is
*613 between two primary units, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the
571 Kamailat, there is probably, in fact, political action taking
578 place between two secondary groups within the respective primary groups. However, there always exists the very real possibility that greater conflict will be generated involving primary and even tribal units.

128 In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss Bedouin law and sanctions within the framework of the lineage structure and the authority levels at which they operate. The following section will further illustrate the legitimacy and dynamics of authority and structure in Bedouin society.

Law and Political Order: 'Awaiyid Awlad 'Ali

671 [792] A "holy man" in al-Qasr, who has intimate knowledge of both the Quran and Bedouin law, has this to say on the subject of the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali:

> 671 171 The Sharii'a (Islamic Law) was given by God, and it guides man concerning what is good and what is bad: it is for all Muslims. The 'awaiyid was made by man for the Bedouins: it is for settling problems and evaluating damages. The 'awaiyid is natural, made by man and the Awlad 'Ali for settling the problems of the Bedouins. It is different from the Sharii'a. The Awlad 'Ali made the 'awaiyid, not the ashraaf ("holy men"); but the "holy men" approved it. The 'awaiyid agrees with the Sharii'a, but not in everything for it is not from the Sharii'a. Shari'it Muhammad ("the law of the Prophet") is one thing and the 'awaiyid is another. The Sharii'a says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life: the 'awaiyid also says an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a life for a life, but in a different way: the 'awaiyid involves money. The 'awaiyid judges a situation; the dhabiiha ("blood sacrifice," usually a lamb as an expiatory fee) and the fine are paid and the problem is solved . . . The 'aqila is better than the government for settling problems in the desert. [672] The government may put a man in prison, and if he dies there you will be responsible to his father and brothers. There is a more liberal judgment here in al-Qasr, and God prefers that we settle our problems through peace . . . [673] If a man dies in prison, it is no sin before God but the Bedouins consider it a sin.

671 At the present time, the customary law of the Awlad 'Ali prevails in al-Qasr, and, I suspect, this body of legal and moral norms will be the basis for Bedouin social and political action for some time in the future. In any case, it furnishes us with a base-line from which any future studies of social

671 change in al-Qasr must proceed.

671 Bedouin law should be considered within its historical
177 context, especially as it has reference to the Maliki school
of Islamic Law. The Maliki school, or "rite," (madhhab) of
law is considered to be the most conservative interpretation
of the doctrine of the Prophet Muhammad. Therefore, the
Maliki school is thought to reflect the society and tribal
traditions of pre-Islamic Arabia more dependably than any of
671 the other three schools of law. For instance, the Maliki
177 school, in the domain of family law, stresses the importance
428 and the primacy of agnate rights and claims. This is especially so in matters of inheritance: the law states that
in the absence of agnate heirs the property of the deceased
passes, not to female survivors but, to the central treasury
[562] of the State. This single legal aspect helps us to understand the Bedouin practice of disallowing the female to
inherit and should be a consideration in any study of Bedouin
succession rules.

175 Maliki Law was introduced into North Africa during
671 the ninth century, and became the official legal doctrine of
177 the Berber dynasties. It was first taught in this part of
the world, probably, by Yahya ibn Yahya, a student of Malik
ibn Anas, the founder of the school. Murray (1935:313)
presents a valuable legal document from the Western Desert
in which the name "Yahya" is frequently cited as the authority

175 671 177 for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). 671 177 Maliki law, derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia, may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based social structure in the Western Desert. [428] [562] The Bedouins of al-Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit, though they do have other, and more secular, justifications for the practice.

671 182 648 As we have already noted, in the above quote from the "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the 'awaiyid can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that "the government does not understand the problems of the Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the desert." They feel that they need the 'awaiyid for the sake of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have the 'awaiyid, they would eat each other. The 'awaiyid is so important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for Bedouin justice."

[656] In 1933, the government "abolished" the 'awaiyid and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the 'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
577 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
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181 of his rights;" a man should be courageous enough to fight
641 for what belongs to him and his family. These values, which
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571 become political values in a tribal context, coupled with the
idea of self-help make for a political order which is ultimately
based upon the law of blood-revenge and feud. At least this
is the case where the external system of authority relations
578 is concerned. But force as the ultimate mechanism for the
571 establishment of political order is better considered an
182 extreme, and only one of the mechanisms used by the Bedouins
in the process of conflict regulation. The attempt is to
establish a balance of rights, concerning honor and property,
and not to go beyond another's boundaries lest he retaliate.
Force, as a coercive institution, can never be the sole basis
of political structure, as Schapera has shown in the case of
the Bergdama and Bushmen (1956:211-221). Thus the Bedouins
[681] say blood-revenge would be impossible within the secondary
* [613] corporate group; relations this important cannot be based
[682] upon force. In the case of homicide within this group compensation
is immediately forthcoming.

571 Also, it has been pointed out that self-help and
672 collective responsibility do not operate indiscriminately.
* 613 That is, an individual cannot depend upon the backing of
[578] his group irrespective of his own motivations in a particular
situation which calls for retaliation or threatened the group
with retaliation. Individual responsibility figures in cases

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672 other than those dealing with blood-revenge too. For instance,
*613 in matters concerning personal debts incurred, the group is
571 not responsible for the individual. The Bedouins say that if
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*613 a man has the money he must repay his debts: if he does not
426 have the money, then he must ask a rich relative to pay his
debts for him. He is then in debt to his relative and, out
of respect for him, should not borrow money or go into debt
[558] again. If he does, he will bring dishonor ('ar) to his
[681] family and they will, ultimately, banish him. There was dis-
682 agreement among my informants as to whether or not they
*613 should contribute to a diiya which was compensation for an
829 intentional slaying. Some said that they would not question
124 the motives of their kinsman who has killed because "we are
together in the good and the bad, and I must pay for him
just as he must pay for me." But others held the opinion,
which I feel was a prevailing one, that one must take into
account the justifiability of the killing. This seems to
have been the case in the past, for the Bedouins say that
traditionally the bait of the killer had to pay one-half
of the diiya.

*613 All things political somehow relate to the payment
682 of blood-money. We have seen that the essential function
681 of the 'aqila, and even the condition of his taking office,
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571 refers to the responsibility of collecting the diiya from
the members of his group. The criterion of being a member

*613 682 681 182 571 of the group, of joining a new group, or of becoming a man, all refer to the notion of sharing in the payment of the *diiya*. All obligations and sanctions which carry the force of law in Bedouin society also are directly related to compensation and retaliation. Weber (1954:110) has stated the general case: "The *wergilt* debt as set by the judge was the most ancient debt and all forms of obligation have derived from it." [171] Evans-Pritchard (1940:171) has stated the particular case: " . . . Nuer law, in so far as it applies to a study of political relations, must be treated in connexion with the blood-feud." The blood-feud and the *diiya* are institutions by which authority groups interact and political order is maintained. 681 578 682 Blood-revenge, or the threat that it may take place and spread, is a most serious sanction in the Bedouin political system. Of the twenty-two cases of conflict in al-Qasr about which I have good details, nine of these deal with homicide or attempted homicide, and thirteen involve quarrels over rights to land, water, and women which could have led to violence had not arbitration succeeded. In fact, seven of the nine cases of personal injury began over property rights.

*613 682 Rules regarding the *diiya* in Bedouin society apply at all levels of the lineage structure. This seems important to note for it points up an unusual degree of autonomous authority at the tertiary level. Research on segmentary societies has often stressed the fact that compensation is

*613 impossible within the corporate group. Middleton and Tait
682 (1958:19) have generalized on this point, and Wagner (1940:
218) has been very explicit: "When a breach of law occurs
within a given group (lineage, sub-clan, or clan) and the
nature of the offence is such that it affects those interests
which are specific to the group and not further divisible,
a restoration of the breach by compensation is obviously
impossible, as it would necessitate the splitting of the
group into two units . . . " The Bedouins avoid division in
[672] such cases by holding the whole secondary group responsible
for the *diiya*, and usually the share of the *diiya* which would
be forthcoming from the killed man's tertiary segment is excluded
from the total payment. It seems that either the
Bedouins represent an atypical case, or Africanists have
failed to make a sharp and analytical difference between
the blood-vengeance grouping and the group which actually
shares in the paying and receiving of blood money.

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Bedouin law and political order, then, center on
[682] the institution of blood-revenge or retaliation. The payment
[626] of compensation as a prevention of blood-feud is a central
concern of the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*. Murray (1935:313-328)
presents a Bedouin legal document "signed with the seals of
twenty-two *sheikhs* testifying to the accuracy of the code"
which set forth the main tenets of the *'awaiyid* of the
Western Desert. I checked the contents of this document with

671 I checked the contents of this document with
[124] my own informants who agreed that it was authentic and
represented the _'awaiyid_ as it should be practiced. Almost
[682] the whole of the _'awaiyid_ refers to the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of killing and the payment of the
[128] _diiya_. The case studies which I present below reflect the
'awaiyid as it was practiced in 1935.

682 Blood-money is calculated relative to three things:
whether or not a killing was premeditated or accidental; the
sex of the victim; and whether or not the victim was a freeman
or a slave. The full _diiya_ is paid in the case of intentional
killing, and three-fourths of this amount is due in the case
[562] of accidental killing. The _diiya_ for a woman is one-half
that for a man whether or not the killing is intentional.
[567] There are no slaves in al-Qasr, only their descendents who
are now freemen. In the case where a pregnant woman is killed,
the foetus will be examined and should it prove to be a male
then the full _diiya_ will be due.

578 An important mechanism for conflict regulation in
682 the Western Desert is the _nazaala_, i.e., "the act of taking
*613 refuge." If a killing is committed, the killer immediately
778 seeks protection by going to the residence of a neutral third
party. The third party, who may or may not be an _'aqila_, and
his lineage give protection to the whole tertiary segment of
the killer. This may involve the actual relocation of the
killer's _bait_ to the residence of the protecting group for

578 682 *613 778 the period of one year. During the period of sanctuary, it is hoped that two things will happen: that the killed man's group will be placated and agree to compensation rather than retaliation as a means of conflict regulation; and, that over this period of one year the killer's family will pay the diiya.

The practice of nazaala is one means of differentiating between internal and external political relations. Killing between tertiary groups of the same secondary lineage would never be mediated by the nazaala, rather, compensation would immediately be paid and the matter settled--or at least never again mentioned. The Bedouins believe that killings at any level should be forgotten for fear that hostile feelings, or even feuding, will re-emerge. This excerpt from my field notes shows this.

> Hajj Sabr asked if I would take him in the jeep to Ras Abu Laha. As we passed Umm al-Rakham, the territory of 'Ailit Amarik (Marabtiin affiliated with 'Ali Abyad) west of al-Qasr, he told me about a feud which took place there five years ago. The quarrel began, as most do, over the rights to a piece of land: 'Ailit Amarik and a lineage of the Qinaishat tribe both laid claim to a strip of land between their territories. One man from the Qinaishat was killed, and, in revenge, the Qinaishat killed three men and wounded four from 'Ait Amarik. The government intervened to stop the killing. It became settled when the 'awaagil met at the zawiya of Umm al-Rakham. They ate together and resumed brotherly relations. Since Hajj Sabr was one of the third parties involved in this settlement, I asked him if I might read his copy of the document on this case. He replied: "Shame, shame! If you begin to ask about this case, it may start all over again. There are still bad feelings between the two tribes."

*613 778 182 682 The nazaala as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the diiya. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "Banu Adam kill-i-filuus" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the diiya is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the nathaara ("the keen-eyed one"). If the services of a nathaara become necessary [305] in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

682 683 671 [124] [627] Since Bedouin law, and not Egyptian law, still prevails in al-Qasr, personal injury cases must be expedited according to the 'awaiyid lest the greater sanctions embodied in the principle of self-help follow. Sanctioned fines for death and bodily injury are standardized in al-Qasr and in the whole Western Desert. One informant, a rajal khair ("good man") who sometimes adjudicated quarrels, possessed an authoritative paper which listed the injury and ensuing fine prevailing in al-Qasr when I was in the field. Below are the contents of this paper. The comments in parentheses were made by the man as I translated the paper: they were offered as the rationale behind Bedouin law.

L.E. 400 - for inflicting an injury upon a person which renders him sterile.
400 - for the intentional death of a man with a gun or knife.
400 - for causing the loss of a man's nose, ("Because to cut up a man's nose is to make him ugly.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's eyes, 200 L.E. for each eye, ("Because without eyes a man can do nothing.")
400 - for causing the loss of a man's ears, 200 L.E. for each ear, ("Because a deaf man cannot work.")
300 - for the death of a man if caused by beating with sticks or stones, ("This is unintentional, for if you really wanted to kill the man you would use a better weapon.")
200 - for the intentional death of a woman with a gun or knife.
150 - for the loss of a hand.
150 - for the loss of a leg.
10 - for the loss of a front tooth, ("Because it is bad for a man's appearange.")
5 - for the loss of a rear tooth.

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562 Implicit in the *'awaiyid* is the assumption that the woman is less responsible for her deeds and something of a weakling. The Bedouins have a proverb which says that "the devil whispers in the ear of the woman." [682] If a woman slays a man, intentionally or accidentally, the *diiya* is considered as for unintentional killing. 671 562 684 Where sex offenses are concerned, it makes a difference if the act takes place in the man's (i.e. the husband's) tent or in the desert, and, of course, it makes a difference whether or not it is a case of rape or adultery. If a man finds another man and his wife in his dwelling in the act of adultery, he may kill the man and pay the *diiya* for unintentional killing. From this *diiya*, he deducts the amount of the bride-price and 50 L.E. for trespassing. The fine for rape ranges from 10 L.E. to 100 L.E. On the other hand, if intercourse takes place with the woman's consent, the fine is only 5 L.E. or 10 L.E. If a virgin is deflowered, the fine will be 100 L.E., and the man will have to marry her, paying the bride-price asked for by the girl's father and going through the normal procedure for marriage. Where offenses involve unmarried women, all fines are paid to the father. In cases concerning married women, fines go to the husband. [586] [558] According to the Bedouins, it would be a great dishonor to the man's family if the husband were not to divorce his wife after it becomes known that she has been promiscuous. They said that if a man

671 They said that if a man
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684 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
681 "write a *barawwa* aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
[114] al-Qasr while I was there.

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the *'awaiyid*,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
*[613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The *'awaiyid* recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and *rajal khair* will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the *'awaaqil* handling the case. The *'awaaqil* consider the specific history of a particular piece of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the testimony of elders and individuals of high social status. Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the *'izba*
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle
their own land disputes because the government's way of
handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality
and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin
case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of
dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593] level of authority by the *shaib*, or one acting in his place:
[596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious
enough to prompt intervention by the *'aqila*. On the other
hand, the *'aqila*, as a legitimate representative of his
authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict
regulation falling within the sphere of external political
relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal
segments.

The *'aqila* as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
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182 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

*613 ultimately, all-out warfare: the role of 'aqila is most
578 critical at this level. Abou-Zeid (1966:259) has suggested
182 an explanation for the delicate balance of political relations
which exists between secondary lineage groups. He thinks that

> [577) . . . in the segmentary society of the Bedouin of the Western Desert . . . honour has played, and still plays, a most vital role in the field of social control, besides providing an effective code of morality . . . A slight offence inflicted against a lineage . . . is taken as an unfavorable humiliation requiring immediate retaliation to wipe out the shame, regain honour, and restore the same relations as formerly between the groups.

682 Homicide and wounding cases, which usually develop over con-
683 flicting claims to land or water rights, are most prone to
578 lead to grand-scale conflict. Thus the 'aqila will always
*613 mediate and adjudicate these cases whereas he will not
necessarily intervene in those cases involving tertiary groups where appeals to moral solidarity and kinship unity may succeed in restoring relations. It is difficult to muster evidence for this contention since conflict between tertiary groups is more of a private matter than it is public, and, once settled, such conflict is not likely to be discussed, or even admitted.

*613 Most of my details on conflict regulation and the
578 judicial process in al-Qasr involve political action between
619 secondary or primary groups, eighteen of the twenty-two cases
681 in fact. Of the nine cases dealing with personal injury (eight

*613 578 619 681 cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level; seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size [648] could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

784 695 681 There is another realm of sanctions which can be invoked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and

681 property disputes, and I shall briefly discuss this before
695 I proceed to describe Bedouin legal processes. Besides the
784 threat of blood-revenge and fines of money, the individual,
or group, who violates the moral and legal norms of Bedouin
society may be faced with sanctions of a sacred nature. In
695 any case where clear evidence is lacking, one litigant may
request that that other party swear the oath (yamiin Allah)
*613 in support of his claim. In all three corporate charters
695 presented earlier in this chapter, those of 'Ailit Ma'fas,
695 'Ailit Lazumi, and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, support of lineage-mates through the oath was a condition of group membership.
[672] Collective responsibility not only applies in the case of
secular things, i.e., sharing the blood-money and the
exercise of blood-revenge, but also where the possible curse
of God is concerned.

695 When one party to conflict requests that the oath be
administered as a means of settling a dispute, the other
party will always accept because it is assumed that in this
way both litigants "will get their rights." The party taking
695 the oath must be supported by a number of his relatives
602 ('umraa al-dam) who are willing to risk the consequences, and
*613 who are chosen by the other party. If a man is unable to
muster the required number of kinsmen to take the oath, and
the number is always relative to the seriousness of the offense
of which he is accused, then this is taken as a sign of his
untruthfulness and he loses his claim.

695 untruthfulness and he loses his claim. According to the
602 *'awaiyid*, the number of supporters required in a homicide or
613 wounding case is fifty; in a case involving the rightful
671 ownership of land or a well the required number is twenty-five; in a case of conflicting claims over a camel, five relatives must swear in support of the claimant; and in matters concerning smaller animals, such as sheep, the number of supporters will depend upon the number and price of the animals. But, of course, the number of supporters will always be relative to the size of the groups involved, and so the *'awaiyid* is not always followed to the letter of the law.

695 The time and place of the oath is fixed by the *'awaaqil*
(692) adjudicating the given case. It is administered either at the tomb of a "holy man," or at the mosque in Marsa Matruh, and always on a Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. There is a standard text to the oath and this is given in the instructions of the
695 *'awaaqil* to the litigants. The Bedouins, with few exceptions,
784 believe in the effectiveness of the oath of God. The rationale is that no man is willing to lie and suffer the wrath of God. The curse which results from a "bad oath" usually takes the form of an accident or misfortune to the swearer or a member of his family. The Bedouins believe that divine sanction operates not only against the one who makes a bad oath, but also against the one who bears false witness against another and causes him to take the oath.

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The following excerpt from my field notes concerning Bedouin law will show the earnestness with which informants upheld the function of the oath as a legal sanction.

> I know that you want to find out whether or not the oath will prove the guilt or innocence of a person. Well, it will. First of all, if a man is known to be a liar, those of his relatives who are supposed to support him will refuse to swear the oath. And, if they do take the oath and know that the person is lying, then definitely something bad will happen to both him and them. I will give you a case which will prove what I say. Years ago, there was a quarrel between an _'aiela_ of Awlad Kharuf ('Ali Abyad) and 'Ailit Abu Qarasa of the 'Aishaibat over the rightful ownership of a Roman well in the desert. The well originally belonged to our family (i.e. 'Ailit Abu Qarasa). The Abu Qarasa requested that the oath be used to settle the matter, and that twenty-five of the Awlad Kharuf swear that the well belonged to them. They swore the oath and the case was finished: the well went to the Awlad Kharuf. The Abu Qarasa could say nothing more since the oath had been taken. But listen to this: within one month's time of taking the oath, seven of the twenty-five Awlad Kharuf swearers were buried. At the present time, only three of the original swearers are still living. One of these three begot only girls, and when these girls married all of their marriages ended in divorce. Another of the three survivors has a son who lost an eye and an arm in an accident. And the third man, he has not married yet. Some of these men who died were very young at the age of death. You see, if I steal 10 L.E. and swear that I did not, then God will punish me ten-fold. God's punishment may strike my animals, my family, or my money; God will take his vengeance through these three means. You should always remember that the life of one man is worth one-hundred wells.

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The man who swears the oath places himself and his group in ritual danger. The above description of the oath and its possible consequences show that the Bedouins believe divine punishment can work indirectly. One case-study presented

695 below will show how a "bad oath" can work directly on the
784 false witness.

784 Divine sanctions enter into other aspects of the
626 Bedouin judicial process and function to maintain social
626 control in al-Qasr. If we can speak of a standard, or
681 minimal sanction, in Bedouin law it would be the dhabiiha
and 10 L.E. In any case, however small the offence might
be, the litigant found to be in the wrong will have this
judgment made against him. But in almost every case "the
[788] party who takes his rights" will refuse the dhabiiha and
[272] 10 L.E. and insist instead upon a ritual three cups of tea.
An individual refuses the dhabiiha as an act of brotherhood
and thanksgiving that the quarrel has been settled. The
Bedouins point out the practical factor that very few men
in al-Qasr can afford to part with even one lamb. On the
626 other hand, in more serious cases, such as homicide, which
681 occur in the external sphere of political relations and
682 threaten to disintegrate the political community, the parties
264 involved will actually eat a whole meal together. In this
case, the dhabiiha is accepted, for the act of commensality
is deemed necessary for reconciliation.

626 But whether or not conflict is concluded by a simple
182 ritual or a large feast, the prevailing mood is one of
771 gratitude that the secular bonds of brotherhood and a pre-
ordained sacred order have been maintained. The Bedouin

626 process of conflict regulation is ritually sanctioned and
182 the political order sacralized in a public way at the con-
771 clusion of litigation when the parties involved and the
'aqila read the _Fatiha_ (the first _sura_ of the Quran). For
671 the Bedouins, the _'awaiyid_ is the enactment of the word of
771 God, and the man who follows the _'awaiyid_ follows the command-
771 ments of God. One _'aqila_ speaking of the final authority which
776 directs Bedouin society said this:
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> God knows all things. God made the world and gave man a brain with which to think. Therefore, he gave man two choices: the good, and the bad. If a man follows the good, he does not steal, kill, or lie. God gave us Muhammad the Messenger, and he taught the ignorant to follow the word of God. You are an educated man, and so you must choose the good path and follow it. I do not read but I follow the Quran.

577 It follows, then, that "the good man" represents an
183 important Bedouin cultural ideal which is legitimated by
771 reference to the sacred. The practice of this ideal leads
[829] to "the good society." Another _'aqila_, in reply to my
question concerning the definition of a "good man," answered:

> A good man should follow God, and through this he will be a perfect man because such a man could make no mistakes. You could find no better person than this. The good man fasts, prays, makes the pilgrimage, and helps the poor. He avoids stealing and lying; these are the most important things to avoid . . . All men aim to do good. Some men think that they are doing good, but they cannot tell good from bad: this is the origin of badness . . . A man aims to do good so that the Arabs will thank him for it. The Arabs (i.e. the man's fellow Bedouins) will say that he is doing good and that he is following the good path.

577 According to this _'aqila_, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
121 process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
681 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
114 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
642 at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the _'aqila_
[627] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
[648] just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

121 first, the government may enter into conflict cases which
681 are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal
692 units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or
648 external political relations, have the right to take their
case to a rajal khair. Both exceptions represent informal
[626] processes of social control in al-Qasr; the first case rarely
happens; and the second case seems to occur quite frequently
but no recordings of the settlement are made.

681 Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what
121 Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These
are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their
effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it
[671] would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as
opposed to a law of public delicts:

> [692] In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some other person or body of persons within the community to be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction frequently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

681 In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve
675 individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions
671 to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus expressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

681 675 charters of Bedouin society, the *rawaabit al-'awaaqil* and
671 the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*. Again, following Radcliffe-Brown
121 (1952:212-219), sanctions expressed in al-Qasr may be con-
681 sidered civil as opposed to criminal sanctions since, even in
682 182 the case of intentional homicide, the emphasis is upon resti-
tution and the restoration of the "good society" rather than
[671] upon punishment. The Bedouin legal system is one which deals
with private delicts, and which depends upon secondary social
sanctions and ritual sanctions for the arbitration and settle-
ment of disputes.

121 Since neither a dichotamy between private and public
681 delicts nor a differential distribution of authority at the
various levels of the lineage structure obtain in the uncentral-
ized political system of the Bedouins, political action and
type of sanction will be described in terms of whether or not
they occur in the internal political system of the secondary
or domestic group, or in the external system where interaction
between secondary, primary, or tribal segments takes place.

The most striking difference between the two systems
of political action rests with the fact that the *lex talionis*,
retaliation regulated by custom, does not operate within the
121 secondary group. In the two cases of killing between tertiary
681 groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas and 'Ailit Lazumi already given, com-
682 * [613] pensation was immediately paid: the incidents were both
settled and "forgotten." In conflict situations arising in the

121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 682 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
[182] expressed through the *'awaiyid* try to avert bloodshed and
[671] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
for settlement through compensation.

Just as the Bedouin accepts the *'awaiyid* as a set of
681 682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the *diiya*
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Presumably,
a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the *diiya* with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
[626] taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the *'awaiyid* are mechanisms
[671] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
*[613] exists, i.e. the *'aqila* which functions over the total range
[692] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
[776] sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[695] made manifest in the reading of the *Fatiha* or the oath-taking
128 ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
68 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
[124] below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
[114]

128 68 what happened; some of them are my translations of legal docu-
[124] ments which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases
[114] happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting
of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into
those involving personal injury and those concerning property
rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority
structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

578 681 Two cases of killing have been discussed previously.
Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which
occurred in the external political system at the various levels
of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict
* [613] between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe;
[619] the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal
[648] levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual function-
ing units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with
conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the
* [613] *'aqila* as a corporate representative is active in these cases.
[182] The third case presented below is a translation of an actual
[778] document showing how the *nazaala* (discussed above) functions
as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

578 *613 682 Date: 1947. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat of the 'Aishaibat concerning murder. The quarrel began over the ownership of land. Members of the Dawlat assaulted a member of the Zagharat but he did not die. Then members of the Zagharat killed a member of the Dawlat in revenge for the beating. [571] [692] Many 'awaaqil from the tribe came to judge this case. They told the Dawlat and the Zagharat: "Shame on you, you are of one tribe." The decision of the 'awaaqil was made according to the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. A diiya of 400 L.E. was judged against 'Ailit Zagharat. The diiya was collected from all of the members of the Zagharat, and it was paid over the period of three years. The diiya was divided into two parts: one-half went to the sons of the killed man, and the other half went to the 'aiela.

Date: 1946. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Dawlat and 'Ailit Zagharat concerning murder. The conflict began when a member of the Dawlat argued with the Zagharat about a piece of land. One night when the man from the Dawlat and his father were on their way home some members of the Zagharat ambushed and killed the father. They did not bother the son because he was only a boy. [571] [692] The 'awaaqil settled the case, and the Zagharat paid a 400 L.E. diiya. [683] In 1959, after all those years, the son and his uncle ambushed the man from the Zagharat who had shot the father; they shot him four times. The man did not die but his leg was paralyzed and he lost the sight in one eye. The

578 *613 682 683 Dawlat, on the decision of the _'awaaqil_, paid a 200 L.E. _diiya_ for the leg and the eye. After this, the two families resumed friendly relations.

[539]

> In the Name of God the Merciful,
> It is the day, 28 Muharram 1382, the same as 1 July 1962. This agreement took place between the following parties: 'Ailit Abu Qarasa and 'Ailit al-Zallat. The reason for this agreement is the quarrel which happened on Wednesday, 24 Muharram, and 27 June. Out of this quarrel resulted the death of the late Juwaida Abd al-Salam. This agreement is made in the presence of the _'awaqil_ of the two parties and with their full approval (also present was Hajj 'Ali, an important _rajal khair_ about whom we will have more to say). The offending group, namely 'Ailit al-Zallat, will go to live with Hajj Sabr Hamad al-Dawlat at Ras Abu Laha area, according to the way of the _nazala_ among the Awlad 'Ali. 'Ailit al-Zallat may walk between Wadi Umm al-Shitan and Wadi al-Hawari on the west side, the sea on the north side, and the borders of the Qinaishat land on the southern side without a _nazil_ (i.e. one from the protecting party). And if they go out from these mentioned borders, they must be accompanied by one from 'Ailit Dawlat. And if they go beyond the mentioned borders, without a _nazil_, no one from the protecting party has a right to stop them. And if any from the other party offends them within the mentioned borders, then 'Ailit Abu Qarasa will be subject to whatever is decided against them in accordance with the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_. This agreement was made and signed in the presence of the _'awaqil_ of the Abu Qarasa, and the period of _nazala_ will be one year beginning the date of today. We hope for the help of God.
>
> Signatures or seals of eleven men.
> Signature and approval of Marsa Matruh Police Office
> Dated: 1 July 1962

578 *613 682 _Date: 1919_. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit Zallat ('Aishaibat, 'Ali Ahmar) and 'Ailit Hafiyan (Awlad Kharuf, 'Ali Abyad) concerning murder. The problem began over the ownership of a well. Three men from the Hafiyan were killed, and in revenge the

578 Hafiyan killed three members of the Zallat. This feud lasted
*613 over a period of 25 years. It happened one time that an
682 'aqila of 'Ailit Zallat was walking in the desert and stopped
578 for a visit at a naja', the owners of which he did not know.
574 He soon discovered that "he was in front of the Hafiyan them-
*613
682 selves." He tried to conceal his own identity, intending to
eat the meal which they offered him and then escape in the dark. But the Hafiyan soon discovered that one from the Zallat was their guest. They told him that they would send men of their tribe with him to give him safe conduct through the desert. They also said that they wished to get together and make peace. Then they made peace, and its conditions were made through the 'awaaqil. No diiya was transferred because each had killed an equal number of men. Then members of the two groups lived together for two or three days and made a feast, they slaughtered sheep and the problem was over. This problem came to an end in 1938.

578 The next case, dealing with wounding, is presented in
682 the form of two documents. It is valuable for the way in
*613 which it illustrates the judicial process and ritual sanction.
[619] Note that in the first document the case seems to concern two
primary segments, i.e., the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat, but the second document, the "Day of Oath," clearly indicates that the parties involved are 'Ailit Ma'fas ('Aishaibat) and 'Ailit Mahatha (Kamailat), two secondary groups.

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Date: 24 January 1946
Marsa Matruh

1st Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain of al-Kamailat

2nd Party: 'Awaqil of so-called Hamad Idris of al-'Aishaibat

Both parties, the first and the second, met before the 'awaaqil and witnesses to solve the prevailing problem between them concerning the wounding of so-called Harun Abd al-Zain who claims that this wound is from Hamad Idris. In the presence of the 'awaaqil all agreed that Hamad Idris should swear the oath and be supported by the below named. And the text of the oath which they will say, is: "By the truth (i.e. haqq, which also refers to a divine attribute) of the owner of this shrine, I swear that this bullet which hurt Harun is neither from me nor do I know who shot the bullet at the time of his injury." And a number of sixteen men must support him at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the date of Friday, the 29th of Saffar, 1946. And if any does not present himself for the oath, then the wounds which are present in Harun Abd al-Zain will be from the 'Aishaibat tribe. And if all swear this oath, the two parties will be even with each other. After this, none of them will hold anything against the other. This was issued in the presence of all of their 'awaaqil and with their satisfaction without any force or ill-will.

(On the original document is presented a list of the sixteen men from the lineage of Ma'fas of the 'Aishaibat who were chosen by the Kamailat to support Hamad Idris in the Oath.)

All of the seventeen above mentioned (including Hamad Idris) must be present at the shrine of Sidi Yunis al-Jaraira on the day Friday, 29 Saffar, in order to swear the oath, and this is what took place at the hand of witnesses, and God is the best witness.

Signatures or seals of all 'awaaqil who were present.

Day of the Oath:

It is on the day Friday, the last of the blessed month of Saffar, 1946. The 'Ailit Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, and with them 'Ailit al-Mahatha of al-Kamailat, came in order to swear the oath at the shrine of Shaikh Yunis al-Jaraira. And they swore this oath and the Kamailat became reconciled

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578 that they had received their rights in this case. And
*613 the two parties are satisfied by this according to the
692 witnesses present.

539 Signatures or seals of four witnesses.
695

578 The next case represents the only time in the memory
682 of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met
*613 to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely
692 unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history
571 that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As
619 noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves
[177] only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably
[648] reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional
[182] political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

619 Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar
682 (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young
578 boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned
*613
[685]

619 that one old man kept a large sum of money at home. One day
*613 the boy went to beg a watermelon from the old man, but really
682 he went to learn the layout of the man's house. In the night,
578 the boy returned to the man's house and demanded his money.
[685] The man refused saying that he had no money. The boy stabbed
the old man to death. The boy then went to his sister's
house and washed the blood from his hands, and had the girl
clean the blood from his robe. The police came to the sister's
house in search of the boy, but he was hiding in a cave nearby.
The police asked the sister: "Where is your brother, he has
killed your mother?" The girl was horrified and told the
police where they could find her brother.

*613 All of the *'awaaqil* of the 'Ali Ahmar met at the farm of
619 'Umda Ibrahim. There were forty-one *'awaaqil* plus 'Umda Ibra-
571 him. They proceeded to Libya by bus, and took forty sheep
682 with them as a *kubaara*. In Libya, they met with officials of
578 the Libyan government and the *'awaaqil* of the Harabi tribe.

682 The Harabi asked for a *diiya* of 3000 L.E. The blood-money
578 asked for was extra high for two reasons: a young man had
619 killed an elder; and the murder was connected with in-
*613 tentional theft. After discussing the crime, the Harabi
[685] reduced the price to 700 L.E. They did this out of respect
for the 'Ali Ahmar who had come so far, and who had paid money
for the sugar and tea. All of the 'Ali Ahmar contributed to

682 the diiya: the Qinaishat paid 50 L.E., the Kamailat paid
578 50 L.E., but the 'Aishaibat, the tribe of the killer paid
619 600 L.E. Of the 600 L.E. paid by the 'Aishaibat it was
*613 distributed as follows: 'Ailit Lazumi and "Ailit Ma'fas each
paid 100 L.E. because they are rich; 'Ailit Dawlat paid only
30 L.E. because they are poor, and each pays according to their
means. The 'aiela of the killer, although they are poor, had
to pay 70 L.E., and the bait of the killer had to pay 300 L.E.
All paid according to their means, except the killer's bait.
This was a special case, it never happened before and will
never happen again and this is why the killer's bait had to
pay more. The killer's bait was very poor, so what they did
not have they had to beg from the richer families of the tribe.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Property Rights

423 In general, property in al-Qasr is owned either by an
*613 individual or by a tertiary group; seldom, in these days, is
423 property held by the secondary lineage group. If we followed
*613 classic segmentary lineage theory, seeing that the tribal
182 political structure and the 'awaiyid are still functionally
[671] intact, we might suppose that land and water possession are
rights in usufruct and not of ownership. The Bedouins themselves insist that the rights to land and water are rights of
ownership. They state that all of the lineage-owned land,
with few exceptions, was parcelled out to tertiary groups a

423 long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence
*613 182 shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is
[691] represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.

I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of
422 562 property rights the rights over women. I have done this
*613 because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage
jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion
and the *'awaiyid*. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not
"own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things
related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the
right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of
695 property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases,
will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either
of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris
685 of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The *'awaaqil*
*613 sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday,
578 market day. And the *'awaaqil* told the two parties: "This is
692 a shame (*'aib*), you must be friends because you are from the
same tribe." The *'awaaqil* knew "from past history and from
truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The
'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim
[695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

691 that 'Ait Idris take the oath as proof that the well was
685 owned by them. Upon the decision of the *'awaagil*, however,
*613 'Ait 'Umran refused to allow 'Ait Idris to swear the oath
578 "because we are all one family." This means, as one *'aqila*
692 actually stated at the conclusion of the case, that " 'Ait
695 Idris is indebted to 'Ait 'Umran."

423 The following two cases which occur in the external
675 system of political relations, one within the 'Aishaibat
*613 territory and the other dealing with land rights in the
territory between two primary authority groups, indicate the
formal aspect of Bedouin adjudication in establishing contracts.

[539] *Date: 12 August 1963*. *A Contract of Agreement on Land Rights*.

Agreement and satisfaction took place between Hussain Karim al-Dawlat of al-'Aishaibat and Khalid Idris al-Ma'fas of al-'Aishaibat, the first and second party. And the reason for this agreement is that each of the two parties own cultivable land at Ras Wadi Madwar. The two parties wish to make a dividing line between this linear piece of land and to declare the borders. The two parties agreed on the following: first, the beginning of the border extends from the eastern side at south Ras Raqabit al-Shumar to the western side at Hatiyid and is shown by stone markers; secondly, this line should be established from the east to the west, and this is a dividing line between the two parties and was executed by them and with their satisfaction; thirdly, whoever rejects or modifies this line will be responsible in front of law and the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali*; each party is responsible for his children and relatives as to their actions regarding this line which is the subject of the agreement; fifthly, this contract of agreement which defines the borders between the two parties was issued in two copies, a copy to each party to use when it is needed.

Signatures or seals of seven men.

423 Date: 12 October 1954. There came to us (i.e. the *'awaqil*)
691 on this day, Khalid Idris of al-'Aishaibat and Yunis Abd
578 al-Nabi of al-Kamailat. The reason for their coming is a
*613 quarrel over land rights at Wadi al-Hijnaiya. And we put distinct markers between the land of the two parties, the
[539] first, Khalid Idris, and the second, Yunis Abd al-Nabi. And the boundary passes by the distinct markers; the first is the *wadi* marker, the second to the sea and beside the tree, and the final marker we put east of Halima well. This is a decision between the two parties in the presence of the following witnesses:

Signatures or seals of five men.

619 The case given below indicates, by the use of two
578 documents, the process of conflict settlement involving two secondary segments of al-Qasr, one Sa'adi and one Marabit.
[671] 'Ailit al-Sulwatiyya, though genealogically not members of the Awlad 'Ali and holders of a client or vassal status in traditional times, are within the jurisdiction of the *'awaiyid* Awlad 'Ali. They claim their rights under it by virtue of the fact of their residence in al-Qasr. The power of ritual sanction is clearly illustrated by this case.

578 Date: 30 July 1964, Marsa Matruh. First Party: Shaikh
685 Khalid Za'aluk al-Sulwatiyya and four relatives. Second
691 Party: Khalid Idris of 'Ailit Ma'fas and three relatives.
619 They are present. The cause of these two parties coming to-
423 gether is a quarrel over a well named Halima. Since the choice
[695] to swear the oath has been made by the two parties, Khalid Idris, the second party, will swear the oath supported by twenty-four members of his *'umraa al-dam* ("blood group") to

578 be chosen by Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, the first party. The text
685 of the oath which Khalid Idris will swear is: "By the truth
691 619 of the owner of this tomb (maqaam), and this book of God, I
695 swear that you (i.e. the 'Ailit Sulwatiyya represented by
[539] Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk) have neither work of hand nor a
grandfather's stake in this well." If any of the oath-takers are missing on the day of the oath, the well will be owned Khalid Za'aluk. And if they swear the oath, the well will be owned by 'Ailit Ma'fas.

The date of the oath will be the first Friday of month nine,
[778] 1964. The oath will be taken at the shrine of Sidi 'Awam, and the swearing will deal with the well only. For the land which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk and his family, and the land to the east of the well belongs to Khalid Idris and his family. And the water which is west of the well belongs to Khalid Za'aluk. The two parties agreed to this. (Each party, and five witnesses, i.e. rajal khair, for each party, signed the document.)

423 Date: 30 July 1964. I, Khalid Za'aluk, have decided to cancel
619 the oath which was supposed to have been sworn on 9 September
578 1964 at the shrine of Sidi Awam. Khalid Idris and the oath-
691 [695] takers were present and were stopped from taking the oath.
And the well named al-Halima which was the cause of the quarrel

423 619 578 691 (nizaa'a) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this renunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concerning the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964.
I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

648 671 578 We have mentioned that the 'awaiyid prevails in al-Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The 'awaiyid is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the 'awaiyid cannot."

423 691 578 619 648 *[613] [634] Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all the 'awaaqil of both tribes and the 'umda and shaikh from each tribe.

423 691 578 619 648 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through the wadi after the rains should be divided equally between the two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict, and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

674 685 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and [682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him [829] the full diiya, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do [671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 578 685 *613 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

619
578 said: "I did not take anything." The *'awaaqil* of both parties
685 met and told the accused: "If you have anything give it to
*613
695 us; if you do not have anything then swear the oath to this
[571] fact." Members of 'Ailit Ma'fas said that the boy was innocent
[692] and told the *'awaaqil* that the boy should have his rights
according to the *'awaiyid* (i.e. he should be allowed to swear
the oath to establish his innocence). The boy accused of the
theft, his father, and two other members of 'Ailit Ma'fas
selected by the accusers swore the oath and the problem was
619 over. Two months later, the accuser from the Kamailat lost
578 his eye in an accident, because swearing the oath has con-
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695 sequences for both parties. A bad oath will work against the
784 one who makes it; there will be a curse upon him, his children,
and his money. And the bad effects of an oath will also work
against the one who falsely accuses another making him swear
the oath.

582 The final two cases deal with marriage rights. The
562 first illustrates a number of things which I have touched on
*613 in the previous discussion of marriage: that a man may choose
792 to ignore the jural structures of the lineage group where the
desires of his offspring are concerned; that the female is
not the totally subjugated person which one might expect to
find in the strongly patrilineal Bedouin society; and that the
role of "holy man" functions in the marital area of authority
relations.

114 The second, rather complex, case occurred while I was
792 in the field. Once again, the role of the "holy man" is shown
562 to operate in cases dealing with women. Shown here also is an
interesting example of the cultural definition of abnormality.

*613 No Date. Case: Quarrel between 'Ailit al-Abaidi ('Ali Abyad)
578 and 'Ailit al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) over marriage rights. A man
582 from al-Abaidi agreed that his daughter could marry a man but
792 the rest of the 'aiela did not approve of this marriage. Since
the man could not go to his 'aqila, who disapproved of the
marriage, he took his problem to a "holy man." The "holy man"
decided that the girl should marry the man she wanted to
marry, but he was afraid that this would cause trouble in the
'aiela. The "holy man" decided to marry the man and woman,
[586] and then to divorce them for a period of one year so that the
conflict would abate. The girl's father knew of this marriage
but the other members of the 'aiela did not. After a period
of one year, the groom went to the "holy man" and said: "Decide
anything that I can do, but I must have the girl." The "holy
[681] man" decided to make him pay a kubaara (expiation) fee of
[684] 100 L.E. to the girl's 'aiela, and he married them again.

*613 Date: 1965. Case: Quarrel within a tertiary segment of the
619 Qinaishat tribe concerning marriage rights. A girl from the
578 Qinaishat tribe had refused to marry her paternal cousin, but
582 he was insistent upon his right to have her.

*613 619 578 582 793 he was insistent upon his right to have her. She went to see the "holy man," al-Sanusi, who lives near al-Qasr. (Al-Sanusi is a descendent of "the Great Sanusi," the founder of al-Sanusiyya, who now lives in Egypt after having been exiled from Libya.) Al-Sanusi decided to keep the girl at his farm until he could decide a course of action. *613 619 578 582 793 683 One night, the girl's cousin secretly came to the Sanusi farm and found her room. The girl was sleeping. The cousin struck a match, the girl awoke and was frightened. She jumped from her bed and began to run, in so doing she fell down a flight of stairs and suffered a rupture. This was a serious offense which the cousin had committed, and al-Sanusi decided that he should call all of the _'awaaqil_ of the area to inform them of this. In the meantime, he sent the girl back to her home and the cousin continued to bother her concerning his rights over her.

[584] The cousin went so far as to "offer the blood-sacrifice for her," a stage in the marriage process which signifies that the union has been consented to by both families. The girl's father was dead, and her brothers and uncles were unable to keep the cousin away from the girl. (It may be assumed that they were conscious of his rights to _bint 'amm_.) They had even beaten him once. [692] All of the _'awaaqil_ of 'Ali Ahmar and 'Ali Abyad, and the Marabtiin in the al-Qasr area came to meet with al-Sanusi at his farm. He (al-Sanusi) said that they all

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 793 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
683 right to the girl should be settled. The *'awaaqil* decided
692 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a *kubaara* of 1000 L.E. from the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to accept the *kubaara*, and this was the correct thing to do since the *kubaara*, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The *'awaaqil* took note of the cousin's rights to his *bint 'amm*: they said that since the girl refused to marry him it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the *'awaaqil*, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

CHAPTER V

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION AND AUTHORITY

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Political Role Analysis: Theoretical Framework

There is current confusion over the definition and use of concepts in political analysis. Ideas concerning power, influence, authority, and the general notion of leadership itself, are variously treated and dealt with equally well. But in every case, a necessary and common aspect of political studies is that of role analysis.

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"Role" is that part of the actor's behavior which constitutes and defines his participation in the social interactive process (Parsons and Shils 1951:23). Political roles define who does what with respect to the political aspect of the social interactive process, i.e. in the system of authority relations. In a most general sense, political role structure may be divided into the two categories of "followers" and "leaders" (Leach 1954:8-10; Easton 1965:205). From the level of the family to the largest social grouping, persons are assigned by the group, or take it upon themselves, to make and help execute decisions. This is to say, that some degree of leadership exists in all social groupings. Whether or not such leadership is institutionalized is another question with which we shall

121 554 571 deal in the course of this discussion.

No political system can persist without a separation of duties between decision-makers and others. The specialized function of decision-making in the political sphere helps "to bring about some adjustment or accommodation in conflicting demands and to implement any settlement where necessary" (Easton 1965:206). It follows then that there is no society without some type of authority role, however simple, and, we assume, that this role can be defined.

121 171 554 571 I do not consider this point a debatable one, though writings on the subject of political organization in primitive society seem to indicate that I should consider it debatable. For example, Steward (1938:247) reports on small bands of American Indians in the Basin-Plateau region who are without chiefs (leaders?). Sharp (1958:5) states that the Yir Yoront cannot tolerate even "mild chiefs"; Schapera (1956:93) notes that "chiefs everywhere in South Africa" are only part-time specialists, and this is taken to mean that the Bushman and Bergdama are without political roles. Service (1966:51) defines "leadership" as "administration" and finds that it is unstructured, which moves from one person to another, and, above all, cannot be associated with the word "chief." 121 554 All of these discussions consider specialization to mean full-time spent in role-playing and the singularity of role assignment. On these bases conclusions are reached as to the presence

121 554 or absence of political roles in primitive societies. It is obvious that in no society does an individual play one, and only one, role. Every social role is, in some degree, a part-time role. Even at the apex of role specialization and structural complexity (the presidency of the United States, for instance), an individual plays his political role along with others. Also, in trying to determine the presence or absence of roles in a society, it should be kept in mind that the notion of institutionalization refers to a process and not a state of being. Therefore, in any one society at any one point in time, there may be a number of roles "happening." This, it seems, will especially be the case in the dynamic field of politics.

121 554 571 In political analysis, influential and leadership roles may be viewed in terms of differential responsibility. Authority is the institutionalization of a responsible relationship between the leader and other members of the collectivity wherein the former has the right to expect support from the latter in given situations (Parsons 1960:183-186). A role which is imbued with power, but not authority in the analytical sense which I wish to bring out here, lacks this institutionalized right to expect support. M.G. Smith (1966:127) makes this analytical distinction most clearly:

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> As a regulatory capacity, authority is legitimated and identified by the rules, traditions, and precedents which embody it and which govern its exercise and objects. Power is also regulatory, but is neither fully prescribed nor governed by norms and rules.

Authority is always attached to specific roles while power is a generalized control over others. For instance, power may be based on religious or economic grounds and operate with equal influence in the political sphere. The basis of the legitimacy of authority is the backing which it receives from the legal system. Power, however, is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out his will regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber 1947:152). Power over others is a type of influence which may operate without their consent, their "will," or even their awareness and understanding. For instance, when one party controls property or other values essential to person's existence, he has power over those others (Goldhamer and Shils 1939).

Influence of the authority type is explicit and institutionalized control of certain symbols which emphasizes group goals. Power-type influence is the control of goods and symbols, often the inexplicit manipulation of these things, which emphasizes particularistic goals usually with a private individual referent. Power and authority are two types of influence. For analytical purposes, they may be considered at opposite ends of a scale of institutionalization. In this

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way, each may be considered as having aspects of the other attached to it: a power role may at times take on an authoritative aspect, and an authority role, when its incumbent "pulls rank," may be said to be exerting power rather than authority.

I have found it necessary to utilize the concepts and ideas discussed here in order to understand the distribution of power in al-Qasr. The range of authoritative action is wide in Bedouin society, and no simple dichotamy between power and authority will suffice to explain it. However, authority does crystallize at certain points in the al-Qasr social structure, and political rights and duties at these reference points become relatively formal and well-defined. When we speak of the crystallization of authority roles, we refer to a tendency toward legitimacy as a process of institutionalization taking place in society. Authority among the 'Aishaibat tribe is legitimate, public, and representative because it is distributed and exercised with reference to imperatively coordinated associations, or corporate groups.
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Furthermore, the manner in which authority is segmented and distributed informs and legitimates the Bedouin lineage structure. On the other hand, power and power roles possessing no legitimate or representative influence with reference to the lineage structure, may actually inform "structures" and "modes" which combine and "are quite unlike the articulations

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in a lineage system" (Peters 1967:280).

My own study indicates that authority roles are more easily studied since they are more easily observable. Power roles are subtle simply because they are less institutionalized; closer field work is required if we are to understand their structure and function. Al-Qasr is characterized by segmentation in communication structure which follows the lines of lineage segmentation. As a consequence of this, social intercourse is of a restricted nature wherein each lineage group tends to be its own audience. In cases such as these, where social interaction is anything but intense, the character of political relations between groups is difficult to perceive. Thus the operation of influence at the informal level, i.e. power, is difficult to comprehend. But it seems absolutely necessary that politics per se be studied in the tribal situation, and the only way that I can handle it in the al-Qasr case is to consider leadership in the context of an institutionalization process.

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There are precedents for this approach, and these also serve to point up the importance of leadership studies in primitive societies. Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xi-xxiii), referring to decision-making processes in tribal societies, was convinced that even in cases of contingencies, and seemingly "spur of the moment" group activities, careful observation would show that "they were directed by leaders who had some

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measure of recognized authority" (p. xv). Radcliffe-Brown conceived of politics as a process, and actually worked with concepts of increasing specialization in decision-making and role differentiation to bring this out (p. xxi). The structural focus of political analysis is the role: he reminds us that analytical concepts such as the "State" do not exist in the phenomenal world, that there exists only individuals who play roles and interrelate as possessors and non-possessors of authority (p. xxiii).

More recently, Pospisil (1968:201-222) has claimed that all societies necessarily possess authority roles by virtue of the fact that justice and its administration is "vested in the decision-making activity, irrespective of its informality or subtlety, of an individual or group of individuals of influence." According to Pospisil, law and conflict regulation upon which political order rests cannot be divorced from "the decision-making process of authority or group leaders" (1968:206). In his study of the Kapauku Papuans, Pospisil (1963:52-55) describes the basis of a "power" struggle between different "authorities."

In this study, I have tried to use the concepts of decision-making process, power-authority continuum, and role-structure for an analysis of Bedouin leadership. Such an approach may be better suited for a study of peasant or modern-complex societies where roles are more differentiated

121 554 571 and better defined, but I feel that the area of leadership in tribal society is more complex and less well studied than we are led to believe. Both the decision-making process and some kind of authority are present in all societies, but we know less about such universals in tribal society. It is as Easton (1965:205) has said: "Even in the smallest group, we can expect to find that the power and responsibility of caring for recurring matters as well as crises tend to reside in the hands of the few."

Status and Role Differentiation

554 565 Although structural differentiation along class lines does not exist in al-Qasr, status differential does exist and a discussion of it is essential for an understanding of Bedouin authority structure. Classes exist only where individuals at a specific socio-economic level "become conscious of their common interests and organize themselves"(Linton 1936:110). Status stratification in and of itself is not indicative of a class structure, for "a size beyond the possibility of facial recognition" is an additional prerequisite (Bierstedt 1957:404).

554 571 Authority structure in al-Qasr, like any of the other structures of society, constitites a system of roles. The actors who act out the roles in this particular system occupy a special status, or position, in the Bedouin social system

554 and political structure. This group of actors corresponds
571 to Max Weber's concept of *stand*, or "status group," a group set apart from the rest of society by the amount of "status honor" which its members possess. In content, "status honor" is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all of those who wish to belong to the circle. Linked with this expectation are restrictions on social intercourse" (Gerth and Mills 1946:186-188).

In the course of daily observation in al-Qasr, one begins to understand that certain persons communicate more frequently and more easily with certain others; that the member families of this group tend to intermarry; and even that the men of this group tend to dress similarly. In each case, they visibly and socially set themselves apart from other Bedouins in al-Qasr and the surrounding area: one can identify a member of this "status group" on the streets of Marsa Matruh. They do not represent a well-structured group, least of all an association. More concisely, Weber refers to these individuals as

> A status group (which) is always somehow societalized, but is not organized into an association. *Commercium*, in the sense of "social intercourse," and *connubium* among groups are the typical characteristics of the *mutual esteem* among status equals; their absence signifies status differences (Gerth and Mills 1946:300).

554 It would be considered "wrong" for the members of
571 [577] this group to present themselves at an al-Qasr wedding party,
[585] or the annual celebration held in honor of a local saint of
[796] the area. When I inquired about the conspicuous absence of
[124] some of my chief informants from such gatherings, I was told
[431] that "they will send their gifts," or that "it is not decent
554 that they come to something such as this." In terms of
571 Bedouin social structure, there are a number of plausible
182 561 explanations for this "status separation." Fathers should
[593] not attend public affairs at which their sons may be "performing,"
i.e., young men should be allowed to play a public
role outside the confines of the father-son authority
structure. By virtue of the extension of the father role,
and its corresponding authoritarian attitude, every member
of the elder age-set commands certain rights and obligations
which would prevent the free expression that is the hallmark
of Bedouin parties. Conversely, and at the more general
level, members of the "status group" who wish to remain
members of this circle accept certain restrictions on social
[114] intercourse. At the five different Bedouin "parties" which
I attended, there were "elders" present, but none of them
could be classified as members of the "status group." Bedouins
plainly state that elders should not attend parties, but, on
the other hand, they show much more concern and emotion when
they say that a member of the "status group" should not "be

554 seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism
571 at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger
182 generation with a tension-release situation, but also a
561 symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors
[154] and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the
political order.

[578] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach
554 to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change
571 in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market
178 economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital
[471] (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits
[439] this. The "status group," with business and social relations
[177] in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an
[796] attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 571 178 789 796 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to the old way of life." This is a restriction on social intercourse. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to 554 571 183 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But the result is a "status group" mood which may be described as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of the "status group."

554 556 571 * [613] The pool from which the members of the "status group" are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been, traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
571 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

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TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 One most important way of accruing "status honor"
571 in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict
627 situations. The role of the third party represents an effective
*613 and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of *'aqila*. For instance, by mediating through the
process of *nazaala*, the third party prevents feuds.

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[1] This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds. In this
571 sense, the third party is a legitimate moral and political
627 influence, but not formalized to the degree as that of the
*[613] 'aqila. A discussion of the authority structure in al-Qasr,
then, requires that the allocation of authoritative action
in terms of the loci, or roles, of political influence be
designated.

[792] The central place of the third party role in the
Bedouin political structure is manifested in the many laudable terms which refer to it: rajal khair ("good man") is the most general and often used referent; rajal saalih ("pious man") refers almost always to a "holy man," a specialized role in al-Qasr; quwaal al-khair ("the speaker of good"); and fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair ("the doer of good"). The latter three roles are approximately equivalent to that of rajal khair, though some informants argued that rajal khair is especially designated because he mediates quarrels while the fa'aal al-khair or 'amaal al-khair help a man when he is in financial difficulties.

554 The functioning of the third party in conflict media-
571 tion is formal to the degree that two parties agree on his
627 intervention and to abide by his decision; but the structuring
*613 of the third party is informal by comparison with the in-
182 stitutionalized role of 'aqila. However, the existence of
the third party role, and its various expressions in al-Qasr

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571 politics, and the fact that it is differentiated from the
627 role of _'aqila_, are the bases for conceptualizing a structural
*613
[182] division of political duties and authority distribution.

554 Role differentiation in the authority structure may be
571 discussed from two points of view: the degree of difference
between authoritative decision-making roles and the other roles,
and, the way in which one authoritative role differs from
another. These refer to the different degrees of specialization
characterized by any one role as compared to another. I
have already discussed the way in which the role of _'aqila_
differs from other social roles (such as the kinship roles)
in the authority structure of al-Qasr. In the following
[128] discussion, I focus on role differentiation in the non-institutionalized
aspect of the authority structure, on power
and influence.

Societies differ from culture to culture in the complexity
of role differentiation. Within any one culture it
554 may differ from social domain to social domain. The political
571 system in al-Qasr is from this point of view structurally
627 simple, the assignment of duties in the traditional authority
*[613] structure being divided between the _'aqila_ and the third party.
What legitimate influence is possessed by the third party is
derivative from the "status honor" of its members. The
[792] exception to this is the _rajal saalih_ who derives his power
or influence as a result of his special relationship with God.

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Thus within the "status group" a difference exists between those members whose power might be considered "secular" (i.e. the rajal khair), and those whose power might be considered "sacred" (i.e. the rajal saalih). Their right to mediate and to overseer the execution of decisions binding on parties to conflict derives from this status. In a way, authority role patterns may be seen to overlap, and the "status group" impinges on the legitimate authority of the 'aqila by virtue of the fact that they are, for one reason or another, his status equals inside and outside the political structure.

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This structural division of political duties for dealing with conflict corresponds to Eisenstadt's (1965:30) differentiation of roles in terms of degrees of instituionalization. The role of 'aqila is present and enduring in each tertiary authority group. There is an incumbent who can be pointed out. His rights and privileges are circumscribed, and his duties and obligations are well defined: the power of the 'aqila role is limited by the very fact that it is

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institutionalized. The role of the third party, or the mediator in Bedouin society, is less institutionalized, and therefore, less structured and less confining with respect to the kind and amount of influence which the role-player might exert.

The role of the rajal khair, and this implies reference to all third parties, carries with it power. When power is

When power is
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*[613] institutionalized, such as it is in the role of _'aqila_, it becomes authority. This is the Weberian notion of power and authority which has been used by Bohannan (1958) for an analysis of, what he refers to as, "extra-processual events." "Extra-processual events" refers to the operation of power in everyday social relationships, whenever some people make others do what they want them to do. In other words, possessors of "status honor" are also possessors of power, and, I would claim, by virtue of this, such people are recruited into decision-making roles. Not only do members of the "status group" manipulate others in everyday dyadic social relationships, but, more importantly, in the context of conflict control they are able to dominate in political triadic relationships. Furthermore, since they are not structurally bound in their decision-making role, i.e., they operate across group and lineage lines, they accrue even more power and widen their power-base or support structure. What is highlighted in this kind of political role analysis is the fact that different individuals play the game of power politcs in various ways, (128) and with varying degrees of success. In the next chapter, I will bring out this very point by presenting a case study of one such role-player.

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627 When we contrast the roles of _'aqila_ and _rajal khair_, we are defining a political role-set. In an attempt to differentiate between the two roles further than we already have,

554 571 *613 627 and to clarify the concept of political role structure for al-Qasr, we may make the useful analytical distinction between an "arbitrator" and a "mediator." George Simmel (Wolff 1950), in his discussion of the sociological significance of the third element, i.e. "the triad," notes the important difference between the "mediator" who only guides "the process of coming to terms," and the "arbitrator" who "ends up by taking sides" (1950:146-149). In the process of mediation, the termination of conflict is in the hands of the parties themselves, and there is no final authority to which one may appeal. In the process of arbitration, the 'aqila may, after deciding that mediation has been unsuccessful, impose his will over the wills of the litigants and appeal to the rawaabit as the final authority. The mediator attempts to reduce "will" to "understanding" (Simmel 1950:148). Mediation may be considered an initial stage of most Bedouin judicial processes; thus the mediating and arbitrating attributes of political authority are not always separate, as in the role of 'aqila. In so far as the regulation of conflict is a political mechanism for the reduction of strain, then " . . . the existence of the third element serves the perpetuation of the group" (1950:152).

554 571 627 The rajal khair and the "status group" in al-Qasr have much in common with Evans-Pritchard's tut role in Nuer society (1940:178-181).

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> A tut in this rather wide sense of 'man of good standing,' or 'social leader' is usually a scion of an important lineage, the head of his own family, and master of his homestead and herd . . . (His) authority is never formalized. He has no defined status (i.e. specifically delimited position), powers, or sphere of leadership . . . Beyond his domestic groups a tut has authority in his village only in the sense that he takes a prominent part in questions of procedure and other discussions.

The non-institutionalized third party role in al-Qasr has power and influence in political affairs, and this condition arises from certain structural features and economic facts about Bedouin society. In a word, outside the lone formal role of 'aqila, a person's political influence is directly related to the traditional influence which attaches to his family, or to his economic status. In all cases, the person of "good" family and sufficient wealth has a high status on the social prestige scale of al-Qasr. The people who have high esteem do not have prescribed roles to play in al-Qasr, but their roles are indeed important. Furthermore, the rajal khair role can be just as important as any political role which is prescribed, and it may even become more important.

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Besides the 'aqila and the third ~~party~~, there exists two external but related roles which form part of the total system of Bedouin authority. The roles of 'umda and shaikh represent institutionalized offices. They function, however, more as structural aspects of the Egyptian governmental authority structure. Of course, no complete separation between the two structures can be claimed. It is recognized

554 that these officers, as representatives of the Bedouin, must
571 figure in both structures. Therefore, we must understand
177 and explain the relationship between the two sets of roles
extant in the Bedouin total political structure, one set
pertaining to the traditional authority structure and the
other to the relatively new legal authority structure of
the nation state.

554 The one factor common to all Bedouins in politically
571 influential roles is that they possess a high degree of
"status honor," and thus belong to the "status group" of
al-Qasr. The "status group" is responsible for political
order in al-Qasr and the political links which it maintains
with other systems, Bedouin and Egyptian. Bedouins say that
responsible action in conflict control belongs to one who
knows how to give a man his rights while maintaining the
honor of both parties; at the ideal level, it is the duty
of all to do this. The fact that the power group and "the
rich" comprise two coterminous groups is accidental and
even incidental to the Bedouins. In theory, there could be
a person of low economic status but who would belong to the
"status group" simply as a result of his ability to mediate.
*[613] The authority of the 'aqila and the governmental offices of
[177] 'umda and shaikh are legitimate only where formal litigation
[627] is concerned. Beyond this, they may have influence, not
legitimate authority, and in this case, they switch roles
and operate as a rajal khair.

554 571 and operate as a *rajal khair*.

There are two primary types of political roles in al-
554 571 Qasr, the traditional and the modern legal. Modern legal
177 political roles have been decreed from above by the government.
*613 The traditional roles of *'aqila* and "third party" represent
[627] autochthonous roles emerging from Bedouin social and cultural
structures. Bedouin traditional roles correspond to Weber's ideal-type "traditional authority" which is based upon "piety for what actually, allegedly, or presumably has always existed" (Gerth and Mills 1946:296). The role of *'aqila* is "traditional" rather than "legal" despite its fully institutionalized status. The relatively modern roles of *'umda* and *shaikh* are what I term here "legal"; these offices are not, nor did any of my informants consider them to be, roles natural in the Bedouin political system. The legitimacy of these roles stems from, what Weber called, "legal authority" in which "submission . . . is based upon an impersonal bond to the generally defined and functional duty of office"
[627] (1946:299). In this case, the norms to which conformity is
demanded are not those espoused by the *'aqila* or the "third party," but are established by national governmental decrees and regulations.

128 In the remaining part of this chapter, the attempt is to show two things which I consider essential to an understanding of Bedouin political structure and a perspective of

128 Bedouin culture change: how the Bedouins perceive their authority structure, and how political authorities relate to members of the political system.

Traditional Roles

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627 The authority and role of the 'aqila has been discussed so that I can devote attention to the "third party" roles in this section. No formalized document exists to stipulate the rights and duties of the "third party," such as exists for the 'aqila in the form of the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. Nevertheless, Bedouin litigants have certain expectations of a rajal khair when he mediates in a case of conflict. Before a rajal khair agrees to take part in the judicial process, the disputants make it explicit that they will accept his decision as final and binding. Such an agreement is not put into writing. On the other hand, a rajal khair can intervene into a dispute on his own. In so doing, he may gain in prestige relative to the manner and degree of success with which he handles the problem. By saving face for both parties in the quarrel, by cajoling an ingratiating attitude from both parties, the rajal khair may reinforce or augment his "status honor" and his local following.

*[613] A person occupying the office of 'aqila can participate in the process of conflict regulation as a rajal khair. We noted that this is a case of role-switching. It is conceivable

554 571 627 *613 then that the 'aqila can increase his prestige and status beyond the limits of his formal role. When he does take the role of rajal khair, he does so only in conflict cases involving two lineages other than his own. Where any member of his own lineage is concerned, an incumbent 'aqila cannot be considered a neutral "third party" which is a prerequisite of this role. This factor constitutes a limit on the power of the 'aqila.

One 'aqila explained the relationship between the rajal khair and 'aqila roles in this way: "The two are equal. The 'aqila is responsible for one bait, but the rajal khair solves any problem in any place, for any bait. He goes to them or they come to him. I am, for instance, responsible for the members of Bait 'Umar, but it is quite possible that any other bait can ask for my advice in a problem. And so I go as a rajal khair."

In a general sense, the office of the 'aqila represents an ideal, while the real aspects of conflict regulation in al-Qasr center around the role of the "third party." In fact, many of the cases formally handled by the 'aqila afterwards undergo readjustment, as it were, by a rajal khair. 554 571 627 This is done by the rajal khair's suggesting a "more reasonable" settlement which is agreeable to both sides. For example, in a case of conflict over water rights the following was reported: "The 'awaqil passed the judgement that they should pay a

554 dhabiiha and 10 L.E. But Hajj 'Ali intervened and did not
571 let them pay the fine. Instead, he had them write a paper
627 declaring that should they reopen this matter, they would
have to pay the old fine plus a new fine of the same amount."
Simmel (Wolff 1950) notes that the mediator saves group unity
through his "intellectuality," but that he is also an exploiter
of the situation. It is obvious that Hajj 'Ali could have
increased his "status honor" in the eyes of both parties to
this conflict. The rajal khair who is facile enough to
salvage the honor of both parties in a dispute increases his
chances for future mediation and, hence, the chance to further
augment his "status honor." The minimal fine involved in
most of Bedouin litigation indicates a concern, not with
punishment per se, but with "taking one's rights" and lawful
share of honor. Social harmony is viewed in terms of an
equitable distribution of honor. The power which a rajal
khair has over litigants, which derives from his status in
the social structure, contributes to this social harmony
necessary for the persistence of the community.

554 The Bedouins say that one goes to the rajal khair,
571 or rajal salih, because he knows that he will "get his
627 rights." Litigation is entered into with the understanding
829 [691] that neither party will emerge a "loser." On the other hand,
* [613] the 'aqila, who is expected to be dispassionate and totally
objective, must rule on the rightness or wrongness of an act;

554 hence the rajal khair represents a face-saving mechanicsm
571 and an alternative which is needed. The rajal khair may even
627 violate group norms in acting to restore the balance of
[829] honor: he may lie with intent to deceive, behavior which at
*[613] any other time would be considered "wrong" by the Bedouin.
[577] An informant said that

> [539] the real rajal khair is a man who goes to men in a quarrel and asks them to be on good terms and to avoid the devil. He uses good judgement in quarrels. In this case, he may even have to lie. He goes to both parties and listens to them insult each other, but when he returns he tells each that the other is a good man and wishes to settle the quarrel. He tells them: 'Do not let the devil interfere.' He tells each that the other wants his friendship.

554 I pursued the detail that a rajal khair may lie to restore
571 peace, since other informants had made a point of this. My
577 informant then explained:
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> [539] I don't want to commit myself because no one knows if the rajal khair is really lying; the men at the time of the quarrel do not know that he is lying. Not all men are rajal khair: there are only a few. The rajal khair puts himself in trouble to help others, therefore, the people do not want to harm him (by thinking ill of him). The rajal khair must be a good man and help others, and he always speaks the truth. He lies but he is doing good, and the people do not want to harm him. When the rajal khair lies, a man does not lose his rights. A man tells the rajal khair this; he tells him that he does not want to lose his rights, and he does not care what he says as long as he does not lose his rights.

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One 'aqila, who is famous for the sharpness of his tongue in dealing with litigants, was explicit about the authority of the rajal khair as compared to his own in matters of conflict regulation:

> Both are one (i.e. the 'aqila and the rajal khair), for the rajal khair can also finish a problem. The rajal khair tries to solve the problem, but only the 'aqila judges (yahkum). The rajal khair worries about the feelings of the two men involved, but the 'aqila cares only about justice and what is right . . . The rajal khair does not want the two men to lose one another. It is a friendly way to solve problems.

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Bedouins of low status in al-Qasr who are economically linked to the rajal khair in what resembles a patron-client relationship permit this fact to influence their own interpretation of the authority structure. A common view of the 'aqila's formal authority indicates that the Bedouins themselves are conscious of a structural comparison of political roles, but not of the underlying economic conditioners at work.

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> There are good men and there are bad men: the rajal khair is the opposite of a bad man. The rajal khair is not responsible for his group, but the 'aqila is. The 'aqila is chosen from among the elders of the bait so that he is not always a good man. But when they want a man to solve problems, they get him from among the rajal khair. The 'aqila is responsible before the 'umda and shaikh, and he is responsible for collecting and receiving the diya.

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The rajal khair represents a vital element in Bedouin society. He is a symbol of security, the man to whom one

554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
627 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
182 of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[181] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from
[556] non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future.
> [178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

554 One _'aqila_ claimed that the _rajal khair_ is a person
627 who shares in his own authority and presides when he is
*613 away, but he separated the "rights" of the two roles. The
[779] _'aqila_ is able to force two parties in conflict to read the
[578] _Fatiha_, the first _sura_ of the Quran, in order to terminate
the problem; this is beyond the rights of the _rajal khair_ whose
influence is not directly supported by sacred sanctions. But
[784] the role of _rajal khair_ does have its "sacred" aspects, for
all Bedouins know that "you should never harm a _rajal khair_
or God will punish you for this." I never heard this same
thing said about the _'aqila_.

554 Historically, it was perhaps the case that the _rajal_
627 _khair_ was the person of high status who represented the authority
*613 of an absent _'aqila_. The role never became institutionalized
182 but functioned as a support and substitute role in a structure
dominated by that of the _'aqila_. In a segmentary society
627 where the various structures exist in opposition to one
628 another, it is important that an institution, such as a third
182 non-partisan element, exists to facilitate communication
578 between parties for the purposes of conflict regulation.
Besides the _rajal khair_, an example of this would be the
traditional case of the wife from an outside tribe who alone
was permitted freedom of passage between the two warring
parties. Her purpose, it was assumed, was that of peace-making.

554 The rajal khair, then, is a broker in social relation-
571 ships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status
627 group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his
fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and
loyalty. This role, like that of the 'aqila, is a secular
[681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as
those of the 'aqila's are political. In this sense, they
are differentiated from the role of rajal saalih whose
sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 The traditional role which we define as that of the
792 rajal saalih, "the holy man," was probably much more important
[178] in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two
rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a
resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the
prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The rajal saalih of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy
man," is assured of status because he is an ashraf, one who
claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a
[561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he
cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi
[793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure
of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is
sometimes referred to as rajal saalih kabir, "a great holy
man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared
to that of the rajal khair in conflict regulation is a function

554 of the Bedouin attitude, or lack of it, toward religion.
792 Since the time of Muhammad, the Bedouins have been considered
771 notoriously bad Muslims. Today, the Bedouins tend to joke
about their lack of zeal, and often point out that "holy
619 men" are not to be trusted.[2] This is seen in Sa'adi behavior
771 toward the Marabtin tribes who are their vassals. Theoretically,
792 the Marabtin who trace descent to the Prophet and might be
554 considered "sacred Tribes" should be respected by the "secular"
[778] Sa'adi tribes. But the Sa'adi of al-Qasr tend to deride the
554 Marabit. For instance, the "holy man" of al-Qasr, 'Amm Salih,
792 is a Marabit and well-known for his ability to successfully
627 mediate in conflict situations. But one informant, pointing
619 out this gift which 'Amm Salih possesses, said: "Amm Salih
is a good man, he is not a Marabit." But 'Amm Salih identifies
himself as a "rajal saalih" and a "Marabit"; he sees no role
conflict here.

771 The Bedouins also joke about the manner in which they
[522] practice the "pillars of Islam." Especially, they make light
of the fact that they are irregular in mosque attendance.
They say, with a slight smile, "we pray in the desert." A
[124] common way for an interview to end was by an informant rising
and saying: "Now I must wash for prayers." This happened

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[184] [2] Professor Abou-Zeid also notes this trait in his study of the Bedouin near Sallum, on the Libyan border (1966:248).

771 at any time of the day! As one Bedouin put it: "According to the idea of goodness (*salih*), we are not good. This is because we do not pray, we are part-timers in prayer."

554 A good *rajal saalih* is considered by the Bedouin to
792 have a special "blessing" (*baraka*), a concept somewhat
778 equivalent to that of *mana*. Someone such as 'Amm Salih
is thought to have *baraka*, and this type of power naturally
increases his influence and enhances his status. The following
[124] informant's account brings this out and shows something of
the magico-religious element at work in Bedouin power relations.

> [539] Hajj 'Ali does not believe in magic but he respects
> the "holy man" like anyone else. He owns a field
> from which are taken stones for building houses.
> One day he saw some men taking stones from this
> field. They were digging near a well so that the
> well would not be able to hold water after they had
> finished. Hajj 'Ali told the men to stop digging.
> One man answered: "I am cutting these stones for
> the Jaraira family (the family of 'Amm Salih), and
> only a few more and we will be finished." Hajj
> 'Ali replied: "For the Jaraira as for anyone else,
> we don't favor anyone, so stop the work now."
> Then Hajj 'Ali went home, never thinking that they
> would cause any trouble for him, and he was
> afraid of no harm. He slept and he had a dream.
> [787] In the dream he saw three of the Jaraira family,
> all of whom were dead and whom he had known in life.
> In the dream they only watched him and spoke no words.
> In the morning Hajj 'Ali went to the co-operative
> society's office and there he met 'Amm Salih. He
> said to him: "'Amm Salih, I want to tell you something."
> Then he related the whole story to him, and said:
> "I had no fear that you would do me any harm. But
> last night I saw your relatives in my dream; I had
> not even thought of them yesterday, so they are not
> [828] the cause of the dream. (The Bedouins believe that
> dreams reflect, and are connected with, what you saw
> or did during the day). So come and take all of
> the stones that you want, even if you are going to
> build a palace."

554 [571] [178] It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can [792] see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other areas of social action.

554 792 627 [695] [691] * [613] [829] Although it is conceivable that a rajal salih can be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and divorce. The rajal saalih may also be asked to serve as a witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins point out that the "holy man," like the rajal khair, is apt to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the 'aqila.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a rajal khair, a rajal saalih, not an 'aqila. He is better than an 'aqila--he is our brother. He is much better than the 'umda because he never changes the truth. The 'umda may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 792 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's charisma stems from the fact that he is a rajal salih, or the facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

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his role.

The people of al-Qasr identify 'Amm Salih as the "holy man" in the area. In my interviews, when I asked for the name of a party, besides the 'aqila, who solves the Bedouins' problems, the answer was either Hajj 'Ali, the rajal khair, or "the Jaraira family." (This refers to 'Amm Salih and his brother.) When I asked for the name of a man who could tell me "how the Bedouin should act," the only name mentioned was that of 'Amm Salih.

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'Amm Salih says that he solves many problems, not all of which deal with marriage and divorce. He claimed that he could settle conflicts over land and water. Just as a man may choose to go to the rajal khair, so also might he go to the rajal salih. Often enough, the selection of a "third party" will be determined by his propinquity. One 'aqila told me: "Salih Jaraira is a good man . . . If two men wish to accept Jaraira's decision, and if he lives near them, it is all right. If Jaraira cannot solve the problem, then they will return to the 'aqila. The 'aqila can solve it or he can call in other 'awaqil who can solve it."

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When I asked 'Amm Salih for case studies of problems which he has handled, he said that he would not reveal them because they are private affairs. He was willing, however, to describe the method in which he solves a problem.

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> 554 Suppose the donkey of A (a man present at the interview)
> 792 gets into the barley of B (another man present). This is
> 627 actually a serious matter since it could conceivably lead
> to a big fight between A's _'aiela_ and B's _'aiela._ First,
> I separate them and make each go to his home. Then I
> get A's three brothers (his father is dead), we take a
> _dhabiiha_ (lamb) and go to B's place and all eat together.
> [779] After the meal, we read the _Fatiha_ (opening _sura_ of the
> Quran) together to show that all is forgiven. After the
> _Fatiha_ has been read no trouble will start because this
> is done in the presence of the Jaraira.

[784] He explained that reading the _Fatiha_ in bad faith would bring
the same curse from God that a bad oath would bring. He also
*[613] claimed that only he and the _'aqila_ have the authority to
command men to read the _Fatiha_.

554 'Amm Salih says that he uses the _'awaiyid_ as a guide
792 in solving problems, and that it is necessary because
627 "quarrels spread like fire, it is like fire; they spread to
671 killing and war." He was the only person in al-Qasr who
554 tried to conceptualize the difference between the _'awaiyid_
792 _Awlad 'Ali_ and the _Sharii'a_. 'Amm Salih said that it is
627 wrong to lie, according to both the secular and the sacred
671 authority codes: "One who lies exceeds the word of God,
779 and God will punish him for this.
577 No one can know how this
[784] punishment will take place, only God will know this . . .
Sometimes a car goes off the road and people will say that it
is the punishment of God. But you never know because the
554 punishment of God comes in the after-life." I asked him:
792 "If this is so, why may the _rajal khair_ lie in trying to
627 settle quarrels?" He replied:
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554 792 627 [577]

> Lying is bad (haram), but this is "the lie of a peace-maker" (kadhib musaalih). For instance, if you have a quarrel with Yunis here, then I have words with both of you. I use different words with each of you. I use different words than those which you used in the quarrel--I use good words. This is to bring you two together again. Maybe I see that you are going to kill, or I hear bad words from you; I do not go and tell him what you said.

'Amm Salih said that it is his "duty" to mediate disputes, and that he never hesitates "because God will reward me later." He did not want the quarrels to grow into wars. He also bases his pleas for conciliation upon moral discoure, the method used by the other traditional authorities.[3] 'Amm Salih said that in trying to solve a problem, "I give priority to the elder. I go to the younger man and tell him that he should make peace with the elder because no one cares more for him than his antagonist, and that he really cares more for his antagonist than for any other." The rajal saalih mediates but does not arbitrate: he attempts to redress the balance of good relations but does not impose judgements.

554 792 627 *613 [779] This approach to conflict regulation is not that of the 'aqila in his formal role, but it is similar to what the rajal khair would use. The main procedural difference between the two informal roles (i.e. rajal khair and rajal saalih) is that, in each case, the rajal saalih reads the Fatiha with

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[114] [3] The approach which I used in my interviews with 'Amm Salih derives from the work of John Ladd as presented in his book, The Structure of a Moral Code, 1957.

554 the disputants. As noted, the *rajal saalih* shares this right
792 with the *'aqila*. The *rajal khair* does not have recourse
627 to this mechanism which amounts to divine approval of the
*613 binding decision of the "third party." 'Amm Salih in his
779 discussion of the Bedouin moral code corroborated this point: "Any *'aqila* can read the *Fatiha*. In this way, he and the two parties involved terminate the quarrel. This is a way to show that all agree on the settlement. Originally, only the *rajal saalih* did this, but now the *'awaaqil* do it in all cases." It would be interesting to know if in Cyrenaica both roles perform this function or if it belongs only to the role of *rajal salih*.

554 I cannot generalize concerning this role for the whole
184 of the Western Desert. Sayyid al-Sanusi and 'Amm Salih seem
627 to be special men. On the other hand, the *'aqila* and the
792 *rajal khair* are roles which we would expect to find all over
*613 the desert, and in Libya also. The *'aqila* is the focus of institutionalized traditional authority structure, and the *rajal khair* and "status group" represent the power structure.
554 This attempt to differentiate between authority and power
121 is essentially one which deals with the more general problem of leadership. Any study of the structure of authority must have reference to the notion of leadership. Role analysis seems the best method of dealing with leaders and their functions. Role analysis together with the conceptualization of institution as a process is an adequate way of dealing with the tendency

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
178 irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
792 rajal saalih was more influential during the days of the
571 Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy
[795] men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group" in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now. People in the old days were not educated as they are today:
554 the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In
178 the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask
792

554 you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to
178 him. God was pleased with them at that time."

[792] This notion of changing foci of authority and power
cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of
the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such
a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of
culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

634
554 The roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ were created and imposed
[648] upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early
[177] part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect
the Western frontier.

[619] Both of these roles are representative offices at the
primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have
an _'umda_ and a _shaikh_ who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in
close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of
command, these offices receive demands which may originate
either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr.
But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and
the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence
[571] resides with them. With reference to the two authority
[635] structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the _'umda_ and the

634 554 shaikh are administrators, not executives, in the service of
[571] the Governor and the "status group" of al-Qasr. Nevertheless,
[635] under the influence of the bureaucratic principle, as a new
structural principle in Bedouin society, these offices could
conceivably become seats of power.[4]

634 The 'umda and shaikh are described as "elective" offices
554 by the Bedouins but, in fact, they are appointive just like
666 the office of 'aqila. Theoretically, every man has a vote
571 but, actually, only the members of the "status group" vote. Paradoxically, perhaps, the Bedouins stress two major qualifications for these offices: the 'umda and the shaikh must be men "who know the needs of the Bedouin of the desert, and know how to talk to the Governor"; and, "they must be men who do nothing without the permission of the 'awaaqil (i.e. without the permission of the "status group" who elected the 'aqila in the first place).

634 The two offices are not equal in prestige and status
554 neither in the eyes of the Bedouins or of the Egyptians. The office of shaikh is the lesser office. It amounts to a clerical post, and the shaikh really functions as an assistant

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[635] [4] The Governor, who is of Bedouin origin, has already recognized this potential and has moved to eliminate the possibility of a more powerful 'umda representing a more powerful "status group." When I left the field, the Governor was in the process of drawing up new ground rules for electing the 'umda and the shaikh which would call for public elections on a "one man, one vote" basis.

634 to the 'umda. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
[178] It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[177] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held
offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that
elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair.
Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming
of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as
a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and
control of external relations.

634 The offices of 'umda and shaikh are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of 'aqila, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of 'aqila is functional at
[428] the bait level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates
for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the
offices of 'umda and shaikh should go to the "best men" in
the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
[571]

634 asymmetrical power relationship between commoners and "status
*613 group" which maintains political order. The Bedouins say of
666 the *'umda's* office, as they did of the *'aqila*, "if the son is
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[571] worthy of the office, then he should take his father's place."
Such a statement is usually qualified by noting that if the son does not possess the qualifications of the office, of course, he will not succeed. This is not simply a case of power politics, there is more to it. Behind the inheritance of the *'umda* and *shaikh* office is a logical concern and attempt to sustain a balance of political and social relations.

The "inheritance" of the *'aqila's* office is explained by showing that the candidates for the office are limited to the brothers and sons of the incumbent, the former *'aqila*. The offices of *'umda* and *shaikh,* in contrast, have a recruitment pool which includes, potentially, every man at the primary tribal level, the 'Aishaibat. The rule of succession, where the modern legal roles are concerned, is a mechanism for maintaining, what is considered by most Bedouins to be, the
634 legitimate distribution of power in al-Qasr. Once the roles
*613 of *'umda* and *shaikh* have been "captured" by a *bait*, for
666 political power resides at the tertiary level of the lineage
428 structure, any attempt to change the distribution or locus
578 of power will be culturally transformed into a threat to the
honor, not of the individual, but of his *bait* and *'aiela*. And this is a basis for conflict in Bedouin society. It is

634 no coincidence, then, that the present *'umda* and *shaikh* are
*613 the sons of the former *'umda* and *shaikh*. This reveals not
666
428 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
[578] that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
families.

It is important to note that since the time of their
[178] inception, these roles have not changed *'aiela* or even *bait*
in al-Qasr. When the former *'umda* from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
634 his eldest son petitioned to the *'awaaqil* of the 'Aishaibat
*613 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
666
428 The *'awaaqil* met and made their decision. One *'aqila* who
571 was present at the election said: "The office of *'umda* should
stay in the Lazumi family since the father was *'umda*. The
'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to
follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the
'awaaqil will find a new *bait*." Although the Bedouins speak
of "the *'awaaqil*" electing the *'umda*, it must be remembered
that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and
that the *'awaaqil* are only part of this group. The names of
[627] the men who elected the present *'umda* include less *'awaaqil*
and more *rajal khair*.

114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 *'umda* of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

114 until sometime after my departure from the field.[5] Nevertheless,
634 before I left the field I discussed the pending
666 election with some of my informants and members of the
114 634 "status group." The interviews reveal that the "status
666 group" still intends to dominate the area of power relations
124 829 with the government. As one informant said: "The present
*[613] *'umda* and the one before him were from Bait Bu Taram of
'Ailit Lazumi, and the next one will be from Bu Taram also."

634 The tenacity of traditional politics and the influence
571 of the "status group" are reflected in the affairs surrounding
666 the election of a new incumbent to the office of *'umda*. In
this situation, all Bedouins become concerned more with the
distribution of power than with the actual person who will
124 fill the authority role. One informant, an *'aqila*, gave
*613 indication that formal authorities support the "status group"
634 and the distribution of power which they represent and maintain.

571 666

> Mustafa, the brother of the *'umda*, takes his place while he is in Cairo attending Parliament. The *'umda* told me that he was going to ask the *'awaaqil* to sacrifice (i.e. slaughter a lamb) and write a paper making Mustafa the new *'umda*. (Here I told the informant that I had spoken with Mustafa about this, and he told me that he did not want to be the *'umda*).
> Even if Mustafa does not want to be the *'umda*, the *'awaaqil* will force him to accept . . . It should remain in the same family, it would be a shame if the office went to another family. Mustafa's father and brother were *'umdas* before him. If the office left the family,

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[5] Technically, the 'Aishaibat were without an *'umda* while I was in the field. However, he spent enough time in Matruh that he was able to carry on his duties until his successor could be named.

124 If the office left the family,

> *613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
> 634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
> 571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
> 666 'awaaqil will decide.

578 A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the shaikh is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of 'umda. The shaikh, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the 'umda. As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the shaikh's office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the shaikh remains in the shadow of the 'umda. He never substitutes for the 'umda, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the 'umda's family; when the 'umda is absent,

634 his brother sits in his place.

554 The present *shaikh* is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and
634 this is to offset the fact that the office of *'umda* is in
*613 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official
554 power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically,
the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two
lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential
in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present
[666] *shaikh's* father decided to retire due to old age, he requested
[571] that his son be allowed to take up his role. The *'awaaqil*
of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination" and
[556] the son was "elected." It is a fact that the *shaikh's* father
is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas
and that the *'umda's* father was the richest man of 'Ailit
Lazumi.

571 Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not
*613 the official authority structure but the political *status quo*
582 (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status
group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency
of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves.
*613 In Figure 10,[1] the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Umar
582 of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only
four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out
of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even
more impressive is the information obtained from considering

[1] [See p. 132--Analyst]

*613 582 all of the marriages in the history of 'Ailit Ma'fas (see Table 1).[1] From a total of 197 marriages, 33 were within the 'Aishaibat tribe. Of these 33 marriages with the other lineages of al-Qasr (see Figure 3 for the lineages of al-Qasr), 2 were with 'Ailit Abu Qarasa, and 2 with 'Ailit Zallat, 4 each were with 'Ailit Zagharat, 'Ailit Dawlat, and 'Ailit Shraif, but 17, or just over 50 per cent, were with 'Ailit Lazumi.

634 554 For the time being, the offices of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ seem to be modern symbols of the traditional power structure rather than loci of real power, though this does not preclude their becoming so in the future. But for the present, these roles are considered "not of the people, not of the desert, they belong to the government." 634 554 *613 Here is the way one _'aqila_ explained it:

> The _'umda_ is higher in the government but the _'aqila_ is the responsible one in the _'aiela_. The _shaikh_ has nothing to do with _'awaqil_, he only makes contact between them and the government . . . The _'umda_ gets the request from the government and asks the _'awaqil_ to handle the situation, but he does not tell them how 634 635 *613 554 to do it . . . The _'umda_ and _shaikh_ go to meetings with the Governor, then they tell the _'awaqil_ about the matters discussed. There is no direct contact between the Governor and the _'awaqil_ . . . The _'umda_ comes to the _'awaqil_ concerning general problems . . . If the Arabs need something from the government, they go to the _'umda_. They tell him to go and tell the Governor what they want . . . The _'umda_ represents them and he does good in this. God only knows if he is doing a good job. If he is not it will show in the next election.

634 554 From the standpoint of the political system of al-Qasr, we might conclude that the _'umda_ and _shaikh_ are roles

[1] [This should read Table 5. See p.115--Analyst]

634 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few
554 people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these
634 officers, and very few want any contact. On the other hand,
554 the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth
178 of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that
all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure,
and that the roles of 'umda and shaikh will expand. These
roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and
status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess
now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority
structure remains relatively intact. The 'umda and the
shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot
make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-
634 Qasr at this time. It is obvious, of course, that the 'umda
635 may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental
554 force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never
178 happened. The incumbent 'umda is still a Bedouin, and this
prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also,
the Governor is concerned with restricting the 'umda's
influence not increasing it.

634 I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a
613 struggle for power between traditional authority represented
178 by the 'aqila and modern legal authority represented by the
578 'umda. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when,
and if, the 'umda came to represent authority in a newly

634 *613 178 578 structured situation the traditional authority structure
would have disappeared from the scene.

But, there is a struggle for authority recognition
178 554 627 going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the
old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal
authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the
rajal khair. The rajal khair has a firm public basis for
establishing himself in an authoritative and representative
role. Traditionally, the rajal khair has faced inward and
outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr
prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at
the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him
[648] toward Marsa Matruh. In the present stage of culture change,
the rajal khair is in a position to combine his ascribed and
achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group,
the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of
prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power,
and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

The rajal khair, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a tertium quid status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the rajal khair also has a foot in the

178 modern camp. He has been able to enter into dialogue with
554 modernizing agents because his intra-tribal "status honor"
627 renders him public recognition at the institutional level,
and because his worldly style of life allows him to, in part,
identify with a modern reference group.

554 The *'aqila* ~~and~~ & the *'umda* might be seen as the two
178 extremes of a temporary and emerging authority structure for
634 the Bedouin of al-Qasr: the traditional authority bound to
*613 the old moral order, and the modern legal authority identified
wholly with an, as of yet, outside political and moral order.
[627] Ideally, it seems that only the *rajal khair*, who is neither an
'aqila nor an *'umda*, is in the structural and ideological
position to assume leadership and to guide the Bedouins during
this period of culture change.

CHAPTER VI

AUTHORITY AND CHANGE: A CASE STUDY

Theoretical Orientation

Eric Wolf (1956) was one of the first political analysts to perceive the importance of "the nation-oriented person," the nexus between the local community and the nation state, for a theory of culture change. He described the Mexican "broker" as a power-seeker:

> An individual who seeks power and recognition outside his local community must shape his behavior to fit these new expectations . . . he must learn to function in terms which characterize any complex stratified society in which individuals can improve their status through the judicious manipulation of social ties . . . Individuals who are able to operate both in terms of community-oriented and nation-oriented expectations then tend to be selected out for mobility. They become the economic and political "brokers" of nation-community relations, a function which carries its own rewards (pp. 1071-1072).

Wolf felt that the "brokers" provided the anthropologist with a key concept for the analysis of leadership in situations of change where local communities are being integrated into larger systems. The basic function of the "broker" is to relate community-oriented persons, "who wish to stabilize or improve their life chances, but who lack economic security

121 and political connections," with nation-oriented persons who operate at a national socio-cultural level of integration (1956:1075-1076).

Clifford Geertz (1960) has also examined the role of a "cultural broker" in Indonesia as an instance of "a vigorous, imaginative regional leadership, able to play a cultural middleman role between peasant and metropolitan life, and so create an effective juncture between traditional cultural patterns and modern ones" (1960:229). In the case of the Mexican "broker" described by Wolf, the major means of consolidating and obtaining power both at the regional and the national levels were through political channels. In the case of the Indonesian "broker," both religious and political channels are the means by which the local Muslim teacher, or kijaji, has obtained power: traditionally, he was a specialist in communication of Islam to the countryside, and today he has taken on the role of local party leader (Geertz 1960:230).

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In al-Qasr, the rajal khair seems to be the Bedouin counterpart of the Mexican and Indonesian "broker." With a firm economic base in the local community, and with his ability to adopt new patterns of public behavior, i.e., "he knows how to speak to the Governor and public officials," the role of rajal khair provides the means for one to move upwards through political channels (Wolf 1956:1071). Within the context of a newly emerging authority system based upon the

121 structural principle of bureaucracy, the rajal khair lacking
554 legitimacy in the traditional lineage-based system may en-
627 visage an authoritative role and increased chances to "improve
557 his status through the judicious manipulation of social ties."

121 Leadership studies in the context of cultural change,
554 such as those which deal with "broker" types, have important
178 implications for a more general and fundamental theoretical problem: the role of the individual in culture and society. Radin, as early as 1927, Redfield (1960), Geertz (1960), Fallers (1964), and Mead (1964) have spoken of "primitive philosophers," "the hinge group," "the cultural brokers," "the new men," and "the evolutionary clusters." All terms have direct reference to role types constructed from the observation of individuals possessed of the ability and creativity to offer new ideas and methods of dealing with the pressing cultural problems of their times. The unitary goal of all these researchers was to understand culture change through a focus on the way in which the individual manipulates his cultural resources.

121 I would maintain that, especially in political analysis, the approach and focus of the researcher is directly related to his ontologic position concerning the concepts of culture and human nature. That is to say, whether or not the researcher believes that "man has no choice in life, that culture determines his behavior," then he will or will not find it relevant

to his problem to investigate something other than the structural categories of society; something such as ideas and other creative acts of leaders. It has been noted that leadership studies are lacking in the analyses of tribal societies. I find it no mere coincidence that this is also the area of research in which kinship, for the sake of kinship, has been studied and restudied. This is also the area of research in which, as Easton (1959) rightly notes, kinship analysis is erroneously identified with political analysis; in which social structures are elevated to the ontological level.

David Bidney (1953) has articulated the basic issue of the debate between "the superorganic evolutionists" and the "humanistic school," the former defending a theory of cultural determinism and the latter insisting upon freedom of thought and action for man. Since 1953, data have tended to support Bidney's claim in favor of cultural freedom, that culture may be investigated at different levels, and that, in fact, freedom of scientific thought is a prerequisite of any science of culture (1953:179). Other scientists concerned with both particular cultural problems and a general scientific theory of culture are increasingly in agreement with this position (see Geertz 1962 and 1964; Cohen 1962; Mackenzie 1967).

Leadership studies, it would seem, and the creative cultural dynamics of the "Third World" (Worsley 1964) certainly

121 bolster empirically Bidney's contention that

> The traditional ... societies have suddenly awakened to a consciousness of their underdeveloped condition and have demanded and been granted, often reluctantly, the rights to control their own cultural destinies. The new watchword is Freedom--freedom from alien control and freedom to rule themselves and to participate more fully in the cultural achievements of mankind (1967).

The Era of the New Nations, more than any other period in history, supports the methodological imperative of "a culture" and "Culture" toward which the anthropologist must orient himself if he is ever to arrive at a valid conception of man, society, and cultural evolution. In the New Nations, cultural innovations have most certainly been introduced by individuals which "deliberately promote and encourage cultural progress" (Bidney 1967:xxvii).

I have suggested in another place (Obermeyer 1967:6) that a Weberian model of society, which takes cognizance of both objective and subjective reality, approaches the methodological needs which Bidney insists upon for a scientific theory of culture. Furthermore, Weber's model is directly related to his view of political action "which seeks to encompass both the very great limitations that every social situation imposes upon the individual and the great opportunities for action that are inherent in the instability of social

121 structures (Bendix 1962:261).[1] Structural analysis, to be sure, is essential but it is also important that we have an understanding of the process by which individuals strive for and achieve certain roles, and the various ways in which they "manipulate, and even create, elements of the culture that evaluates them" (Fallers 1963:163). The very antithesis of this approach is represented in a leadership study by Marshall Sahlins (1963) who, in view of his cultural deterministic ontologic position and his stress on purely structural features, comes to a predictable conclusion: "Perhaps we have been too long accustomed to perceive rank and rule from the standpoint of the individuals involved, rather than from the perspective of the total society" (p. 300). It seems hardly realistic to accuse anthropologists of ignoring social structure in pursuit of the creativity of the individual.

Both Wolf (1966) and Geertz (1960) have acknowledged the primary place of Robert Redfield's work in their conceptualization of culture change. Redfield (1953;1960; 1962) explained culture change by reference to a process involving the divergence and convergence of two ideal types, "the great

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[1] In connection with a considered synthesis of the theories of David Bidney and Max Weber, I have also suggested that the approach of the symbolic interactionist school of sociology may be useful. This school emphasizes that the individual reacts to social constraints not by *conforming* but by *confirming* the social structure. Interestingly enough, there are indications that Durkheim's thought was developing in the direction of symbolic interaction (see Stone and Farberman 1967).

121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition" refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition" to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia" which further refines the scope and types of leadership. Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . . (who) belongs to two worlds, not one, he is a marginal man." He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit
121 the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does
554 not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition
627 of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to
177 admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be
[571] considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

121 advanced" and is assumed "to have authority"; that the "great tradition" is represented in the writings and public actions of the political elite; and that "social prestige is dependent on its adoption (or at least on its profession)" (1962:69). Implicit in von Grunebaum's analysis, and also contained in Redfield's model, is the employment of reference group theory to understand human behavior in society. In
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181 the al-Qasr case, I have tried to show that "status group" members repudiate many of the traditional ways of life while at the same time identifying more and more with the Egyptian "status group," the bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh. The implication here is that the Bedouin "status group" is in the process of taking on the values of a new reference group to which they do not yet belong but to which they seek admission.

The bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh, like those of Cairo and Alexandria described by von Grunebaum, represent the "great tradition." The "status group" of al-Qasr while aspiring to the "great tradition" emulate certain of the behavioral traits and expectations of the elite group. For
[771] instance, they are conspicuous for their regular attendance at Friday mosque services in Matruh. Merton, who has developed reference group theory, points out that "men frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their behavior and evaluations" (1957:234). This type of behavior, or "anticipatory socialization," is the process of taking on

121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other
reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type of status consciously desired, the local authority and social structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of
mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty, obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, protection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regulation, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962:
121 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the _'aqila_ fulfills
554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
* [613] with conflict regulation. The _rajal khair_ role, as I have
[627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."
121 The _rajal khair_ dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new
power structure based on national and political consciousness. Traditionally, _rajal khair_-dominance was not by force but through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

121 fully organized government behind the role, the element of
554 force may enter into the *rajal khair* style of domination.
627 Thus far, the *'umda* and the *shaikh* roles have functioned
[634] through the traditional roles of the *'aqila* and the *rajal*
*[613] *khair*, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern
[178] may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge. This is what I wish to explore.

121 The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense
571 of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves
554 responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people"
or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would
[177] occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

121 554 571 156 My approach here is to state the problem of authority and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the outside business world. All this he has done while remaining a "good Bedouin."

124 554 156 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the Bedouin most intimately?" [571] On the basis of the data collected in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj 'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with him corroborated his central place in the authority structure. [126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained valuable insights from this data.

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[2] The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

156 I know that Hajj 'Ali consciously and actively seeks
554 to be a leader among the Bedouin, that he seeks a place in
121 the new governmental structure in Marsa Matruh, and hence that he desires power, however benevolent his intentions may be. In what follows, I hope to bring this out by presenting Hajj 'Ali as himself and as a "cultural broker."

When I say that Hajj 'Ali desires power I mean nothing derogatory. Power-seeking is a kind of social phenomenon which characterizes man-in-society around the world; the quest occurs in primitive and modern groups, and university structures alike (Moore 1958:1-30). Hajj 'Ali's desire for power, and also authority, has not wrought change in the whole structure of the al-Qasr social system. As we shall see, Hajj 'Ali is discontent with the present structure of al-Qasr and feels that the Bedouins must accept change. His discontent is related to the changing conditions in and about al-Qasr; the chance to express it or re-channel it, at this time, derives from his ascribed place in the al-Qasr system. Whether his desire for power is a result or a cause of his discontent I cannot tell. Only a personality study in depth could answer this question.

In terms of this study, one way to look at Hajj 'Ali's case is to view it as his attempt to convert power in the internal system into authority in the external system. But in this context "external" refers to the national level rather

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of _'aqila_, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.
[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful _bait_." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of _'umda_: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the _'izba_ sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.

159 Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
156 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
873 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
[212] ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
son study law at the university or enter the military academy
"and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying:
"Either way I will be employed by the government and will not
be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did
not argue with this: he said that his son should study what
he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 872 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
562 that girls should receive an education.

156 Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
159 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
554 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
472 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both tra-
ditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 159 one important way from other members of the "status group"
554 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
443 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
423 472 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
*[613]

156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
554 443 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
423 472 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
*[613] and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
[452] owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
156 Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
159 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
554 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
443 439 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
472 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 [316] building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[312] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[427] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[342] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[595] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
with four wives.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 554 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a *rajal khair* *par excellence*.
627 For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some
124 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an *'aqila* pays no attention to anything save getting food for his children. The *rajal khair* has money and men (a reference to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle), and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 159 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
554 world by giving him the honorific title of "*shaikh*," and
439 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
472 245 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 554 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
[627] most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[114] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by the *'aqila* or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

156 159 554 675 He was sometimes asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four), Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila was present to sign and validate this document.

156 159 554 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr. But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh 635 634 156 159 554 124 [648] was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this to "control the Bedouin" and to "get the men out of the tents." He explained in his own way what he considered to be the structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> *[613] Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

124 635 156 159 554 *[613] The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that

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635 Hajj 'Ali "became an *'aqila* by his way of life." Of course,
156 159 the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an *'aqila* at all. Although
554 I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority
*[613] structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief
156 agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely
159 with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali
554 was the *'aqila* of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore,
*613 and most impressive of all, one *'aqila* in 'Ailit Dawlat and
his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the *'aqila* of
Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of
Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest
on the part of the Dawlat *'aqila*. There is good reason for
these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key
traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group.
It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must
have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative
capacity. The *'aqila* who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an
'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived
outside the *'izba* sector and hence mistook an important
rajal khair for an *'aqila*. The Governor understandably
mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an *'aqila*.

635 There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as
648 the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the
[554] [156] Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council
[159] (*Majlis al-Muhafza*) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need
[634] not be an *'umda* or a *shaikh*, although they may be. The
oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an
'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels
understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an *'aqila*. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the *Majlis al-Muhafza*: "I
am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the
'umda or *shaikh*, I choose the *'aqila*. Every man on the
council is an *'aqila*, and the number is determined by the
population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
[619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes.
This is because they are more numerous, and they are near
Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The
'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes
by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
[114] sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

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[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
648 [871] 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[537] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if
they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling,
their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact
the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough
space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this
condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that
a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident,
but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded
in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity
as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and
most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
554 177 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
635

121 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to
156 phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives
159 him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the
554 role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the
635 council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-
177 Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation
[648] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his
159 status and political leadership and the fact that he has
554 assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr
635 during this period of change. Once each year the Governor
177 makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested
159 that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and
554 al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he
635 would inquire into the matter.
177

156 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
159 Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of
554 his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was
635 the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech
177 was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials
537 alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the
Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this
short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again
159 played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing
554 but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali
635 spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside,
537 speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin,
had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The
[634] 'umda and shaikh had accompanied the Governor on his tour

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
635 with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj
537 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
[634] his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
[122] reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
[522] 'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend
124 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
829 all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
[571] identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 159 554 177 178 124 829 [571] draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact. When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 159 554 571 574 796 123 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan. I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised to find present no members of the "status group" but only their exact opposites. [556] [735] On the occasion of this feast it is the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts, and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554
571 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
574 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
796 one for a modern leader.
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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554
829 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
582 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the
Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual
male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the
Middle East in general.

*613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
571
682

* 613 602 571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole *'aiela* is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the
156 159 554 829 682 Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> The world changes. Before it was only the *'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali* and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the
> [778] killer asks for the *nazaala*, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's *bait* for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
829 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
682 [182] in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
*613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his _'aiela_ and _bait_. Although the _'aiela_ members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpremeditated
killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the _'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali_ argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the _'awaiyid_, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

> 156 Another thing which I do not like about our old ways
> 159 is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if
> 554 I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse
> 695 me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If
> 829 you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some
> of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

156 Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis
159 of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to
554 do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the
829 mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of support-
178 ing law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his *rajal khair* role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."

If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
829 the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the allocation of political values and distribution of power in terms of traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the *'umda* or the *shaikh* "who knew how to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 177 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.

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> There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the _'awaiyid_ nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next _'umda_) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the _'awaiyid_ either.

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This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one _'aqila_ voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

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> If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their _'umda_ because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

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Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the _'awaiyid_ as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the _'umda_, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.
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178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing
needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories
> as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert,
> here in particular, we need olive presses. This
> will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> plants them and the transportation is such that we
> [489] cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest
> change in the desert results from the presence of
> 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools,
> now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old
> boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent
> of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . .
> Another cause of change is due to the fact that
> everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the
> radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> (_tatawwar_) is taking place, and the people here are
> [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know
> reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a
> letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I,
> and I know better than my father did, who lived in
> al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
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178 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
177 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the *'awaiyid* at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554 178 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
177 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> 554 178 177 As I said before, the people here are realistic about
> change. There are now only about three or four of
> 829 us who send our sons to study at the university, the
> 871 rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys
> will amount to. The other day, one of our educated
> boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr.
> All of the women are now hoping to see their sons
> become as successful as this. This is exactly like
> the first time we cultivated olives in the desert:
> the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive.
> After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted
> that they did not cultivate it. Time is
> changing, and the people are changing. Education is
> the basis of everything in any nation. Now the
> agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to
> do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar
> regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr
was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj
'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 668 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
[124] was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the *Majlis al-Muhafza*." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the *'umda* and the *'umda*'s probable successor

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imply that he feels they are not really equipped to represent their traditional constituency. Hajj 'Ali, as everyone in al-Qasr knows, is traditional and modern at the same time. It seems that he has only alienated those whom he threatens and those who are a threat to him, i.e., the _'umda_ and the _shaikh_.

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He may not be educated, but he knows the _'awaiyid_; at the same time he stresses the fact that his son will have the education which he never had. Empathy is a primary trait of the charismatic leader and the "cultural broker" who seeks to manipulate social relations. No one could explain to me why Hajj 'Ali did not have an education while his brother (who is only three years younger) and other members of the "status group" do read and write. He perhaps only became concerned in the period of change. Hajj 'Ali, the "cultural broker," is more politically conscious and creative within the context of two worlds in change.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

121 In this study I have attempted to understand and
128 to describe the structure and process of Bedouin society
105 in al-Qasr by utilizing the data of politics. The primary assumption of the study has been that political analysis must proceed along lines which give recognition to, and focus upon, the centrality of the concept and structure of authority and the way in which it contributes to an orderly social process. This study has dealt with the structure and function of authority and, as much as possible, its theory and practice in both contemporary and historical Bedouin society. Authority in al-Qasr is intimately tied up with the system of rights and obligations obtaining between individuals which is expressed through a structure of social roles. At another level of social organization, the rights and obligations inherent in a structure of authority inform a segmentary lineage system. Part of this study aims to understand and to underline the organizational principles from which the Bedouins of al-Qasr derive their meaning of authority, social roles, and social interaction.

In the first part of the study some of the general

128 historical aspects and specific economic facts of the Bedouin
105 social process were made explicit. The intention of the first
121 two chapters was to indicate the scope and dynamics of culture change now occurring through the growth of a market economy and the expansion of political awareness in al-Qasr. The economic transformation of Bedouin society and the move towards political integration into the larger Egyptian society are, more and more, reflected in a shift from dependence upon communal-based social ties to associative relationships based upon private landholding, individual competitive participation in the national economy and profit-keeping, and new rights and obligations brought on by the activities of national and provincial level politics.

The first part of this study also sought to understand the meaning of social change in al-Qasr. Due to historical experiences and ecological factors, social structure and social change carry different meanings for the Bedouin recipients and the Egyptian agents of change. In some cases, it was seen, it is even dubious that Egyptian officials are responding to the felt needs of the Bedouins. As background to a later discussion of authority and change, we tried to understand what the felt needs of the Bedouins are at this time. One aspect of this problem was to define the traditional units of Bedouin society as opposed to the modern administrative units, and to consider change in light of this contrast. My

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concern with the nature of al-Qasr's past not only helps us to understand the Bedouin present but should also help us to conceive of the Bedouin future. What data I was able to collect concerning the historical development of the Bedouin authority structure and its place in the economic transformation of Bedouin society relate to the later discussion of the ascribed nature of leadership roles and the probability that, in the future, access to political roles will become a matter of individual achievement and a heightened awareness of things political. In connection with this we saw that the Governor of Marsa Matruh through the institution of new bureaucratic structures, such as the Governor's Council and new electoral guidelines, is fostering political change in this direction.

Although the largest part of this study dealt with the political aspect of traditional roles and structures, the contention was that traditional complexes are increasingly unable to deal with the cultural problems of the day. This applies to economic as well as political structures, as the first part of this study is intended to show. But among the New Nations and, in particular, whenever we are dealing with tribal and peasant communities, "the most striking changes have been the decline in the authority of the elders in terms of both community and family organization . . . (because) the life experience of the elders . . . is at best only partially relevant to the current needs) (Halpern 1967:123).

128 105 121 Authority represents and maintains a legitimate political order and an allotment of power. Without a system of authoritative norms, conflict could not be restrained and no social system could survive (Parsons 1960:183). As the concept of authority and its meaning undergo change so also do the appropriate structures and the power distribution between persons and groups change. The structure and dynamics of authority in al-Qasr were investigated through an analysis of the categories and interrelations of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system. This analysis was based primarily upon a definition of the organizational concepts and principles of Bedouin society such as unilineal rule of descent, residence, cognation, and contractual agreement and alliance.

While knowledge of these structural principles is fundamental to an understanding of Bedouin society, it was noted that a strict reliance on them would tend to limit one's understanding of politics in al-Qasr since they in fact conceal the nature of power and the functioning of semi-institutionalized roles. Nevertheless, these structural principles are informed by a set of key beliefs and values which are inculcated during the socialization process, and in a complementary way all of these concepts lend support to a corporate structure of authority. This corporate structure of authority which was discussed in terms of the concept and leadership role, or office, of _'aqila_ was claimed to be the

128 basis of social control in traditional Bedouin society. To 105 a large extent the corporate authority structure in al-Qasr 121 is still intact but is undergoing change at this time. Change of the rule of consensus and the way in which it has reference to traditional principles of organization for the regulation of politics is the subject of the final two chapters in this study.

The unilinear principle and its corollary, the corporate group, were defined as the basis for the structural division of Bedouin society into groups. Within the context of a traditional struggle for ecological advantage and a growing participation in the modern political process of interest group conflict, the lineage groups of al-Qasr were considered as political, or authority, groups. The membership and boundaries of these political groups parallel those of structures formed through an alliance of tertiary segments of the lineage system which is itself sanctioned by the rules of unilineality, marriage, residence, and adherence to a legal and moral code known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil ("the bonds of the wise men"). The central political notion of Bedouin society, and the one which converts a kinship group into a political group, is that of 'aqila. The 'aqila principle, which is manifest in the role of the corporate leader, refers to both the idea of collective responsibility and to a politically instituted office. The concept of 'aqila is essential to an understanding

128 of internal social control and political group interaction
105 in Bedouin society. In order to grasp the meaning of _'aqila_
121 in Bedouin society it was necessary to explore something of
the history of the concept.

Max Weber (1947:143-145) has drawn attention to the political significance of collective responsibility and the way in which it is related to the concepts of corporate leadership and self-help (blood-revenge) in traditional societies such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr represent: "All are held responsible for the action of any one . . . (and) the action of certain members, the 'representatives,' may be binding upon the others." Blood-revenge, or the law of self-help, is an instance of regulation through convention, and this practice, Weber claims, leads to "solidarity." Weber further claims, and is supported by the evidence which I present here concerning the concept of _'aqila_, that we are likely to find a representative office especially where money must be collected and administered in the interest of the group (p. 145).

In modern political anthropology, Evans-Pritchard was the first to clearly equate kinship relations with political relations: he conceived of kinship groups as political conflict groups within the framework of a balanced opposition between structurally and ideologically similar units (1940:190). I have obviously found this conceptualization of tribal

128 politics very helpful, but the major emphasis of my study was
121 the authority structure rather than the kinship structure.
105 Authority was considered in terms of two aspects, both of which tell us something about kinship structure: in one way authority is the property of relations which obtain between persons and roles of a group, and it acts to define the structural boundaries and to secure the structural continuity of the group; in another way, authority is the property of a tertiary group expressed at the secondary level of the lineage structure and represented by the office of *'aqila*. In this last sense, authority defines the group vis a vis other groups and acts to promote political order in society. Authority, in view of these two aspects, was described as operating at the various levels of the lineage structure, i.e., the familial, the internal and external levels. I sought to clarify the discussion by defining concepts and roles which characterize authority and political action at these various levels. One role, the *shaib,* which functions solely at the familial level of the authority structure was described; the fully institutionalized authority role of *'aqila* was analyzed as were a number of only partly institutionalized roles, or power roles. The most important of these power roles was seen to be that of the *rajal khair*. The institutionalized roles, and this includes the *shaib* or head of the household, were described as functioning

128 121 105 according to public expectational patterns while the non-institutionalized roles, being by definition less impinged upon by structural norms, could function outside these patterns. This distinction between types of roles was seen to be the basis of the rajal khair's ability to manipulate persons and events in a play for power. These three levels of authority were factored out from one another solely for analytical reasons. In reality, the one shades into the other: the authority of the shaib at times overlaps with that of the 'aqila, and the power of the rajal khair and rajal salih at time impinge upon, and detract from, the rightful influence of both the shaib and the 'aqila. Role analysis, as it is used in this study, I consider one of the most important methods available for an investigation of a political problem.

Through political role analysis it was shown that the role of 'aqila is the most important for an understanding of the structure and functioning of Bedouin society. Political, or authority, groups are defined in terms of the presence or absence of this role; hence the whole political structure proceeds from this concept. The legitimacy of the 'aqila, and therefore the legitimacy of the political order which obtains, stems from an explicit legal agreement among members of the tertiary and secondary groups known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil. These bonds are a contract between the 'aqila and the other members of the corporate group, a mutual pact which

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sets forth the rights and duties of the political office and the corporate members. The duplication and reciprocal honoring of this contract by tertiary groups related, in fact or fiction, according to the unilineal principle gives rise to a political alliance of groups who are viewed as "one corporate body" at the secondary level of the lineage structure by all outsiders. Structural relations between secondary groups in Bedouin society are chartered in accordance with the several principles of social organization, such as marriage, contract, residence, and also according to the process of conflict control.

Actual conflict in al-Qasr usually takes place between secondary groups even though it is sometimes expressed as conflict between primary or tribal groupings. Coalition for the attainment of political goals and the process of conflict control at the supra-tertiary levels of the lineage hierarchy depend upon the recognition of mutual usefulness and a common means for settling disputes and re-establishing social harmony. The problem-solving device which assures the conditions of an orderly social process is the system of Bedouin customary law, a set of legal and moral norms (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20), known as the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of the sons of 'Ali").

The customary law of the Bedouins of al-Qasr was described and a number of case studies occurring at the various levels of the lineage and authority structure was

128 presented. According to the moral and legal norms of the
121 Bedouins, conflict control is effected formally and informally.
105 A primary value of Bedouin society instructs all men to mediate conflict whenever possible lest quarrels spread to involve more people and a wider loss of rights. Redress of wrongs takes place through the intervention of, what were defined as, either a mediator at the informal level or an arbiter at the formal level of conflict control. If neither of these peace-making mechanisms is invoked, or should both fail in their attempt to restore social harmony, then the law of self-help, or blood-revenge, may operate. This method of controlling conflict is, according to most of the Bedouins, to be avoided at all costs.

The notion of the "third party" to conflict was developed in this study. It was pointed out that in the case of the triadic relationship in conflict control it is the rajal khair or the rajal salih who usually becomes involved, and that this role has the right to mediate but not to judge. This is in fact the distinction which the Bedouins themselves make between the roles of arbiter-'aqila and mediator-"third party." This differentiation between political roles is equivalent to a distinction between formal authority and informal power.

In order to further explicate the political role-set in Bedouin society a classificatory distinction was made

128 121 105 between traditional roles and modern legal roles; the former category included the _'aqila_, the _rajal khair_, and _rajal salih_, while the latter was made up of the _'umda_ and the _shaikh._ The roles of _'umda_ and _shaikh_ have been historically imposed upon the Bedouins from without and thus were not viewed as indigenous to the al-Qasr political system. The role classification used here, which is borrowed from the work of Max Weber, is purely analytical for in reality both of the modern legal roles figure importantly in any complete treatment of Bedouin authority and its structure. All of the role-players who make up the internal and external authority structures of al-Qasr were considered to be members of a "status group" who possess high "status-honor" which is based upon family and wealth and, to a lesser extent in modern times, age.

Finally, the concept of the "cultural broker" was introduced in an attempt to delineate the nature of political change in al-Qasr. In the last chapter of the study the case study of Hajj 'Ali was used to develop the idea of "cultural broker." In some ways, the first five chapters of this study serve as a background to the discussion of Hajj 'Ali as a "cultural broker." The dynamics of the historical, economic, and political situations, the changing meanings of kinship concepts and other structures, and the growing tendency to trust secular as opposed to sacred and traditional authority, all of these factors converge to attach importance and immediacy

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to an understanding of the role of "cultural broker" in the present and future of al-Qasr.

Hajj 'Ali provided us with an example of the secularization of traditional society. This process has been described as one "whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action (Almond and Powell 1966:24). A number of the critical attitudes held by Hajj 'Ali had to do with the Bedouin conception of marriage, law, and authority; in each case it was seen that he questioned the legitimacy of Bedouin tradition and, eventually, would like to steer the Bedouins of al-Qasr away from this world view into the larger Egyptian political community. Besides Hajj 'Ali's discontent with the _'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali_ and other Bedouin customs, it was suggested that he desired change in al-Qasr's traditional structures and ideas because of his own design upon higher status and authority in the Egyptian bureaucracy of Marsa Matruh, a reference group with which all members of the "status group" identify.

What is happening in the case of Hajj 'Ali and al-Qasr is a sign of the times as far as the New Nations are concerned. The growing need for centralization in order to compete on the international market transforms the traditional structures of the New Nations whenever and wherever it must. But this process is not just a matter of induced change; it is not a one-sided affair. Inherently, any social structure, 128 including "traditional" ones, is a dynamic mechanism for the 121 solution of cultural problems. Related to this is the fact 105 that the individuals who manipulate these mechanisms are creative and responsive agents of change themselves. The need for central coordination and cooperation with national governments sets the stage and provides the stimuli for new cultural responses and devices which result in novel and creative internal reorganization and reintegration around new cultural patterns (Moore 1958:1-28). The case of Hajj 'Ali illustrates the beginnings of such a reorganizational process in al-Qasr.

The main objective striven for in this study deals with only one aspect of the problem of change in the New Nations, but it is an important aspect: all politically-oriented researchers should try to explain the legitimacy and the dynamics of authority and structure in society. In my particular case, discussion centered on lineage theory and its corollary the corporate group, and authority was treated in terms of political role analysis and local leadership patterns. Change was viewed almost wholly as an endogenous process, but the importance of exogenous forces was not played down. It was claimed that an essential part of the "cultural broker" role was to legitimate the authority of the nation-state in order to effect change and legitimate his own authority role.

Conflict control was seen as a life-long process. As

128 culture change takes place, new bases for conflict arise and
121 new devices for control come into being. Politics was viewed
105 as the process of problem solution by the group, from the
family level to the total societal level. Politics involves the struggle for, and the legitimation of, power, and functions to bring about some kind of an ideological adjustment between political groups: "Systems of beliefs are made in the image of an idealized home, and there one loves and obeys one's parents, loves the remaining members of the family, and treats all other persons as outsiders" (De Grazia 1948:49).

A struggle for power characterizes Bedouin society as it does any other human society. Equality in al-Qasr, as in all human societies, is an ideal and only an ideal. Inequality, in reality, persists and structures the patterns and issues of conflict in Bedouin society. There are possessors and non-possessors of property and wealth: there are possessors and non-possessors of "status honor." Consequently, there are possessors and non-possessors of authority, for authority derives from property and "status honor." But in al-Qasr, and in every human society, property is not the singular prerequisite of "status honor" and authority. (In this sense, one fundamental aspect of Marxian theory is totally incorrect.) We saw in the cases of 'Amm Salih the "holy man" and the prospective _'aqila_ of Bait Braik, that authority is determined in terms of a complex of structural and ideational

128 121 105 factors. Nevertheless, in al-Qasr inequality does exist and is related to an unequal distribution of authority between individuals and groups, and the important point is that this is the basis of conflict. As culture change proceeds along with al-Qasr's need to be integrated into the national society, the threat to the traditional distribution of power and authority will foster new patterns of conflict; new means for dealing with conflict will also have to be found. Creative individuals such as Hajj 'Ali will have a hand in the new processes of conflict control and cultural invention. Traditional patterns of conflict and political structures provide meaning and a semblance of stability to al-Qasr society, but when conformity to political values becomes relative to motives of expediency, when politics become secularized, then instability and change in structures follow. And traditional concepts must be redefined and reevaluated to cope with the new conditions.

121 In the case of the New Nations, political change seems to be reflected in a shift from traditional organizational principles to a modern bureaucratic principle which entails a higher differentiation in the political structure. And, as Fortes (1953:24) has noted, unilinear descent groups, such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr, tend to break down when specialization sets in.

The notion of viewing social change in terms of a shift to the bureaucratic structural principle is not, of

121 course, original with this study. It was the basis of Weber's (1947) treatment of social change and was one of the conceptual points of his secularizational process. Firth (1961:50) spoke of this bureaucratization process as involving the recognition of new problems and the need for "extra-organizational" roles and decision-makers to deal with them. Gluckman (1963:78) noted that in the future social ties and cleavages, fission and fusion processes, will be studied in the context of modern bureaucratic politics.

The problem of social and political transformation is what I consider the most important province of the modern anthropologist. It is a problem which demands investigation at the local community level, in both the real and the ideal, the scientific and the native, sense of the term. Such investigations should aim at answering the questions so well stated by May Edel in the case of Uganda (1965:358):

> To what degree are the boundaries of the moral community--the group within which common moral fellowship is acknowledged--changing, becoming wider and more inclusive . . . To what extent are (new factions) a tribal legacy deeply rooted in the divergent loyalties and institutions of the past, and destined to be a genuine source of long-range difficulty in Africa?

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'aqila--head of the corporate group
'asaba--paternal relations or agnates
'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali--the recognized legal codes of the Western Desert
bait--the minimal corporate group, which includes three to five generations of members
bait al-rabi'a--spring house (tent)
bait al-saif--summer house (tent)
barawwa--the act of banishing from the group
daar--the one-room house
dhabiiha--a standard or minimal sanction in Bedouin law
diiya--blood money
duwaar--the multi-roomed house
faqiih--holy man
hulwaan--see mahr
khal--mother's brother
ma'azuum--the marriage contract
mahr--brideprice agreement
naja--the basic residential unit composed of a father, his wife (wives), his unmarried children and married sons and their families

azaala--the act of taking refuge or sanctuary
qasr--fort or castle
qawaal al-khair--"the speaker of the good", a third person who serves as arbitrator in a conflict
ajal khair--"good man", a third person acting as arbitrator in a conflict
rajal soalih--a third person arbitrator in a dispute, usually a holy man
awaabit--contracts
haib--elder, literally the white-haired one; head of the extended family
harii'a--Islamic law
'umda--village chief; representative to the government of tribal sections within districts
washuun--wife (wives)
yamiin--an oath

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[For information on the effects on the Bedouin economy of various branches of the United Nations (e.g., the Food and Agricultural Organization), see categories 747 and 433.]

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[For information on the Bedouin 'ailit lineage groups, the biyut (sing. bait), corporate land holding groups (tertiary groups), the 'awaaqil, political authority groups composed of tertiary groups, and the 'aqila or head of the corporate group, see category 116, pp. iii-v, 4, 28, 30, 33-35, 38-39, 58-61, 64-66, 71-95, 104-108, 114-118, 121, 123-125, 128, 131-133, 137-141, 145-192, 197-203, 206-212, 215-229, 231-236, 241-242, 248-264, 268-272, 276-285, 294-295, 298-304, and 310-312.]

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[For additional information on the role of the 'aqila as mediator or arbitrator in disputes, see also categories 627 and 628.]

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[For additional information on the 'aqila, the head of the corporate group, see also category 613.]

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[For general information on the payment of blood-money in retribution for homicide, see category 682.]

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[For generalized information on the rajal khair and rajal soalih -- third party arbitrators in a dispute -- see categories 627 and 628.]